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2 July 1980

# USSR REPORT

## USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 4, April 1980

Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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## LENIN'S CONCEPTION OF FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PRESENT DAY

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pp 3-16

[Article by A. Yu. Mel'vil']

[Text] "The course of history and the extremely profound metamorphosis that are radically changing the appearance of today's world are providing us with more and more new evidence of the accuracy and indestructable force of Lenin's ideas."

From the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 110th anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's birth

All of the outstanding revolutionary events of the 20th century are indissolubly connected with the name of V. I. Lenin--the leader of the world proletariat, the founder of the Soviet State and the greatest scholar, theoretician and practitioner of the revolutionary renovation of the world. V. I. Lenin made an invaluable contribution to the creative and comprehensive development of Marxism and successfully used the method of dialectical materialism, worked out by the founders of this doctrine, to analyze new historical conditions. "Leninism is the Marxism of the present era, the only integral and constantly evolving doctrine of the international working class,"<sup>1</sup> the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 110th Anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's Birth" states.

Lenin's teachings about imperialism, about socialist revolution and proletarian dictatorship, about the new type of party, about the class allies of the proletariat in the struggle for democracy and socialism, about the indissoluble connection between social and national liberation and about the principles of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures have become a powerful ideological, theoretical and methodological instrument for the social transformation of the world.

The course of social development attests to the successful materialization of Lenin's ideas, which have become a strong factor in world politics. No international issue of any gravity or importance can now be resolved

without the participation of the USSR, a state whose foreign policy activity has always been based on the strictest fidelity to V. I. Lenin's instructions. Proof of the accuracy and indestructable force of Leninism can be found in the very foreign policy of the USSR, which is distinguished by several qualitatively new features. Above all, these include a love of peace, stemming from the very nature of the socialist order, which has put an end to exploitation within its own borders and is striving to eliminate it from relations between large and small nations and states in the international arena. Lenin's prediction is coming true: "The Bolsheviks will establish absolutely different international relations, giving all oppressed nationalities an opportunity to rid themselves of the imperialist yoke."<sup>2</sup>

The Leninist foreign policy program of the Soviet State openly declared and implemented, for the first time in the history of intergovernmental communications, the principles of proletarian internationalism, peaceful coexistence and genuine equality and democratism. These principles marked the beginning of the reorganization of world relations and the establishment of a new world order, based on the standards of justice, equality, mutual advantage and the renunciation of discrimination. For the first time, a foreign policy line was consciously based on the principle of active participation by the popular masses as the most important factor in international relations, the principle of extensive participation by the masses in making and implementing the foreign policy of the socialist state. The decisions of this state are backed up by unanimous public support. For the first time, policy began to gain strength from its frankness, the sincerity on which V. I. Lenin always insisted. One of the distinctive features of the foreign policy of the first socialist state was its willingness to take the initiative: After all, it was Lenin's "Decree on Peace" that marked the beginning of a constructive dialog with the West for the purpose of establishing the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between states with differing social systems.

All of the international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet State is permeated with fidelity to V. I. Lenin's ideas and is backed up by them. They serve as its scientific ideological, theoretical and methodological foundation and a practical guide for action.

One of the most important conditions of the Leninist approach to politics is its specific and objective assessment of the balance of various forces and tendencies in the world arena. The creative nature of the Leninist method of analyzing international relations and problems is the reason for the profundity of research by Soviet theoreticians, as well as foreigners who take a Marxist-Leninist stand, on new phenomena and processes in international life. It allowed for the immediate accurate recognition of the social class nature of international fascism, the correct definition of the present era as the era of the general crisis of capitalism, the determination of the objective laws governing the establishment of the

world socialist system and the new type of international relations developing within this system, the analysis of the objective conditions, tendencies and prospects of the policy of international detente and, finally, the discovery that world war is no longer inevitable now that the balance of power in the international arena has changed.

The force and success of Lenin's ideas stem from the very nature of Marxist-Leninist theory and, in particular, from the fact that this theory organically and indissolubly combines strict adherence to scientific principles (as the main consideration in the social sciences) with adherence to revolutionary and party principles, since the objective of this science and theory has openly been declared as the assistance of the proletarian class in its revolutionary struggle.

A prominent place in Lenin's theoretical legacy is occupied by his comprehensive and scientifically sound conception of foreign policy and international relations in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. One characteristic of this Leninist conception of foreign policy is internal systemic harmony and integrity,<sup>3</sup> and we have every reason to regard Lenin's ideas on foreign policy and international relations as a completely definite, comprehensive and multileveled theoretical system.

The bottom level of the Leninist conception of foreign policy, the general theoretical level, is made up of the basic tenets of historical materialism, which explain the dynamics of socioeconomic structures and the laws of class struggle. This is followed by the level on which the specific nature of international relations and the basic trends in social development are investigated; it is on this basis that special categories and laws, operating exclusively in the sphere of foreign policy, are determined. Finally, there is the top "floor" of the theory, which is made up of an accurate understanding of the past and present of international relations as a sphere of scientific analysis: Here again, objectivity is an absolutely essential condition for the Leninist approach to foreign policy as a science.

The process of contemporary world development is providing us, as pointed out above, with more and more new evidence of the scientific profundity and practical value of Lenin's revolutionary conception of foreign policy. What are the reasons for the undiminishing influence and significance of this theory today?

This is due to a number of factors, including the present growing importance of the ideological factor in foreign policy, particularly theories and ideas on international relations and processes taking place in the world arena. Under the present conditions of the increased complexity and close interaction of international issues, particularly those with a bearing on the very survival of human civilization, the empirical method of "trial and error" could lead to a catastrophe. For this reason, an urgent need is being sensed everywhere, now more than ever before, for a



theory capable of providing a truly scientific explanation of ongoing processes and indicating the actual prospects of world development. In addition, the increasingly important role of theoretical knowledge in the practice of foreign policy is also dictated by the need to regulate and direct the mounting political enthusiasm of the broad popular masses into the proper channels--enthusiasm which is reflected in their stronger influence in the sphere of foreign policy. This enthusiasm must be based on truly scientific knowledge.

Without attempting to cover this extremely serious and multifaceted subject in its entirety, we will focus our attention on some of the major components of Lenin's conception of foreign policy, which are of cardinal significance today. These are, firstly, the scientific method of analyzing international relations, worked out by V. I. Lenin on a principled basis laid by the founders of Marxism; secondly, the theoretical system of foreign policy and international relations established by V. I. Lenin, which provides for a comprehensive analytical understanding of the systemic interdependence of phenomena, processes and tendencies in the international arena; and, finally, the revolutionary nature and humanitarianism of Lenin's strategy of peace, which is now being successfully implemented in the international activity of the CPSU and Soviet State. Now that we have outlined our subject matter, we will delve further into the undiminished significance of Lenin's ideas as applied to the current state of Soviet-American relations.

#### Scientific Method of Analyzing International Relations

The reversal accomplished by V. I. Lenin in foreign policy thinking was primarily reflected in the elaboration of a truly scientific method of analyzing international problems and relations.

Defining policy as a science and an art, V. I. Lenin insists on the need for the strict scientific substantiation of political activity, particularly foreign policy actions, and calls the "materialistic theory of politics" its theoretical and methodological basis.<sup>4</sup> The stipulation that a scientific approach is essential in the analysis of foreign policy presupposes the study of the peculiarities and dynamics of international relations as the development of socioeconomic structures governed totally by objective general laws. Lenin regards politics as the sphere of relations between classes and nations in connection with the seizure and retention of power and defines politics as "economics in concentrated form";<sup>5</sup> he attaches cardinal significance to the ability to comprehend the specific material and economic interests of the particular classes and social groups which somehow influence the making of foreign policy by states. This is why the specific individuals, or even parties, defending certain views and positions at a given time are less important in politics than the particular classes and social groups for which these views and attitudes are directly beneficial.



Various types of components can be distinguished in the structure of international relations--foreign economic, political, legal, military, cultural, scientific and technical, moral and ideological, sociopsychological and so forth. The immediate subjects of these relations are usually states, particularly under the conditions of a class antagonistic society, in which the state expresses the special interests of ruling classes. But international relations also develop between peoples, in connection with which V. I. Lenin always insisted on the need to simultaneously address both governments and people. Today, now that major foreign policy decisions have more and more of a bearing on the prospects of war and peace and the fate of millions of people, Lenin's prediction that the broad popular masses will become increasingly active subjects of international relations is coming true: "Broader and deeper historical participation by people should be accompanied by an increase in the number of people who consciously make history."<sup>6</sup> To one degree or another, the subjects of international relations are social systems, social groups, parties, organizations and so forth. At present, a factor of cardinal significance is the appearance on the international scene of the socialist states, which are conducting a fundamentally new foreign policy, and the developing countries, which are fighting for truly egalitarian and mutually beneficial international relations.

The Leninist approach to the analysis of foreign policy assigns considerable importance to the historic principle. Before international relations could originate and develop on a global scale, the process of worldwide social historical development naturally had to go through certain preliminary phases, and the specific features of each historical period of these relations always stemmed directly from the peculiarities and functioning of the socioeconomic structures existing in each given period.

Here V. I. Lenin bases his reasoning on K. Marx' famous statement that international relations are not primary, but secondary and tertiary and, in general, derivative or "transferred" social relations.<sup>7</sup> This "transfer" is accomplished by means of various mediating factors: For example, through the interaction of domestic economics with world economic development, through the reciprocal influence of domestic and foreign political processes, through the interaction of ideology, public thinking, the public mentality and so forth.

From the premise that domestic relations are primary and international relations are derivative of the former, V. I. Lenin deduces the following major principle of the scientific analysis of international problems--namely, the principle of the unity and dialectical interdependence of domestic and foreign policy. "Distinguishing 'foreign policy' from policy in general or, in particular, contrasting foreign policy to domestic policy," V. I. Lenin stresses, "is a thoroughly incorrect, non-Marxist and unscientific practice."<sup>8</sup>

There are objective and subjective reasons for the unity of domestic and foreign policy. An objective factor is the abovementioned interdependence of domestic and international relations and their determination of the nature and dynamics of socioeconomic structures. The subjective reason is connected with the fact that the subject is a specific class, represented by the state, which conducts domestic and foreign policy aimed at the preservation and consolidation of the given structure of social ties and relations and the given system of ownership.

Therefore, within the framework of the unity of domestic and foreign policy discovered by Marxism-Leninism, processes occurring in domestic politics have a decisive effect on foreign policy. In turn, the foreign policy of the state is independent to some degree and is capable of sometimes exerting considerable reciprocal influence on the domestic life of society. This methodological premise of Lenin's scientific approach to the analysis of the interrelationship of domestic and foreign politics is of great practical significance in contemporary diplomacy and international relations.<sup>9</sup>

The significance of Lenin's method of analyzing the relationship between domestic and foreign politics is particularly great in our time, now that the tendency, characteristic in general of the stage of imperialism, toward the more pronounced intermeshing of these two spheres of social relations can be seen quite clearly. It is no coincidence that this is the object of heightened interest (although not always productive) in Western foreign policy thinking. In particular, the obsolescence of American foreign policy's traditional alternatives of isolationism and expansionism has been admitted. The current trend is the further, even greater expansion of the sphere of foreign policy activity by states, and many foreign policy decisions turn out to be domestic in their origins and consequences (and vice-versa).

In the traditional bourgeois view, questions connected with borders, spheres of influence, the balance of power and so forth have always been foreign policy subject matter; all of the leverage of power has been held by a small group of imperialist powers. Today new social forces are loudly announcing their presence in the world arena--the worldwide socialist system, the developing countries, the international working class, the peace movement and others. The foreign policy agenda now includes new and complex issues, some of which are global in nature and directly related to the domestic life of society. The increasing complexity of foreign policy activity and the appearance of new tendencies in the development of international relations are also connected with a distinctive feature of the present day--the fact that the sphere of world politics is now an area of close interaction and interdependence not only involving the abovementioned two spheres in specific countries, but also the foreign and domestic policy lines of states with differing social structures, particularly the capitalist and socialist countries.

## Theoretical System of International Relations

Lenin's elaboration and implementation of a genuinely scientific materialistic approach to the analysis of international relations served as an essential instrument and foundation for the construction of his comprehensive and thoroughly substantiated theoretical system of foreign policy and international relations. Lenin's conception of foreign policy is distinguished by an integral view of international relations as a profoundly interrelated system governed by the general laws of social development. The system is unique in that the principle of its theoretical construction does not consist of certain external and specific parameters of international relations (as, for example, the variety of geometric--"triangular," "rectangular," "pentagonal" and others--models of international relations that are popular in the West today and are based on various, often mutually exclusive interpretations of the balance of power in today's world, or the equally popular "lines" of power conflicts and connections as "East-West," "North-South," "West-West" and so forth), but their internal and fundamental characteristics, stemming from the dialectical, historical-materialistic interpretation of the nature of international relations.

"People live within a state, and each state lives within a system of states, and these states exist within a system of some kind of political balance in relation to one another,"<sup>10</sup> V. I. Lenin said. Within the framework of this system there are various natural laws, some of which govern the entire system while others are confined to specific subsystems. But the chief laws governing the functioning of the system of international relations are those which are affected by the general laws of social development. The appearance of the first socialist state in the world arena and, later, the appearance of the worldwide socialist system introduced a distinct element of social class polarity into the structure of international relations. There was qualitative modification of the conditions and laws governing international ties and relations, in accordance with which the development of the global sociohistorical process in the world arena acquired, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, the nature of a confrontation between two structures and two economic systems--communist and capitalist.<sup>11</sup>

Lenin's ideas about the fundamental characteristics of the contemporary system of international relations stemmed directly from his theory of socialist revolution. As we know, K. Marx and F. Engels believed that communist and non-communist countries, and even "anticommunist nations," would exist simultaneously for some time.<sup>12</sup> In the new historical era of imperialism, even before the socialist revolution, Lenin had drawn conclusions regarding the differences in the economic and political development of various countries and the possibility that socialism would first be victorious in just a few countries or even in a single nation.

Therefore, during a specific historical period, the parallel existence of states belonging to opposite socioeconomic structures, between which extremely complex and contradictory international relations develop,



colored by the objective requirements of the transition period, becomes inevitable.

An important component of Lenin's theory of foreign policy in the period of transition was the distinction he drew between two spheres, or two levels. The first consisted of relations between the social systems themselves, while the second covered relations between states, which could belong to the same system or to different ones. Precise differentiation between these levels is necessary primarily because each is governed by its own natural laws and mechanisms (often unrelated). Lenin's differentiation is the reason for distinguishing between the sphere of intergovernmental relations and the sphere of social processes, the class and national liberation struggle. It is also the reason for the inadmissibility of any "export" of revolution or counterrevolution. Today, under the conditions of processes connected with the normalization of relations in the world arena between states belonging to different systems, these elements of Lenin's theory of international relations are acquiring decisive significance. In particular, they constitute an unequivocal response to Western politicians who would like to confuse these areas and blame domestic social processes on those taking place in the intergovernmental sphere.

The appearance of two different social poles in the global system of international relations marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the class struggle of the proletariat, during which this struggle rose to the global level. After taking over the government, the proletariat does not cease its class struggle, but continues it in a different form and by different means.

Relations between social systems become dominant in the international relations of the transition period. Regardless of the specific nature of relations between different states, they can be categorized according to Lenin's qualification of different types of relations according to the degree to which they reflect the basic social conflict and new social tendencies in the world arena. The development of a comprehensive theoretical system for the classification of international relations was one of the important scientific achievements of the Leninist conception of foreign policy.

Lenin singles out comradely cooperation as the type of relations most representative of the socialist order's new contribution to international affairs. Within the framework of the socialist community, these relations are based on a single type of socialist ownership and increasingly intensive socialist integration. The development of this type of international relations is based on social community and economic cooperation, political unity and the coordination of foreign policy actions and, finally, cooperation in the sphere of ideology.<sup>15</sup> Another important aspect of comradely cooperation is the dialectical combination of national and international interests, stemming from Lenin's idea about two tendencies in the national question—toward national independence and economic convergence.

It should be noted that relations of comradely cooperation are also spreading to the ties between socialist countries and countries taking a non-capitalist course of development. The future of international relations will depend on the development of this kind of cooperation.

According to Leninism, the polar type of international relations is the relationship of exploitation and hegemonism, characteristic of antagonistic structures. On the one hand, this is the "relationship of the oppressed nationality to the oppressor," and on the other there is the "relationship between two oppressor nationalities in connection with profit, its division and so forth."<sup>14</sup> The distinctive feature of this type of international relations is the policy of a state or group of states which pursues the goal of using political, economic, ideological or military means to exploit and subjugate other states, nationalities or parts of the world, for the purpose of which force or the threat of force, foreign domination and intervention are used. This type of international relations is of a historically temporary nature, just as the antagonistic order engendering it. The most overt forms of this relations are now the object of principled and extensive criticism and are encountering increasingly resolute opposition, which is attested to, in particular, by the resolution "On the Impermissibility of the Policy of Hegemonism in International Relations," adopted at the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly at the initiative of the USSR.

Relations of exploitation and hegemonism and relations of comradely cooperation represent the two poles; movement from the first to the second constitutes the essence of international relations in the period of the capitalist order's replacement with a communist one. For a fairly long time, international relations will be variable and mixed (and, therefore, particularly contradictory) and will include elements of confrontation. As V. I. Lenin pointed out, however, socialism is interested in the peaceful forms of this confrontation and in the development of egalitarian and mutually beneficial cooperation between states belonging to different systems. These ideas are what make up the basis of the Leninist theory of peaceful cohabitation, or peaceful coexistence.<sup>15</sup>

The main objective prerequisite for the transition to the given type of international relations is the change in favor of socialism in the global balance of power, as well as the successes of the national liberation process and the intensification of inter-imperialist conflicts. The prerequisites also include the objective process of the internationalization of world economics, as predicted by V. I. Lenin. As for the subjective conditions, these include certain changes in the political thinking of the Western ruling elite and the more pronounced realism, which have largely led to the realization of imperialism's diminishing possibilities in the world arena. At the same time, these processes in the ruling class mentality (just as their effect on politics) are far from uniform. Regression is also possible here, leading to situations in which, tempted by the chance of regaining lost political advantages, these ruling circles



attempt to return to the use of force and to hegemonistic ambitions, as is being done now in the United States. It is possible that the components of confrontation and cooperation can even be contrasted to one another in international relations of the transition period, in which case the dominant element might be "struggle" or, on the contrary, unjustified attempts to extend the principle of cooperation to such areas that are not under the control of imperialism as, for example, the area of ideology.

In accordance with V. I. Lenin's theoretical system of international relations, peaceful coexistence applies exclusively to the sphere of inter-governmental relations. It does not eradicate the basic conflicts of the contemporary era, it is not an idyllic state of invariability and staticity, and it is not a perpetuation of the sociopolitical status quo.

Peaceful coexistence presupposes the development and expansion of cooperation in absolutely specific areas (primarily in economics, science, technology and culture and, to some degree, in the political settlement of conflicts) between states belonging to different systems. The very process of positive changes in contemporary international relations has been given the name of international detente. In answer to the question of American TIME magazine correspondents, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev said that "detente is the willingness to settle differences and disputes not by force, not by threats and the rattling of sabre, but by peaceful means behind the negotiation table. Detente signifies a certain degree of trust and the ability to respect the legal interests of others."<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, the sphere of relations between the different systems is broader than the group of phenomena and processes covered by the term "detente." It includes competition and elements of confrontation, including encounters in the sphere of ideology, but these must not grow into "psychological warfare," the use as a means of intervening in the internal affairs of states and nationalities or lead to political and military confrontation. It should be noted in this connection that the relaxation of military tension, which is a major element of peaceful coexistence, unavoidably accentuates the importance of non-military forms of competition and confrontation. In particular, as noted in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrinational Work," the nature of the "dramatically more acute ideological struggle in the international arena" must be taken into account.<sup>17</sup>

#### Revolutionary Nature and Humanism of Lenin's Strategy of Peace

The theoretical system of foreign policy and international relations that was worked out by V. I. Lenin through the use of the scientific method of analyzing international relations is not derivative or abstract, but practical and effective, and it proposes a comprehensive foreign policy program for action, the purpose of which is to create the necessary conditions for the revolutionary renovation of the world. "Our goal," V. I.

Lenin writes, "is to establish a socialist order, which, after eradicating the division of mankind into classes and eradicating all types of exploitation of the individual by other individuals and of nations by other nations, will certainly eradicate the possibility of war in general."<sup>18</sup> Lenin's program of peaceful coexistence presupposes not only the normalization of international affairs, but also the creation of favorable conditions for progressive social change. This is the profoundly revolutionary purpose of Lenin's strategy of peace. "Peace," V. I. Lenin writes, "is immeasurably more effective than war in advancing the cause.... Peace will clear a path hundreds of times as wide and as long for our influence."<sup>19</sup>

It would be wrong, however, to regard peaceful coexistence simply as a means of attaining certain class objectives. Lenin's strategy of peace and the struggle for peace are also a significant end in themselves, as the present existence of modern means of mass destruction make the prevention of military catastrophe an exceedingly important goal of tremendous general humanistic significance. This was clearly stated by V. I. Lenin: "The end of wars, peace between nations and the cessation of robbery and violence are precisely our ideal."<sup>20</sup> A combination of revolutionary features and humanism therefore constitutes an essential characteristic of Lenin's strategy of peace.

Practical steps aimed at promoting international detente are now acquiring exceptionally great significance in connection with this. "The attitude toward detente is the most precise indicator of the political intentions of any country,"<sup>21</sup> Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed in his speech at a plenary meeting of the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly.

The immutable significance of Lenin's conception of foreign policy for the present day also consists in the dialectical and concrete historical approach to the question of the social nature of war, based on the previously mentioned teachings about the interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy. According to V. I. Lenin, the social nature of war depends on the particular policy the war is perpetuating, the particular class that is waging war and the particular goals for which the war is being fought. Lenin's specific and differentiated approach to the social nature of war, which is regarded primarily as an offspring of the system of private ownership, also includes the analysis of various bourgeois groups and their different approaches to foreign policy aggression. Lenin distinguishes between the "pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie" and the "belligerent bourgeois, aggressive bourgeois, reactionary bourgeois camp."<sup>22</sup>

This methodological distinction is of particular importance today, now that the prospects for peace depend largely on the outcome of the internal political confrontation between these two groups in the West. The urgency of the matter also stems from the fact that the current policy of imperialist circles sometimes still evinces, and even more vehemently in some cases, a tendency toward militarism, toward reliance on force both from

within and from without (a characteristic example is the present U.S. and NATO shift toward a strategy of force).

An important place in Lenin's conception of foreign policy is assigned to the need to defend the socialist homeland, as well as the need to distinguish between just, liberating wars and unjust wars. This, just as the recognition of the relationship between wars and the class struggle, distinguishes Leninism from bourgeois pacifist ideas. Lenin's program of struggle for peace is not of an abstract pacifist nature, but of a class nature. This is why Lenin's definition of peace is not simply the absence of war (although these are related concepts). It presupposes a just, egalitarian and democratic peace.

Another important question also arises: What means does Lenin's strategy of peace presuppose and accept, since it is both class-revolutionary and humanistic in nature? Socialism and the proletariat consistently advocate the peaceful, political resolution of international conflicts and settlement of disputes. "We unconditionally believe it is our duty to wholeheartedly support all attempts to settle disputes peacefully,"<sup>23</sup> V. I. Lenin stresses. It is for this reason that the basic method of Soviet diplomacy and foreign policy activity is the negotiation and conclusion of mutually acceptable agreements. To a certain extent, the tactic of maneuvering and reaching compromises based on a sober, dialectically balanced analysis of the concrete situation is unavoidable and even expedient in such cases. "The objective of a truly revolutionary party," V. I. Lenin writes in his article "On Compromises," "is not to declare the rejection of all compromises impossible, but to remain true, through all compromises, as long as they are unavoidable, to its principles, its class, its revolutionary responsibility and its cause of preparing for revolution and training the popular masses to triumph in the revolution."<sup>24</sup>

Lenin's strategy of peace includes struggle to eliminate and prevent both local conflicts and global wars, and Lenin's legacy contains several ideas of particular value today--the belief that a qualitative advance might transpire in the development of the means of warfare, in military equipment and in the consequences of its use, making war so destructive that it will simply become impossible.

Lenin's instructions and his desire to make world war impossible and to safeguard the cause of peace are being implemented today in the international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet State, primarily in the struggle to carry out the Program of Peace and the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples. These efforts, which reflect the principled and consistent course of the Leninist foreign policy, are legally reinforced in the Constitution of the USSR, the text of which includes for the first time a special chapter entitled "Foreign Policy," which states that the USSR will consistently conduct a Leninist policy of peace and support the consolidation of public security and broad-scale international cooperation.

Fidelity to the Leninist strategy of peace was reaffirmed in the communique of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact States in Berlin in December 1979. In particular, it reasserts the determination and will to persistently act, in conjunction with other states and all peace-loving forces, in the interests of deeper and stronger detente.

Lenin's conception of foreign policy is not only important as a general ideological, theoretical and methodological basis for the international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet State. It is also of fundamental significance in specific areas of international relations, particularly in Soviet-American affairs.

When we discuss the Leninist view of the fundamentals of Soviet-American relations, we must first note the realism and farsightedness of V. I. Lenin, who assessed the economic and political potential of young American imperialism, which was becoming the strongest force of its kind, as well as the prospects for relations between our two countries, representing opposing social systems. For these reasons, the relations between the USSR and the United States were educative in many ways, as they were governed by all of the basic abovementioned natural laws of international relations in the transition period. Lenin felt that the most desirable state of these relations would be peaceful coexistence, which unavoidably includes elements of confrontation, competition and cooperation. He attached particular significance to the development of mutually beneficial economic ties: "We are definitely in favor of an economic agreement with America--with all countries, but especially with America,"<sup>25</sup> he stressed in response to the question of a CHICAGO DAILY NEWS reporter.

Substantiating the importance of establishing cooperation, expanding its sphere and narrowing the sphere of conflicts, Lenin discussed such factors as the United States' key position in the economic and political system of worldwide imperialism, the traditional friendship between the two populations, the definite similarity of territorial dimensions and psychological features, and the existence of revolutionary democratic traditions in the United States. As a realist, however, V. I. Lenin always took into account the aggressive chauvinistic nature of American imperialism, with its pretense of "exclusivity" and world leadership and its tendency to resort to overt force for the sake of attaining its own objectives.

Lenin's ideas about the basic principles of Soviet-American relations are of particular importance today, now that (as the joint Soviet-American communique signed in Vienna in June 1979 noted) the state of these relations is of a primary significance for the vital interests of the people of both countries and largely determine the development of all international politics. The most important recent achievement in this area was the first official admission by both sides of the existence of strategic parity, as well as the reaffirmation of the mutual belief that



global military conflict is not inevitable. The reinforcement of the constructive foundation of Soviet-American relations, the expansion of cooperation and progress in joint efforts to prevent and put an end to conflicts in various parts of the world will necessitate the observance and complete implementation of all of the provisions of Soviet-U.S. treaties and agreements, primarily those aimed at consolidating the national security of the two sides by the only possible present means--arms limitation, which will introduce the necessary element of stability and predictability into Soviet-American relations.

As we know, these cardinal issues are now being hotly debated in the United States, and it is most disturbing that the Washington Administration is more inclined to support the interests of what V. I. Lenin called the belligerent bourgeois, aggressive bourgeois, reactionary bourgeois camp. This is apparently the result of several factors: the exertion of pressure by the military-industrial complex, an attempt to "compensate" for domestic economic and political difficulties, the desire to cancel out the "Vietnam lesson" and to overcome the "breach of trust" and the hope of taking another chance at dangerous military-political adventures. An important role is also being played by campaign considerations--the chauvinistic feelings of groups are being encouraged in the hope of scoring more "points" in the election campaign.

Ample proof of this can be found in recent developments in international relations--the resolution passed at the Brussels session of the NATO Council on the deployment of qualitatively new nuclear missiles systems in several Western European countries, the American President's announcement of a 5-year program for the buildup of military efforts and several other unilateral U.S. actions permeated with the cold war spirit, political irrationality and contempt for the fundamental long-range interests of peace, international detente and the constructive development of Soviet-American relations. Using as an excuse recent events in Southwest Asia, connected with the legitimate struggle of the Afghan and Iranian people for their national and social liberation and against imperialist intervention in their domestic affairs, the American President tried, in his televised speech on 4 January 1980 and in his annual message to Congress on 23 January, to blame the Soviet Union for these events and announced that he would take unilateral steps in the area of Soviet-American relations, representing an actual revision of the tendency toward the normalization of international affairs that became apparent in the 1970's. These steps included the indefinite postponement of the examination of the SALT II Treaty in the Senate, economic "sanctions" against the USSR, the reduction of the economic, scientific, technical and cultural contacts and exchanges that had already been restricted by U.S. actions, and the unilateral cancellation of talks on several aspects of Soviet-U.S. relations.

The inconsistency of the American side and its desire to gain exclusive advantages and to turn back the irreversible course of history were substantiated, just as in the past, with rhetorical comments implying that



the USSR with its communist ideology and policy could not be trusted. Today, however, it must be obvious to everyone that doubts--in relation to trust--apply precisely to the American side, and not only on the strength of the Americans' loss of face in their own government, but also with a view to the exceptional ease with which the head of the administration actually disavows his signature on international documents of major importance.

Attempts to influence the peaceful foreign policy line of the USSR, which is following Lenin's instructions, are futile, as the entire course of modern history testifies. We should note in passing that the alliance formed by the American foreign policy "acrobats" with the present Beijing leadership on an openly anti-Soviet basis is not only unlikely to improve the political position of the United States in today's quickly changing world, but will seriously threaten the cause of peace and the national security of all people, including the Americans. There is no question that the Soviet Union will defend its own legal interests and the interests of its allies and friends.

As a TASS release of 7 January 1980 stated, the Soviet leaders would like to believe that a sober and farsighted approach to Soviet-American relations, including peace-keeping efforts, will ultimately prevail in the United States. As for the position of the USSR, it has always been marked, and will always be marked, by principled fidelity to Lenin's ideas, with no possibility of any temporary vacillation. "The Soviet people and our friends abroad can be certain that the Leninist foreign policy line is invincible,"<sup>26</sup> L. I. Brezhnev stressed in response to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent.

"A giant of scientific thought and a genuine leader of the people, a fiery revolutionary and the founder of the Communist Party and the world's first socialist state, Lenin devoted his entire brilliant and heroic life to a great and noble cause--struggle for the social liberation of the proletariat and all oppressed masses and for the happiness of the laboring public"--from the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 110th anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's birth.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 16 December 1979.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch" [Complete Collected Works], vol 42, p 107.
3. "Vladimir Il'ich himself never set forth the entire foreign policy of the Soviet Republic in the form of a systematically elaborated plan. Its harmony and integrity were in his head. He set forth his views

on this matter in countless specific instances," G. V. Chicherin recalls (G. V. Chicherin, "Lenin i vneshnyaya politika" [Lenin and Foreign Policy], p 259).

4. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 21, p 223.
5. Ibid., vol 45, p 123.
6. Ibid., vol 2, pp 539-540.
7. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 12, p 735.
8. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 30, p 93.
9. For example, the frequent zigzags in U.S. foreign policy, which considerably complicate the management of affairs in the United States, are largely due to temporary domestic political maneuvers, and some of the internal processes taking place in American society impede and restrict the foreign policy ambitions of the ruling elite. Today, however, now that global interdependence has become dramatically more pronounced in world economics and politics, the external conditions of the internal development of nations and peoples are of particular significance. These include, for example, the problem of establishing a favorable international climate to promote successful socialist construction, the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries for socialist liberation, and efforts to overcome the centuries-old backwardness in the developing countries.
10. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 42, p 59.
11. Ibid., p 75.
12. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 2, p 539.
13. Lenin attached great significance to the last of these considerations and associated it with the effects of the general laws governing the spiritual process: "The spiritual life of mankind will be internationalized even more under capitalism. Socialism will internationalize it in full" (V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 23, p 318). Lenin's statement about cooperation by the socialist countries in the sphere of ideology is of particular importance today, now that the agenda includes the exceedingly important task of coordinating ideological work under the conditions of the ongoing heated ideological struggle in the international arena and intensive bourgeois ideological campaigns against socialism.
14. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 49, pp 345, 370.

15. Although the main objects of peaceful coexistence are the socialist and capitalist countries, this principle of international relations can also apply to the developing countries taking the non-socialist path.
16. PRAVDA, 16 January 1979.
17. Ibid., 6 May 1979.
18. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 32, p 78.
19. Ibid., vol 40, p 247.
20. Ibid., vol 26, p 304.
21. PRAVDA, 26 September 1979.
22. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 44, p 408.
23. Ibid., vol 45, p 63.
24. Ibid., vol 34, p 133.
25. Ibid., vol 39, p 209.

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## SOME ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT-DAY STRATEGY OF IMPERIALISM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 17-30

[Article by A. Z. Astapovich: "Multinationals and the International Division of Labor"]

[Text] The analysis of the export of capital and the formation of international monopolies occupies a prominent place in Lenin's theory of imperialism. "The export of capital, as a particularly characteristic phenomenon distinct from the export of commodities under non-monopolistic capitalism, is closely related to the economic and political-territorial division of the world."<sup>1</sup> Lenin viewed the export of capital by monopolies as the basis for the spread of international exploitation not only into the sphere of distribution, but also directly into the sphere of production, and a method of establishing economic supremacy by a few of the richest countries over the colonial periphery.

The economic dependence of the colonies was apparent above all in their subordinate role in international division of labor and in their specialization in the production of mineral and agricultural raw materials for the mother countries. In the postwar period the multinational corporations,<sup>2</sup> as the new form of international monopoly, internationalized virtually all stages of their activity and made extensive use of international capitalist division of labor in their own selfish interests, influencing it deeply and thoroughly. Experience has shown that the rapid development and spread of the multinationals can considerably change the existing proportions in the world capitalist economy and the foreign economic positions of individual imperialist states and give rise to new forms of economic exploitation of the young states. For this reason it is not surprising that the main points of the program for the new international economic order, set forth by the developing countries, include the demand for control over the activities of multinational corporations, over their practice of exploiting natural resources and over the so-called transmission of technology, which often boils down to the appropriation of technology.

An attempt is made in this article to reveal the relationship between the existing system of international capitalist division of labor and division of labor within the framework of the multinationals<sup>3</sup> and to examine the natural laws governing the development of specialization within these corporations in the production and technological fields, as well as the socioeconomic consequences of this process.

As we know, K. Marx regarded social division of labor as a constant process of the origination and "detachment" of various spheres of human activity, their separation from one another and the specialization of particular population groups in specific types of activity. He distinguished between three basic types of division of labor: general, particular and individual. "If we are referring simply to labor itself, the division of social production into its major types, such as farming, industry and so forth, can be called general (im Allgemeinen) division of labor, the division of these types of production into species and subspecies can be called particular (im Besonderen) division of labor, and division of labor within a single shop can be called individual (im Einzelnen) division of labor."<sup>4</sup>

During different stages of world social development, the deciding factor in the internationalization of economic life has been the first, the second or the third type of division of labor. For example, prior to the beginning of the imperialist era, international contacts were mostly made in the sphere of distribution and developed mainly through the world market, connected then primarily with the development of general and, to some extent, particular division of labor. The export of capital by the capitalist monopolies linked national economy in the production sphere as well. It served as an economic factor contributing to the unimpeded international spread of capitalist production relations. In the pre-monopolistic era, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, "the colonies were involved in commodity exchange, but not as yet in capitalist production. Imperialism changed this. Imperialism is, incidentally, the export of capital. Capitalist production was quickly transplanted to the colonies."<sup>5</sup>

The growth of the multinationals made the tendency toward the development of production, scientific and technical contacts within the framework of the world capitalist economy the prevailing trend. Capitalist productive forces developed to such a degree that national boundaries became confining not only for general and particular division of labor, but even the individual type. Present-day capitalism is involving both the industrial countries and the former colonies in individual division of labor by moving separate production links of the multinational corporations to these locations.

The production units of a corporation, located in different countries, become the "shops" of a single gigantic enterprise. By instituting specialization at their plants in different countries, the monopolies are internationalizing the economic development of the capitalist world, and the deciding factor in this process at the present time is individual division of labor, but within the giant monopolistic association rather than within the bounds of a separate enterprise.



As a result, the corporate and international types of division of labor, which differ in terms of socioeconomic characteristics, converge and appear to overlap. This has given rise to a fundamentally new situation in capitalism's world economic affairs.

Under capitalism, international social division of labor is "spontaneous and free division within the society as a whole, division of labor which takes the form of the production of goods for exchange"<sup>6</sup> and is conducted between nations and between branches and subbranches of the economies of all capitalist states. Its chief characteristics are spontaneity, the isolation of individual countries as independent producers of specific products, and the commercial nature of the separate types of production.

The basis for determining the nature of intraorganizational ties and their relationship to ties between countries is the distinction drawn by K. Marx between social and industrial (or technical) division of labor: "Despite the many similarities and connections between the division of labor within society and the division of labor within a workshop, the two types differ not only in terms of degree, but also in terms of essential purpose."<sup>7</sup> Therefore, K. Marx, in the first place, singled out the technical division of labor within a workshop--and this has now evolved into intra-corporate division of labor--as an independent and separate type, and, in the second place, believed that it differed in terms of essence and socioeconomic nature from social division of labor.

The socioeconomic content of corporate division of labor meets Marx' criteria for division of labor within a workshop. Division of labor on an international scale within the framework of an international monopoly is no longer spontaneous and does not result from isolated, sporadic contacts between independent producers in various countries, but is the result of goal-oriented policy conducted by a single economic association of international dimensions. The specialized enterprises of this monopoly are no longer nationally isolated production units, even though they are located in different countries. Besides this, their production is losing much of its commercial nature, which is reflected in the high percentage (25-50 percent) of intracorporate shipments in the total foreign trade turnover of American multinational corporations.<sup>8</sup>

Although the export items delivered to the multinationals' own branches in many countries cross national boundaries, they are generally not sent through the channels of international trade in the traditional sense. The reason for this is the following. A product which becomes part of intra-organizational exchange does not change its owner, which is the multinational; this product of a specified quality and in a specified quantity is designated in advance for this consumer, or the overseas branch; the product is not sold at retail, but at so-called transfer prices, set by the corporations themselves.

All three types of division of labor can exist within the bounds of international monopolies, most of which are multisectorial corporations. But the common ownership and management of all corporate subdivisions and the technological uniformity of the majority of corporate production enterprises greatly promote the development of individual division of labor--the most promising form on the international level.

Both the intranational and international types of division of labor are accomplished primarily and mainly through the specialization of production and scientific research. The specialization of the branches and divisions of multinational corporations, located in different countries, permits these companies to have manufacturers of specific products on their staff and simultaneously combine various elements and conditions of production in accordance with national or regional considerations, the location of sources of raw materials and so forth, and to choose the most convenient (from the standpoint of the firm's interests) system for the distribution of enterprises on the global scale. Capital goes overseas to combine with the necessary manpower, scientific and technical achievements and natural resources. At the same time, production specialization within the framework of the multinationals clearly testifies to their role as the vanguard of present-day neocolonialism, striving to keep the developing countries in a subordinate position in international capitalist division of labor.

All of the multinational corporations are now involved to some extent in international specialization, although they use different types of specialization depending on their specific field of activity. For example, state-by-state specialization within the multinational framework is particularly widespread in fuel and raw material branches, where the mining for minerals, the processing of raw materials and the manufacture of the final product are conducted on the international scale. This general tendency in international intraorganizational production specialization is clearly seen, for example, in the activities of U.S. aluminum companies, which are among the largest producers of aluminum in the capitalist world.

As we can see from Table 1, the percentage accounted for by the developing countries is only high in the mining stage, and it is much lower in the processing stage. The concentration of the processing of raw materials and manufacture of the final product in the developed capitalist countries gives the multinational corporations advantages due to the presence of a large market, a developed infrastructure and a skilled labor force in these countries. Besides this, the multinationals are motivated primarily by the interest of the long-range maximization of profits and the possibility of minimizing the risk of negative consequences of socioeconomic reforms in the young states.

In general, today's multinational corporations in the extractive branches have specialized the entire production cycle: All of them produce, from raw materials extracted by them in various parts of the world, not only semimanufactured goods, but also finished commodities (pipe, cable, wire,

girders, the products of organic synthesis and so forth). The manufacture of the latter, however, is virtually confined to the developed regions of the capitalist world--the main consumers of these commodities. This is also where most of the oil is refined and various subproducts are derived from it. The shipment of oil in special tankers and its pumping through pipelines are incomparably more convenient than its transport in the form of individual petroleum products.

Table 1

Distribution of Production Capacities of U.S.  
Companies During Different Stages of Aluminum Production  
1975, %

	Bauxite extraction		Alumina derivation		Aluminum production	
	A	B	A	B	A	B
Alcoa	31	69	72	28	94	6
Kaiser	40	60	89	11	83	17
Reynolds	16	84	86	14	97	3

A--developed capitalist countries; B--developing countries.

"Transnational Corporations and the Processing of Raw Materials: Impact on Developing Countries," UNIDO, ID/B/209, February 1978, Annex, p 7.

This kind of production specialization within the multinational corporation leads to the broader use of complex, highly mechanized and even automated equipment in all stages of the production process--from the extraction of raw materials to the manufacture of the final item. The operation of this equipment requires a small number of well trained and educated workers. In connection with this, the multinational corporations in the extractive branches only involve the manpower of the developing countries in the production process on a relatively insignificant scale.

The second type of international intraorganizational specialization--product specialization--is most completely exemplified in the activities of chemical multinationals. In this branch, product specialization is based on the comprehensive use of petrochemicals as raw materials on the international scale. In the chemical industry the possibility of establishing enterprises with a complete technological cycle in any particular country is the primary consideration. The plants of multinational corporations in the developing countries, which (the plants) are drawn into intraorganizational division of labor through product specialization, are assigned the role of manufacturers of simple products. As a rule, their manufacture is unrelated to the company's main field of production. Several of the more "dirty" production processes have also been moved to the young states. Plants for the production of the main petrochemical products

(plastic, man-made fibers and so forth), on the other hand, are usually located in the developed capitalist states. This is clearly attested to by the fact that, for example, the Western European and Japanese branches of the American Union Carbide company manufacture various chemicals, plastics and molecular filters, while its enterprises in Latin America, Asia and Africa manufacture only dry batteries, graphite and carbon electrodes and film in addition to engaging in mining and metallurgy.

The third type--the component specialization of the enterprises of multinational corporations located in various states--is prevalent in the automotive industry and agricultural machine building, as well as in electrical engineering and electronics. This kind of specialization, which rests on a technological basis and on the manufacture of components and parts of the final product, most clearly illustrates the principles of global and, from the standpoint of the monopolies, optimal combination, with a view to the objective of guaranteeing the highest possible profit level for the multinational corporation as a whole. Component specialization presupposes multilateral cooperative contacts between the multinational links in different countries.

The characteristic features of the component specialization of multinational corporations are the following. The activities of overseas enterprises are based on the principles of the "optimal" distribution and utilization of resources, transportation and the sales network. This means that the elements involved in production are those that are the most convenient to use in a given country. In component specialization, the common principles of the multinationals' production distribution and their neo-colonial nature are particularly distinct and pronounced. For example, the American multinationals confine the manufacture of technologically complex equipment, parts and components to their own nation or Western Europe. The main products manufactured here by American corporations require high levels of capital and scientific input. This is the part of the future finished product that requires high capital expenditures, the newest materials, the latest technology and the services of highly skilled experts and workers.

On the other hand, the assembly process, which is based on the fulfillment of labor-intensive operations, is now being moved to the developing states by American multinationals. This applies in general to the partial assembly of complex products or the final manufacture of household appliances and implements. The first category takes in electronic equipment, motor vehicles and tractors, while the second includes radios, television sets and cameras.

The question of labor-intensive technology is connected with the entire complex of socioeconomic problems in the developing countries. It is completely obvious that the nature of the technology utilized not only plays an important role in the development of production, but also has far-reaching social import. The main issue is its effect on employment,



as the total number of partially or totally unemployed individuals in the liberated states is extremely high: It has been estimated at 300 million. The incorporation of labor-intensive technology appears at first to aid in the resolution of the employment problem in the young states. It is true that it is preferable to capital-intensive technology from the standpoint of the use of local labor resources. But the spread of labor-intensive production can only lighten the burden of unemployment a little. The creation of even 10 million jobs by the multinational corporations would not change the situation significantly due to the high number of unemployed.

In general, the practice of moving labor-intensive production to the young states has a negative effect on their economy. Labor-intensive processes generally presuppose the use of routine, simple technology which does not require the widespread use of machines and equipment. It keeps the developing countries from mastering new technology and progressive production methods. The labor-intensive technology used by the multinationals in a number of branches virtually excludes the possibility of a significant rise in the level of local manpower training, as it makes greater demands only with respect to speed and agility, and not the general educational background or qualifications of workers.

It should also be noted that the enterprises of multinational corporations import a high percentage of the components for their assembly operations in the developing countries. This reduces the sales market for local firms and, in this way, lowers the levels of production and employment. A study of ten branches of South Korean industry, in which multinationals play a prominent role, showed that around 78 percent of the components for assembly were imported.

There are also other aspects of this problem. For example, the transfer of the labor-intensive production of multinational corporations to other countries is connected with the flow of capital out of the industrial capitalist states, which is causing them to also suffer a rise in unemployment figures. In connection with this, several labor unions, primarily American, are energetically fighting for the restriction of technology exports, are objecting to the multinationals' "desertion" of the United States in search of cheap labor, and are advocating stronger protectionist tendencies in relations with the developing world.

The production expansion of today's international monopolies, accompanied by their vigorous scientific and technical activity abroad, has had largely the same effect. A characteristic feature of the present stage of their development is intraorganizational division of labor in the sphere of research and development and scientific and technical specialization. This process is due to the monopolies' desire to enhance their competitive ability and take firm hold of the leading positions in the capitalist world. The intraorganizational division of labor and scientific and technical specialization of the multinationals' branches are enhancing the effectiveness of their research and engineering and accelerating the

incorporation of technical innovations in affiliate enterprises in different countries.

The problem of the effectiveness of research and development is now of particular importance to the monopolies. This is due to the increased interaction of science and physical production and the change in science's role in the development of productive forces. On the one hand, the latest scientific and technical discoveries (new means of communication and of collecting, storing and transmitting data, and electronic computers) have aided in the development of better methods for the management and organization of the activities of the modern large corporation. This has expanded the boundaries and spheres of the activity of private monopolistic associations and has optimized their structure, internal communications and the dimensions of production units.

On the other hand, research and development are stimulated by production itself, which makes greater demands on science from the standpoint of developing the latest materials, types of fuel, technology and various equipment. For the international monopolies, the development of science and technology is connected more and more with division of labor, with the specialization of their branches in specific operations within the total system of research and engineering. It is indicative, however, that this process has affected mainly the developed capitalist countries. Enterprises in the developing states have been virtually untouched by the scientific and technical advances in the activity of multinationals.

The more important role of overseas branches in scientific research and the progressive division of labor in this sphere of their activity are attested to by the following facts. Firstly, the branches conduct all types of research and experimental design operations. Moreover, the proportion accounted for by fundamental (theoretical) research in total research and development is 1.4 percent on the average in these countries and is not much lower than the indicator in the main firms--1.9 percent.<sup>10</sup> Secondly, there has been a tendency toward an increase in the proportional expenditures of the branches on research and development in the total expenditures of multinationals for this purpose--from 4.5 percent in 1966 to 7.3 percent in 1972. In addition, it should be taken into account that the U.S. Government is financing part of the scientific expenditures only in the main firms, while the branches receive no more than 2 percent of their total research expenditures from the governments of their "host" countries. And if we consider only the company's own funds--this would seem to be the most valid methodological approach--the proportion accounted for by overseas enterprises and laboratories was 12.6 percent in 1972.<sup>11</sup> Thirdly, there has been a reciprocal exchange of technological achievements between the companies and their branches, although the reciprocal currents have not been equal. In 1972, for example, the multinationals provided their branches with research results valued at 837 million dollars and received 125 million dollars' worth from them.<sup>12</sup>

Research and development are conducted by overseas production departments and branches, as well as laboratories and scientific centers established expressly for this purpose abroad, primarily in Western Europe. In recent years all of them have moved from work aimed at the improvement of the individual consumer characteristics of goods and technical services to specialization in the development of new product models. For example, the Ford Company coordinated the activities of three of its centers in England and the FRG for the purpose of standardizing individual parts and components, improving their quality and--and this was the main objective--excluding the possibility of duplication in the development of new products.

As international intraorganizational division of labor in the research and development sphere becomes more intensive, overseas branches evolved into scientific production complexes. They operate in accordance with the global economic strategy of the multinational, determining the general guidelines of their scientific and technical policy and the functions and duties of individual subdivisions in a centralized manner in this branch of activity of major importance to the corporation.

Just as in production, where the activities of the enterprises of American multinationals in the United States and overseas are closely related and cooperative, coordination in the scientific and technical sphere has reached a fairly high level in several corporations. Enterprises, laboratories, offices and scientific centers abroad, again primarily in Western Europe, operate in service not only to local production units of the multinational, but also the entire corporation. The scientific and technological achievements of the branches are largely the result of intraorganizational division of labor on the international scale.

A higher level of division of labor in the sphere of research and development is reflected by specialization within the companies of the electronic industry. They produce perhaps the most important products for today's monopolies (means of communication and computers of various categories), without which it would now be virtually impossible to manage the international activities of companies. For example, International Business Machines (IBM), which controls around 60 percent of the world capitalist computer market, has two scientific centers in the United States and one in Switzerland, as well as nine laboratories in eight countries, each with a staff of 500-800 scientists and specialists. The development and incorporation of new computer models and technology are conducted by all branches according to a standard program. For example, the laboratory in Paris is working on the development of integral circuits, laboratories in Amsterdam, Stockholm and Wimmerkeit (FRG) are developing power packs and auxiliary equipment, and the lab in Greenock (England) is working on a memory bank for one computer model. Some models, however, are worked on only in the United States, particularly during the first stages of their development. All major decisions on the scientific and technical policy of IBM are made in its scientific center in the United States. It has constant cable communications with Paris and, through Paris, with all overseas laboratories.



The experience of IBM clearly attests to an important peculiarity of the development of the international monopolies' scientific and technical activity. It proves that international division of labor in the sphere of research and development is an essential stage in the evolution of these monopolies, objectively determined by the need to develop and incorporate the latest equipment and technology at a time of technological revolution. "Prior to 1961 IBM used its overseas laboratories to maintain its position in local markets," writes E. Mansfield, prominent American expert on technological progress. "After discovering the difficulty of making optimal use of these laboratories due to this limitation of their purpose, however, the firm decided to include the European laboratories in its global developmental program when its 360 system was introduced. When the system was being developed in six base companies, each laboratory, whether American or European, performed specific tasks."<sup>13</sup> The same principles lay at the basis of the development of the corporation's next generation of computers, which are being manufactured at the present time.

The experience of other companies also indicates that this tendency is becoming stronger. For example, Honeywell put a new line in operation for the manufacture of five computer models. The work on two of the models was performed by branches in France and Italy. The "64" model was jointly developed by the American and French laboratories, and the programming devices were jointly engineered by the corporation's American and English enterprises. The work was coordinated from the United States.<sup>14</sup> The Eastman Kodak Company enlisted the services of 1,000 specialists in Western Europe and the United States to develop a new highly sensitive film. A special emulsion developed by the English Kodak laboratory was used in the project and quality control experiments were conducted by the laboratory in France.

The practice of the international monopolies clearly indicates a move to a higher level of internationalization in the scientific sphere in the capitalist world. It should be noted, however, that this tendency is only seen within the limited bounds of individual corporations. This gives rise to a question: What is the relationship between the specialization of the international monopolies in the sphere of research and engineering and the development of research in the host countries--both capitalist developed nations and developing states?

Recent events have shown that the research activity of these monopolies is giving rise to a new kind of "brain drain" in the capitalist world. In the past, scientists and engineers were urged to go overseas, primarily from Western Europe to the United States. Although this is still an important means of monopolizing scientific and technical achievements, it is nonetheless indirect. The acquisition of patents and licenses for the latest discoveries and inventions also affords limited possibilities in this respect. For this reason, the multinationals have now begun to institute scientific and technical specialization within their subdivisions with a view to acquiring direct access to the sources of the latest



achievements in other countries. "One of the reasons for our success," Chairman J. Jones of the IBM World Trade board of directors frankly admitted, "is highly integrated effort in the field of research and development in the multinational context. We have been successful in absorbing foreign technology and talent through our laboratories outside the United States. As a result, we are the recipients of many new ideas from all parts of the world."<sup>15</sup>

The multinationals use different methods to organize the "brain drain" during the course of their scientific and technical specialization. The most widespread method is the recruitment of the best university and institute graduates in the countries where laboratories are located (less than 6 percent of the persons employed in the sphere of research and development in overseas branches of American companies are from the United States).<sup>16</sup> This means that many states are training scientists not for their national economy, but for foreign corporations.

The transfer of scientific knowledge is also accomplished through cooperation between the multinationals and local university scientific centers and research institutes. For example, the IBM laboratory in West Germany is working with the oncological center at Heidelberg University to develop cancer detection and diagnostic equipment.<sup>17</sup> The Hewlett Packard laboratory in the FRG is working on acoustical equipment with a view to the more advanced state of theoretical work with acoustics in Western Europe than in the United States. Just as in the past, when relay generators were developed, this work is being performed in close cooperation with the University of Stuttgart. It is here that some of the engineers of the West German branch of this company were trained. Many devices were also developed by graduates of the University of Edinburgh with the aid of its technical facilities.<sup>18</sup>

Cooperation with research centers abroad allows the international monopolies to not only absorb knowledge and talent, but also to use financial resources in the host countries. This is accomplished through the participation of affiliate firms in projects funded by the government, the use of government contacts to gain access to the resources of local universities and research organizations, and so forth.

The development and incorporation of many large-scale scientific and technical designs can now be conducted and produce an economic impact only under the condition of international division of labor. For this reason, when the multinational corporation sets up its own scientific centers and laboratories abroad, recruits highly skilled foreign engineers and scientists and uses the financial and research resources of universities in various countries, it is trying to overcome the limited national basis for the combination of science with production.

At the same time, it is striking that, with few exceptions, the international monopolies' scientific subdivisions are located in the developed capitalist nations. The proportion accounted for by the developing

countries in the total research and development expenditures of American multinationals is extremely low, although it did rise from 1.8 percent in 1966 to 3.5 percent in 1975.<sup>19</sup> This fact, naturally, is not a coincidence: It is "inconvenient" for the monopolies to conduct research work in countries with a total or almost total lack of scientific personnel and research and design establishments.

For the liberated states, the consequences of this policy are severe, since their dependence and their underdevelopment in comparison to the imperialist countries in the sphere of science and technology are already most apparent. In view of this, it must be said that the spread of scientific and technical information is of decisive significance for these states, affording a chance not only of adapting to their conditions, but also of overcoming their industrial underdevelopment. But the international monopolies offer technology on rigid terms, and in most cases it is either extremely outdated or too complex to meet the needs of the young states. The system of division of labor in the multinational corporations and their refusal to conduct research and engineering on any kind of broad scale in the developing countries are considerably reducing the potential of the latter in the training of scientific personnel and the development of the necessary machines, equipment and technology.

Bourgeois science depicts division of labor within the framework of the international monopolies as a new stage in the development of the existing system of international capitalist division of labor, a stage in which conflicts and disparities between different parts of the world capitalist economy will gradually disappear (the sharp differences in levels of economic, scientific and technical development, the subordinate position of the former colonial periphery and the merciless exploitation of the natural resources of developing countries). The degree of planning that is characteristic of this new stage is supposedly promoting the establishment of a new system of division of labor and world economic ties in the interests of all nations, and the "global optimal combination" within the framework of these monopolies is supposedly the prototype of the future world economic organization. But these statements by the defenders of the multinationals are deceptive, just as the bourgeois and reformist "impression" that the growth of the monopolies would put an end to the crises and conflicts of capitalism was deceptive and groundless.

Intraorganizational division of labor and specialization between various subdivisions of international monopolies, both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of research and development, can only be called international in scale. In fact, they signify a tendency toward a combination of production with the latest scientific achievements which will be restricted to the narrow bounds of the existing supermonopolies and will be contrary to the interests of some countries.

In view of the fact that division of labor within the multinationals differs in principle from other types, which was discussed above, the present process is not so much the intensification, but mainly the

deformation, of capitalist international division of labor by today's supermonopolies. They are developing strong and permanent ties only between individual sectors of the economy, enterprises and scientific establishments in various countries on the basis of their specialization and cooperation. But after all, certain parts of these sectors are no longer simply links of a particular national economy, but are simultaneously components of another economic organism--the international monopoly. The operation of its plants with a partial production cycle depends on the head companies in a few capitalist states, especially the United States, while the nations in which these "auxiliary" enterprises are located fall into a certain degree of economic dependence on the policies of international monopolies. Therefore, division of labor within this framework exists parallel to international, or, more precisely, inter-country, and multinational division of labor and represents a different system, one which disrupts the original system.

Another important fact must be taken into account here. The international monopolies are gaining an increasing share of world capitalist trade and the export of capital and technological achievements. They control the extraction and processing of most fuel and raw material resources. For this reason, it can be said that capitalist international division of labor is not only being deformed in the interests of these monopolies, but its further development will depend on them. Division of labor within the framework of large capitalist enterprises (technical) is evolving into social division of labor on the international scale.

The disruption of the existing system of international capitalist division of labor by the multinational corporations and the transfer of several production units from one part of the world to another are affecting the developing states as well as the developed nations in the West. The depth, scales and nature of this effect differ, but there is no question that the consequences of the reconstruction of intraorganizational division of labor are being experienced most by the young states. The monopolies are only developing specific branches here, branches necessary to them, while the national economies of these states, particularly industry, are underdeveloped on the whole--or, more precisely, developed only to the degree necessary for their "main" branches.

The exploitation of the natural resources of developing countries by the supermonopolies is sharply restricting their potential for industrial development through the use of their own resources. As we have seen, the activities of monopolies presuppose the choice of the most preferable, from the monopoly's vantage point, place for locating each stage of production. The share of the young states in individual stages of the extraction and processing of raw materials naturally does not coincide with the share of the international monopolies, as the national enterprises of multinational corporations occupy a prominent position in the extractive branches. But the multinationals are having a substantial effect on conditions in the liberated countries due to their deciding role in the processing of raw materials.<sup>20</sup>

Table 2

Percentage Accounted for by Developing Countries in  
Raw Material Production in the Capitalist World  
(Early 1970's)

	Steel	Copper	Aluminum	Oil
Ore extraction (fuel production)	34	46	59	62
Smelting	5	40	30*	--
Processing (refining)	10	23	7	24
Sales	9	5	6	21

\* Production of alumina.

"Transnational Corporations and the Processing of Raw Materials," Annex, pp 8, 13.

As we can see from Table 2, the proportion accounted for by the liberated states in regard to the basic types of raw materials and fuel declines as it progresses toward the stages of processing and sales. In recent years, they have pressured the transnational corporations of all imperialist states to expand the processing of raw materials in the location of their extraction (for example, the production of refined as well as blister copper). This tendency, however, is still weak, and the main principle of multinational activity, which perpetuates the inferior and subordinate position of the liberated states in international capitalist division of labor, is still the same: The finished product is manufactured and sold in the developed countries--its main consumers.

The division of labor imposed by the monopolies is also having a negative effect on the position of the developing countries in the processing industry. It is precisely with the multinational corporations that imperialist powers associate the possibility of moving "dirty" and labor-intensive branches to Asia, Africa and Latin America with a view to receiving the necessary products of metallurgy and chemistry from these continents.

Enterprises manufacturing items requiring substantial labor expenditures are engaged primarily in the assembly or manufacture of simple products. This function determines their subordinate role in the technological cycle, which is totally controlled by the multinational corporations. As a result, despite the fact that some elements of the processing industry are located in the liberated states, their inferior status in international capitalist division of labor is not undergoing any fundamental change.

The adaptation of the developing countries to the conditions and requirements of modern industrial production is taking on forms that are unacceptable to them and are often simply distorted. The imperialist monopolies are moving individual shops and production subdivisions to these countries



for the purpose of exporting cheap commodities, mainly intermediate items, from these countries to the West. This kind of export is replacing direct foreign trade by the host countries. It is no coincidence that the share of the multinationals in the exports of the developing states is so high (reaching 40 percent).

When the monopolies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan locate their production units here, they guarantee themselves a labor force with a level of training that is adequate for their purposes but, on the whole, low. As a result, the development of the worker, even one employed in such progressive branches of industry as electronics, electrical engineering, computer technology and the automotive industry, does not go through the sequential stages characteristic of the developed capitalist nations.

The international monopolies are appropriating huge quantities of natural and material resources from the liberated countries for their own needs. Describing the consequences of their behavior, the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) noted that industrial growth in the former colonies and semicolonies was actually "not the industrialization of the developing countries, but the profitable use of their territory by foreign companies."<sup>21</sup> These processes are even more visible and tangible in the sphere of science and technology.

The transfer of ecological harmful, power-intensive and labor-intensive production units to these countries is the main component of imperialism's reorganization of the present system of international division of labor through the multinational corporations. But this reorganization is not aimed at improving the status of the young states in the world capitalist economy, but at turning them into the agrarian raw material and industrial raw material appendages of the imperialist powers and monopolies.

This transfer of labor-intensive production units is helping to "eradicate" the worker professions that do not require highly skilled labor from the structure of the working class in the United States and other developed capitalist states. The activities of the monopolies are reserving the imperialist countries the prerogative of developing and being the first to use scientific and technical innovations and are leading to their specialization in the manufacture of progressive commodities requiring high scientific input. The developing states, on the other hand, despite the opportunity they have been given to manufacture some finished products in addition to raw materials, cannot eradicate their dependence on the West for deliveries of machines, equipment and production technology or their scientific and technical backwardness under these "new" conditions.

Division of labor within the framework of the international monopolies is affecting the economic interests of many capitalist countries, particularly the developing states. It is now more likely to determine the direction and nature of the world economic ties of these countries and their place and role in the system of international economic relations as a whole.

This also affects the factors with which the economic development of any country is now closely connected. In essence, division of labor within the multinational framework is an effective means of mobilizing the natural, material and human resources of the capitalist world in the interest of a small group of individuals--the monopolists and large property owners. This intraorganizational division of labor is constructed without any consideration for national interests or the requirements of economic growth in individual countries. It is hampering the all-round development of productive forces, the democratization of international trade and economic relations and the observance of the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

This is why the progress in the reorganization of international economic relations, which became apparent in the mid-1970's, would have been unthinkable without a vigorous struggle against the monopoly-imposed system of division of labor. The need for the progressive, democratic reorganization of international economic relations and the establishment of the new world economic order was underscored in B. N. Ponomarev's speech at an international theoretical conference in Moscow in May 1979: "Our efforts must be aimed primarily at defeating the imperialist strategy connected with the activities and predatory interests of multinational corporations. These demands are actively supported by the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community, and they are being fought for by the international communist and liberation movement."<sup>22</sup> Progressive forces in the world are advocating the establishment of more favorable conditions for the use of international division of labor in the interests of all countries and all mankind.

"Lenin and the Bolshevik Party were assigned the great mission of preparing for and leading the first victorious socialist revolution in history and of combining the theory of scientific socialism with the broadest activity by the popular masses"--from the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 110th Anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's Birth"

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 30, p 164.
2. American multinationals hold the lead among international monopolies in general and multinational corporations in particular. For example, more than half of all international monopolies with a sales volume exceeding 1 billion dollars represent U.S. business.
3. Some aspects of this problem have already been discussed in Soviet economic literature. See, for example, the article by Yu. Shishkov,

"New Symptoms of the Basic Contradiction of Capitalism," in issue No 5 of the journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA for 1971; I. D. Ivanov, "Mezhdunarodnyye korporatsii v mirovoy ekonomike" [International Corporations in the World Economy], Moscow, 1976.

4. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 23, p 363.
5. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 30, p 35.
6. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 46, pt II, p 450.
7. Ibid., vol 23, pp 366-367.
8. This fact has been examined in Soviet economic literature. See P. I. Khvoynik, "Mezhdunarodnaya kapitalisticheskaya trgovlya" [International Capitalist Trade], Moscow, 1977, pp 172-175; ~ D. Ivanov, Op. cit., p 39; A. Z. Astapovich, "Mezhdunarodnyye korporatsii SShA: tendentsii i protivorechiya razvitiya" [The International Corporations of the United States: Developmental Tendencies and Conflicts], Moscow, 1978, pp 38-39.
9. "The International Division of Labor and Multinational Companies," ECSIM, 1979, p 30.
10. D. Creamer, "Overseas Research and Development by United States Multinationals. 1966-1975," The Conference Board, N.Y., 1976, p 59.
11. Ibid., p 35.
12. Ibid., p 89.
13. "Economic Analysis and the Multinational Enterprise," Ed. by J. Dunning, L. Allen and G. Unwin, London, 1974, p 24.
14. THE COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF WORLD BUSINESS, Winter 1977, p 28.
15. "Multinational Corporations," Hearings, Wash., 1973, p 249.
16. THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, No 3, July 1976, p 234.
17. "Global Companies. The Political Economy of World Business," Englewood Cliffs, 1975, p 18.
18. G. Leroy, "Multinational Product Strategy," N.Y., 1976, p 84.
19. D. Creamer, Op. cit., p 39.
20. For example, by 1975, as a result of nationalization acts in these countries, the share of the eight largest Western companies in copper

mining had dropped to 20 percent (as compared to 57 percent in 1970), but the share in refining was 45 percent. Even in the petroleum industry, where nationalization was most widespread in the 1970's, only the share of the "seven sisters" decreased, while the share of other companies grew. As a result, in 1975 the "seven" extracted 30 percent of all oil in the capitalist world as compared to their 82 percent in 1963. But these same companies controlled 47 percent of all refining and 45 percent of sales, while the other companies of the imperialist countries controlled 29 percent and 34 percent respectively. "Transnational Corporations and the Processing...", p 56; Annex, pp 5, 8.

21. UNIDO, Doc. ID/conf. 3/1314, 2 December 1975, p 10.
22. MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDI'NARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 6, 1979, p 21.

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**LENIN'S POLICY ON IRAN AND THE INTRIGUES OF IMPERIALISM (FROM THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN EXPANSION IN IRAN)**

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 31-42

[Article by I. A. Yusupov]

[Text] The 1920's were a remarkable period in the history of Iran, that ancient Eastern country whose people--under the influence of the Great October Revolution in Russia--rose up in a national liberation struggle. From the earliest years of its existence the Soviet State, led by V. I. Lenin, declared its renunciation of all tsarist Russia's claims on Iran's territory and sovereignty. The Leninist principles of socialist foreign policy were reflected in the Soviet-Iranian treaty concluded on 26 February 1921.

V. I. Lenin attached great significance to the speediest signing of this treaty, which laid the foundations and groundwork for friendly, peaceful and equal relations with Iran. Thus, on 7 December 1920, with V. I. Lenin's personal participation, a plenum of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee discussed the question of the "principles of a treaty with Persia."<sup>1</sup> (Iran was called Persia until 12 March 1935--I. Yu.) On 10 December V. I. Lenin received the Iranian delegation to the Soviet-Iranian talks. On 22 December 1920, delivering a report at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, V. I. Lenin said: "I must also note, Comrades, that this year our policy has secured major successes in the East.... We can also welcome the forthcoming signing of a treaty with Persia, with whom friendly relations are insured by virtue of the coincidence of the vital interests of all people suffering from imperialist oppression."<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin continued to play a most active part in the examination of "Persian affairs" and gave his advice and instructions.

The 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty was the first equal, just treaty with a great power in Iran's history. It was based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. The treaty abrogated all agreements between tsarism and Persia and third countries affecting the Iranian people's sovereign interests, restored all the concessions obtained by the tsarist

government on Iranian territory and so forth. The Soviet Government handed over to the Iranian people major assets worth 65 million rubles in gold.<sup>3</sup> The treaty, which gave Iran great political and economic benefits, insured independent development and defense against encroachments by imperialist states on its integrity and sovereignty.

American imperialism was particularly zealous in its longing for Iran's wealth and had long since attempted to penetrate Iran's economy and establish domination there.

A study of the early stages of American imperialism's expansion in Iran reveals the neocolonialist essence of the contemporary policy of the United States, whose billionaires, as V. I. Lenin noted, "opened a particularly tragic chapter in the bloody history of bloody imperialism,"<sup>4</sup> and displays the age-old link between American capital and Iran's former rulers, the Pahlavi family, who seized power in Iran with its help.

The United States sent its first scouts to Iran as early as the 1830's, in the guise of missionaries. Since that time its interest in Iran had not died down. That attention was stepped up in the early 20th century, when rich oil deposits were discovered in Iran. In May 1911 the financial mission of Morgan Shuster, who was closely associated with U.S. monopoly circles, arrived in Iran. The mission had far-reaching plans for turning Iran into a U.S. protectorate.<sup>5</sup> However, the American imperialists' intentions were not realized; Britain and tsarist Russia stood in the way.

Taking advantage of the fact that British imperialism's positions were significantly undermined as a result of the Iranian people's national liberation movement, launched under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia, and of the Soviet Republic's renunciation of the tsarist annexationist policy, the American imperialists made a new attempt to enslave Iran. They chose the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as the instrument of implementation of their imperialist plans. But this time too, the efforts to subjugate Iran did not culminate in success. British diplomacy, more experienced and skilled in political maneuvers, managed to organize a rebuff for U.S. plans.

American imperialist again tried to establish its domination in Iran when the Soviet Government, acting in accordance with the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921, obtained the withdrawal of British troops from Iran. Washington considered this a convenient moment for taking the place of the British colonialists. To this end the United States sent to Iran an experienced dabbler in politics, agent of monopoly capital and State Department oil specialist, Arthur Millspaugh. He was the typical traveling salesman for imperialism, fanatically devoting his whole life to it. For a long time Millspaugh was the American monopolies' "knight" which they brought into play every time Washington needed to make the next move in Iran, and not only in that country. He was the agent of America's masters and was closely connected with U.S. oil circles, particularly with the Standard Oil Company.

On its instructions, as early as December 1920, when he was the chief of the State Department's oil division, Millspaugh had a talk with the Persian ambassador to the United States on possible investments of American capital in the country's northern provinces,<sup>6</sup> which are particularly rich in oil.

However, to the former U.S. interest in Iran as an important source of raw materials, mainly oil, as a market and as a sphere of application of capital, there was now added the desire to use the country as a bridgehead for armed intervention against Soviet Russia. "In view of the fact that the American people (read: the American imperialists--I. Yu.) have vital interests in the utilization of Persia's natural resources, I venture to suggest that the present moment (the withdrawal of the British troops--I. Yu.) offers an excellent opportunity to implement this interest,"<sup>7</sup> Caldwell, the American ambassador to Iran, writes in a report to the State Department on 6 January 1921. He goes on to express the confidence that by sending in "experienced American officers" it would be possible to seize high command posts in the army, which "could prevent local disturbances"--that is, to put it simply, the American imperialists hoped to suppress the national liberation movement in Iran by means of a strong army.

Subsequent events in Iran gave rise to substantial amendments to the plan elaborated by the United States. In February 1921, Iranian reaction and the British imperialists organized a coup. One of the leaders of the coup, Reza Khan, commander of a Cossack brigade, became minister of war and energetically set about reorganizing and reequipping the army, which he used as an instrument for suppressing the national democratic movement in Iran. The United States had been deprived of its "pretext" for sending in the military to seize control in Iran. That role was taken on by a mission headed by A. Millspaugh.

The mercenary ruling circles in Iran, in the hope of filling their pockets, willingly moved toward a deal with American imperialism, which had grown fat on World War I. In the situation where the national liberation movement in the country was expanding and the U.S. role in the capitalist world was increasing, they gambled increasingly on Washington, which acted as the defender and custodian of the "firm principles" of private ownership. The comprador strata of the Iranian bourgeoisie, who were trying to step up trade with the American monopolies, also had a substantial interest in the Americans' coming to Iran.

The Iranian Government appointed Mirza Hossein Khan Ala, its former ambassador to Madrid and later to Washington, as intermediary in talks with the U.S. Government on "inviting" a financial mission. Wheeler, an adviser at the American Embassy in Britain, reported to the State Department that Hossein Ala visited him on the morning of 26 June 1921 and talked with him on the possibility of the United States granting Iran a loan of 100 million dollars. The Iranian Government guaranteed this loan with northern oil revenues, and it agreed to receive an American financial mission in Iran as a "moral guarantee."<sup>8</sup>

In connection with the departure of British financial adviser Smith from Iran, Engert, the U.S. charge d'affaires in Iran, reported to the State Department that Ahmad Shah had told him that the Americans could take his place.<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that the British supported the idea of sending an American financial mission to Iran, hoping thereby to maintain their dominant position in that country. Point 5 of a memorandum sent to the U.S. State Department by the British Foreign Office on 1 March 1922 says: "His Majesty's government, having tried without success to help Persia improve its internal administration and introduce new financial methods, is prepared to extend friendly assistance to the U.S. Government.... His Majesty's government will give American representatives complete diplomatic support in Tehran in the hope that by means of joint actions by the British and U.S. governments and through the friendly exchange of opinions between them a real improvement will be established in Persia's internal administration."<sup>10</sup>

On 14 August 1922 in Washington, Iranian Ambassador Hossein Ali signed a contract on A. Millsaugh's rights and powers as main administrator of all finance in Iran.<sup>11</sup> He received powers to draw up the state budget, reorganize the Finance Ministry apparatus and associated institutions, attract foreign capital to Iran and grant trade and industrial concessions to foreigners, seek additional sources of income, give written permission (1) to the Iranian Government for the conduct of financial operations, make use of all state documentation and so forth.<sup>12</sup>

These extensive powers, received by a U.S. representative, opened up the opportunity to virtually control Iran's economy, policy and finances. In his book, which he wrote while he was in Iran, A. Millsaugh stressed that "the presence of Americans and American capital in Persia will help create conditions in which the open door principle will be transformed into a reality."<sup>13</sup> In other words, with the help of imperialism's tried and tested weapon, the "open door" policy, the United States was carrying out the enslavement of Iran.

The ruinous effect on Iran of this control by a foreign state's agent was recognized from the beginning by progressive representatives of Iranian society, as reflected in the press. Thus the newspaper VATAN for 3 November 1921 voices a protest against the invitation of foreign advisers: "Inviting advisers is incomprehensible and in no way justifiable.... After all, there is no need for foreign advisers to exact taxes and carry out expenditure on the state accounts; surely we do not want to testify to our complete inability to even spend money.... Inviting foreign advisers is an admission of our own inability, and no benefits can come from them."

Nonetheless, in November 1922 the American financial mission headed by Millsaugh arrived in Iran. The duties of the mission's members were distributed in the following way: A. Millsaugh--chief administrator of finances; Colonel D. McCormick--director of internal revenue; C. McCaskey--chief treasurer; H. Reber--director of the Central Accounting Administration; Captain T. Pearson--director of the Civil Service Administration;



H. Haskell--expert on questions of agriculture and public estates; A. Moris--chief of the highways administration; A. Morgan--executive secretary. The mission also included financial administrators for the provinces--Iranian Azerbaijan (G. Davis), Kermanshah (D. Dunaway), Fars (Major M. Hall), Kerman (R. Fitzsimmons), Khuzestan (G. Homan), Gilan (R. Boneville), Khorasan (D. Loomis) and Tehran (G. Coleman).<sup>14</sup>

Later, the U.S. Government sent more advisers to Iran. Soon the total reached 30.

From the very start of his activity in Iran, Millspaugh established close contact with the ruling monarchist and bourgeois landowning circles and had his own men in the Majlis, where, on his own admission, there was a "group of deputies exclusively devoted to the ideas which lay at the basis of the American mission's presence in Persia."<sup>15</sup> Millspaugh established particularly close relations with the ambitious, power-hungry nationalist leader, Reza Khan, who subsequently took the throne and founded the Pahlavi dynasty, and for whom the establishment of personal dictatorship by any means was justifiable. The father of the future Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi received lavish support from imperialism in his struggle for power. However, being an adroit and prudent politician, without a twinge of conscience he rapidly changed his imperialist patrons as political circumstances changed. First it was the British, and then the Americans, and later the German Nazis.<sup>16</sup>

Millspaugh's attitude toward Reza Khan was determined by the aims of his mission. He immediately assessed Reza Khan's role in Iran's political life and associated plans for the establishment of American domination in the country with the consolidation of the future shah's power. The support for Reza Khan's dictatorial aspirations on the part of the American agent, backed by American imperialist circles, is explained by the fact that, under the conditions of the complete collapse of the power of Ahmad Shah Qajar, who linked his fate with Britain's bankrupt policy, Reza Khan directed his efforts toward the defeat of the national liberation movement in Iran and the establishment in the country of a tough despotic regime relying on the imperialist West. Reza Khan occupied extremely reactionary positions and expressed the interests of the extremist military leaders and the exploitative bourgeois landowning bloc which dominated the country. Thus, typical features of that bloc's domestic policy were the struggle against the democratic movement and a further attack on the vital interests of the working class and other working strata of the population and on progressive forces calling for the strengthening of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Imperialism's class solidarity with his bloc, despite the differences which existed, served as a basis for Millspaugh's cooperation with Reza Khan.

Thus Washington found in Reza Khan a political figure whose power could be strengthened as a condition of ensuring U.S. imperialist interests in Iran. Hence the American mission's great support for Reza Khan's

dictatorial claims and the use of all economic and political levers to "push" the dictator onto the throne.

The Millspaugh mission's activity took place in two directions: the penetration of Iran's economy and interference in its political affairs.

Drawing up Iran's state budget was one of the main duties of the American financial mission, according to the contract. Millspaugh, in particular, sought to prove that the country's economic prosperity lay in ensuring that the income section of the budget prevailed over expenditure.

As is clear from Millspaugh's quarterly accounts, the income section of the budget increased steadily and by fiscal year 1927/1928 (the last year of the mission's presence in Iran), it was nearly twice the sum of the initial budget drawn up by the American advisers. The increase in income was mainly due to increases in direct and indirect taxation. The American financial mission increased mainly indirect taxation from year to year. As compared with the prewar year 1913/1914 direct taxation increased 37 percent by 1924/1925 and indirect taxation increased 340 percent.<sup>17</sup> In subsequent years the increase in these indicators was even more significant. Indirect taxation, which consisted for the most part of taxes on consumer goods, was a heavy burden on the shoulders of the Iranian people, causing their material situation to deteriorate further and further.

The most striking feature of the expenditure side of the budget during these years is the vast sum allocated to the War Ministry, headed by Reza Khan. The American advisers, deliberately undermining Iran's economic and kindling war hysteria in the country, allocated about 45 percent of the budget for military purposes, while Iran's agriculture and cottage industry were on the verge of collapse. It was a case of giving concrete assistance to the War Ministry of Reza Khan, who, in the struggle for power, was strengthening the army with a view to using it to seize the shah's throne. Appropriations for the people's education totaled less than 3 percent of the budget, and before 1924/1925 such a miserly sum was allowed for health care (0.2 percent) that it was not even published; in the 1924/1925 budget, under the heading "health care," there appears the figure 778,562 krans (less than 0.3 percent of state expenditure). Yet the sum allocated for the American advisers' maintenance in the same year was 924,902 krans. In fiscal year 1926/1927 the budget items "health care" and "American advisers" were 1,860,970 krans and 1,705,000 krans respectively. In other words, state resources allocated for the purposes of health care for the entire Iranian population were almost equal to the sum allocated for maintaining a group of American advisers.<sup>18</sup> It is not surprising: The American advisers received an excessively high salary, 8-10 times the salary of even the top Iranian civil servants.

The American advisers tried, at the expense of the working strata of the Iranian people, to bring about an excess of income over expenditure, prepare a state budget without a deficit and thereby justify their own

presence in Iran. It was of no interest to them what the consequences of the U.S. anti-Iranian policy would be for the fate of millions of Iranians, although they were well aware of the merciless exploitation of the Iranian people. Millspaugh himself, in his book, writes of the hard lot of the Iranian working people, who worked for their hard-earned bread by the sweat of their brow, from dawn to dusk.

The missions harnessed Iran's trade increasingly closely to U.S. economic requirements: In 1913/1914 the United States ranked ninth in terms of imports to Iran, and in 1927/1928 it ranked sixth.<sup>19</sup> During that time, total U.S. exports to Iran increased from 223,583 kranas to 24,961,000 kranas, that is, an increase of more than 111 times. Total U.S. imports from Iran increased from 10,209,601 kranas to 81,043,172 kranas (nearly an eightfold increase).<sup>20</sup> The American advisers' activity helped ensure that foreign trade was characterized by a negative balance and nonequivalent exchange between Iran and the imperialist powers. By this means, first, the U.S. advisers ensured Iran's transformation into a market for goods and a source of cheap agricultural raw material for American monopolies (during the period when the American advisers were lording it in Iran, the equivalent purchasing power of a ton of rice fell to nearly half its former level, which led to a grave situation for the country's main producer--the peasantry), and second, they wrecked Iran's economy in order to make it dependent on the United States.

The American mission attached great significance to seizing the oil sources in northern Iran. The United States was striving to get its hands on the capitalist world's oil sources, among which north Iranian oil occupied a significant place. Moreover, the country's northern provinces were close neighbors of the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty, all concessions obtained in Iran by the tsarist government or Russian subjects were handed over to the Iranian people without compensation. Article 13 of the treaty proclaimed that those concessions could not be handed over to foreigners. But in November 1921 Iran's ruling clique, in flagrant violation of the treaty, granted an oil concession for five northern provinces to the American Standard Oil Company. In December of the same year, Thompson, a representative of the Sinclair Company, which also had claims to north Iranian oil, arrived in Iran. But the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company stood in the Americans' path to the seizure of the northern oil.

It was in this critical period of the struggle between the American monopolies and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for the northern oil that Millspaugh appeared in Iran. It is no accident that there was a special clause in his contract giving him the right to interfere in the granting of concessions to foreign states by the Iranian Government. Being a placeman for Standard Oil, Millspaugh exerted pressure on the shah's government to insure that concessions for north Iranian oil were granted to precisely that company. But Sinclair also had a strong lobby in

Iranian ruling circles. Moreover, it enjoyed the direct support of the U.S. secretary of state.<sup>21</sup>

The concession contract concluded between Iran and the Sinclair Oil Company in December 1923, like the draft contract with Standard Oil, which never went through, was predatory in nature: It provided for the exploitation of oilfields in four of the five northern provinces of Iran and the handing over of only 20 percent of the revenue to Iran. Although the Majlis approved this agreement in September 1924, it did not come into force.<sup>22</sup> The concession contract was opposed by the British Government and the Standard Oil Company. In April 1925 the Soviet Government again notified Iran, as it had done with respect to the concession contract with Standard Oil in 1922,<sup>23</sup> that Iran could dispose of the oil concession in the north of the country only within the terms of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty. As a result of all this the Iranian Government was forced to annul the agreement with the Sinclair company as well.

The Americans' machinations over Iranian oil testified to the U.S. imperialists' far-reaching plans. In particular, an important factor in the insistent U.S. desire to obtain the oil concession in northern Iran was the strategic location of the northern provinces and their close proximity to the Soviet Union's borders. The researcher M. Brooks, exposing the anti-Soviet orientation of these imperialist solicitations, writes: "The continual requests for the granting of prospecting and drilling rights in northern Iran were only a pretext for sending agents to those regions."<sup>24</sup> Another American writer, L. Fisher, also points out the anti-Soviet nature of the U.S. imperialist solicitations with respect to oil concessions in northern Iran. "A concession to a British or joint Anglo-American company," he writes, "would inevitably have led to an expansion of British (and American--I. Yu.) influence up to the Russian borders, and as a result a base would be created for intrigues and disturbances, and also for possible efforts to cause the Caucasus to break away from Central Russia."<sup>25</sup>

Another important target of the American advisers' activity in Iran was a concession for the construction of railroads and highways, which was also used as an instrument for enslaving the country and subordinating its economy to the interests of financial capital. V. I. Lenin described such activity in this way: "The construction of railroads seems to be a simple, natural, democratic, cultural, civilizing undertaking: That is how it looks in the eyes of bourgeois professors who are paid to whitewash capitalist slavery and in the eyes of petty bourgeois philistines. In fact the capitalist threads which bind these undertakings by thousands of nets to private ownership of the means of production in general have transformed that construction into an instrument for the oppression of a /billion/ [in italics] people (in colonies or semicolonies)--that is, more than half the population of the world in dependent countries and hired slaves of capital in 'civilized' countries."<sup>26</sup>



In undertaking railroad construction the American advisers, headed by Millsaugh, set the task of weakening British positions and facilitating the further penetration of Iran by American capital. The U.S. imperialists and the Iranian ruling clique saw the railroad as a means of strengthening central power and rapidly eliminating internal "disorder." At the same time the American imperialists hoped to use the railroad for military-strategic purposes against the USSR.

Early in 1923 Millsaugh proposed that the Iranian Government adopt a law on the construction of a railroad and involved the American Ulen Company in this plan. By the end of 1924 the Iranian Government and this company had concluded an agreement on research into the question of planning and constructing a number of railroad lines and highways. The contract was signed by Reza Khan, who had become prime minister by then, and Bennett, the company's vice president.

In order to attract American business to Iran, the financial mission elaborated a plan for granting Iran a major loan for "production" purposes, with Iranian natural resources as a guarantee. "Prospecting" for internal resources, in 1925 Millsaugh prepared a draft law on the introduction of a state monopoly of sugar and tea in Iran, the revenue from which would go into the railroad construction fund.<sup>27</sup>

The monopoly was able to yield 5 million tomans a year (1 toman equals 10 krans), which did not cover the railroad construction calculated for 10 years, the planned cost of which was set at 72 million tomans.<sup>28</sup> The calculation was simple: The resources from the sugar and tea monopoly were not enough for the costly construction work, there were no other sources of finance and, therefore, the Iranian Government would be forced to ask the American imperialists for a loan.

In early 1927 nine American railroad construction specialists arrived in Iran. A railroad department was formed at the Ministry of Public Works, led, in essence, by American specialists. American engineers traveled about the country and investigated the regions of Mazandaran, Shiraz and Mohammerah (Khorramshahr).<sup>29</sup> On 24 February 1927 the Majlis hurriedly adopted the American project for the construction of a railroad linking the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf, 1,670 kilometers long.<sup>30</sup> It was proposed to the government that it begin the construction of the railroad between Mohammerah and Bandar-e Gaz from both ends, via Hamadan and Tehran.

The American plan met with fierce attacks in Britain. The British imperialists had in mind the construction of routes lining Iran with India. They were afraid that the laying of the trans-Persian railroad would undermine the transit significance of routes in Iran for their trade and that the enslavement of Iran by the United States would undermine Britain's positions there.

The Millsaugh mission, offering American capital a broad opportunity to take part in the construction of Iran's communications and to try to gain

a monopoly of such concessions for American capital, opposed the granting of railroad and highway concessions to other countries. Millspaugh objected to the participation of a French company in building the Tehran-Khannaqin highway, and also to the servicing of Iran's air routes by the German Junkers firm.

American engineers in charge of road construction, on instructions from Washington and the Millspaugh mission, worked on the principle of "maximum expenditure, minimum results" so as to destroy the country's economy and force the Iranian Government to ask American capital for loans. The selfish goals of U.S. policy were so obvious that even the Iranian ruling circles, which also derived personal benefit from this construction work, were forced to dissolve the contract with the Americans, and then with a joint American-German syndicate which was delaying matters. The construction was handed over to a Swedish-Danish company, Kompaks, which finished building the highway.

A characteristic feature of Millspaugh's mission was interference in Iran's internal affairs. As already noted, Millspaugh's ally and assistant in consolidating American influence in Iran was Reza Khan. An experienced political dealer, Millspaugh knew how to act subtly according to the situation, "and so it became possible for him," V. Sheehan, an apologist for imperialism, cynically writes, "to take very important political power when necessary, and all this without the slightest outward signs."<sup>31</sup>

Sheehan, admiring Millspaugh's political abilities, considers the Americans' 15-year stay in Iran to be a "miracle" which the monopolists owed to the head of the mission. He writes: "If Reza Shah had ever aligned himself with forces politically opposed to American administration, it is highly probable that the Americans would have had to pack their bags 2 days later, but Doctor Millspaugh foresaw this possibility and forestalled it by concluding an agreement with Reza Shah and by conducting a consistent policy of support for the dictator--or subordination to him whenever necessary--in return for his support."<sup>32</sup>

Of course, these relations were sustained on the principle of reciprocity. In particular, this reciprocity was based on the idea that Millspaugh, strengthening Reza Khan's economic position, received help from him in strengthening American influence on Iran's policy and economy. He did everything to encourage Reza Khan's aspirations to power and helped him substantially in this. Thus, in order to satisfy the war minister's needs in strengthening the army--his main prop in the struggle for power--Millspaugh put the War Ministry budget through the Majlis first, before the discussion of the general budget, and allocated Reza Khan money from the year that had not yet begun.

Reza Khan, in his turn, needing support for his dictatorial aspirations, saw Millspaugh's mission as an important instrument for implementing his designs. That is why he did not refuse the Americans' request to use the

army to extort taxes from the population. "Needing a force capable of collecting taxes," Millspaugh admits, "I saw no other way than to try any possible means of enlisting Reza Khan's support and cooperation and, through him, the army's support."<sup>33</sup>

As Reza Khan's power was consolidated--he also became the prime minister--his ties with Millspaugh also became stronger. Prime Minister Reza Khan "stated," Millspaugh confirms, "that he is more willing than ever to cooperate with the American mission in getting constructive proposals through the Majlis and in attracting foreign capital into the country to develop its resources."<sup>34</sup> These ties became even stronger when, on 12 December 1925, Reza Khan was proclaimed shah of Iran under the name of Reza Shah Pahlavi.

The American mission placed every possible obstacle in the path of the establishment of normal cooperation between Iran and the Soviet Union. This policy on the Americans' part was clearly visible in the sphere of economic reorganization in Iranian Azerbaijan. In 1926 Azerbaijan was visited by reactionary Minister of Public Works Daver and financial adviser Millspaugh, who, with a view to isolating the economy of northern Iran from the Soviet Union's influence, drew up a plan for replacing agricultural crops exported to the USSR with crops for which there was no demand in the Soviet Union and which would go to European markets.<sup>35</sup> Millspaugh also repeatedly rejected the USSR's proposal, advantageous to Iran, on the creation of a Soviet-Iranian society for the exploitation of fisheries on the southern shores of the Caspian.<sup>36</sup> The agreement was only signed after the American mission's departure from Iran.<sup>37</sup>

Millspaugh also actively supported Iranian reaction's struggle against the progressive national bloc that was created in the country, which put forth a program for the sociopolitical renewal of Iran and the establishment of friendly relations with the USSR. For example, the American adviser demanded the immediate payment of arrears from merchants and farmers in northern Iran who supported the progressive forces' struggle for the restoration of trade with the Soviet Union, while not even touching the defaulters in the south. And when the merchants and farmers of the north asked War Minister Reza Khan to alleviate payments, even if only in the form of a moratorium, they were refused.

The mission's interference in the country's politics is clearly reflected in the fact that, when there was a movement for a republic in Iran, Millspaugh stopped paying salaries to civil servants who supported the establishment of a republican system and demanded a list of such civil servants from the government. When the employees went on strike to protest this, "we let them know," he says in his book, "that if any employee left his work, all of them would be dismissed."<sup>38</sup>

The Millspaugh mission's activity severely damaged Iran's economy. The new taxes, the difficult material situation and the mission's overt

interference in political life gave rise, in 1923, to widespread demonstrations against the American advisers' presence in the country. In 1924 American Consul R. Embry was killed in Tehran. Fearing the people's wrath, the government provided Millspaugh with protection. Although the diplomatic aspect of the incident was soon smoothed over, Reza Khan's government took advantage of it to rout left-wing forces. Martial law was declared in Tehran and certain provinces and indiscriminate arrests of democratic and progressive elements began. This was also a way of expressing Reza Khan's loyalty to the American imperialists. As before, Iran's ruling circles continued to give assistance to the mission in subordinating the economy to American capital. Iran's policy was harnessed more and more closely to the United States. Thus the "Iran-United States" society was created, headed by Millspaugh himself, and also by Reza Shah, Hossein Ala, Daver and other pro-Americans. However, the protests against the mission's presence in Iran did not stop. On the contrary, increasingly broad strata of the population became involved in these protests. In 1926 major uprisings flared up in Gilan and Khorasan, which was one result of the policy of increased taxation.

By 1927 U.S. influence in Iran began to be seriously opposed by Germany and Britain, which feared the excessive strengthening of American positions. At the same time Reza Shah's attitude toward Millspaugh was changing. Whereas in the initial part of the struggle for power Millspaugh had helped him to rise and strengthen his position, subsequently when Reza had consolidated his power, Millspaugh became an obstacle, trying to hold on to key positions in the country's administration. Making use of the dissatisfaction with the American mission's activity in various strata of Iranian society, Reza Shah restricted the mission's rights. In fall 1927 Millspaugh left Iran.

He again appeared on the political horizon in Iran when reactionary elements, headed by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, frightened by the scale of the democratic movement and the growth of the USSR's popularity in Iran, sought rapprochement with British and, in particular, U.S. imperialist forces. Discredited reactionary elements like the old British agent Sayyid Zia al Din [Tabatabai], who had formerly been driven out of the country, began to slip back into Iran, and such a pro-American figure as Qavam os-Saltane became head of the government. It was under this government that Millspaugh, just as 20 years previously, arrived in Iran as the head of a huge staff of American advisers, in January 1943, and once again, unrestricted rights and extraordinary powers in the sphere of Iran's finances and its economy--control of foreign and domestic trade, the distribution of industrial goods and foodstuffs, transportation, state factories and plants, prices and wages and so forth--were in the hands of the American agent, who again received the broadest opportunities to implement measures to "harness" the Iranian economy to the U.S. economy.

This time too, Millspaugh's mission did great harm. Not only did it promote the country's economic disintegration and the enslavement of Iran



by the U.S. imperialists after World War II, but also, interfering in political affairs, it did everything to encourage the shah's regime to implement a foreign policy course hostile to the Soviet Union.

As a result of the indignation and protests of the Iranian public, in January 1945 Millspaugh was deprived of his extraordinary powers by the Majlis, and a month later the Iranian Government refused his services.

The Millspaugh mission's activity is only an episode, but a typical one, in the U.S. imperialist policy implemented in Iran for a long time--a policy aimed at the economic and political oppression of the Iranian people and the flouting of their national interests and dignity. In the course of the implementation of this policy there was a symbiosis of imperialism and the shah's reactionary dictatorship, in which each of the participants sought to ensure its own advantages and interests.

The United States, taking into account Iran's strategic position and its oil resources, set the goal of strengthening its military, political and economic positions in that country and obtaining bases in close proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and the Near Eastern countries.

As for reactionary forces in Iran--monarchist circles and the bourgeois landowning class--they sought to hold on to their privileges and consolidate their domination in Iran, supported by the might of American imperialism.

The collusion between all of these reactionary forces led to a situation in which Iran was drawn, in the 1950's, into the imperialist CENTO bloc (the former Baghdad Pact), on the basis of which the United States seized key positions in the Iranian Army, the Gendarmerie, the police and other punitive organs and flooded the country with its agents. Iran's foreign policy was placed at the service of imperialism and anti-Sovietism. Exercising full control over the economy and finances, American capital linked Iran closely to the world capitalist economy and the interests of international monopolies, as a result of which the Iranian economy became subject to the effects of inflation, currency and financial crises and other negative phenomena of the capitalist world.

The United States wanted to insure that Iran would be unable to spend the huge revenues obtained from oil to the benefit of its own economy. The lion's share of profits from the "black gold" went back into the safes of U.S. military-industrial and other monopolies. In the last 20 years the United States has sold Iran weapons worth 36 billion dollars. The militarization of Iran and the shah's arrogant aspirations to play the part of imperialism's "big stick" in the Near and Middle East cost the Iranian people 19 billion dollars, in the form of U.S. weapons, in 1973-1978 alone.<sup>39</sup> This was American imperialism's pay for supporting one of the cruellest regimes in the history of mankind--a regime which murdered at least 38,000 Iranian patriots.

The Iranian people were living in conditions of dictatorship and deprivations. The growth in unemployment and the cost of living and housing was the constant companion of most of the population. And this was the case when the country had colossal annual revenues of around 20-23 billion dollars from oil.

Naturally, this kind of U.S. "cooperation" with the shah's despotic regime could not fail to build up hatred in the Iranian people, both for the shah's regime and for the United States, which ultimately led to a flareup, to the emergence of the present U.S.-Iranian conflict.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biograficheskaya khronika" [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. A Biographical Chronicle], vol 9, p 538.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 42, p 132.
3. See "Noveyshaya istoriya stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka" [The Recent History of the Foreign East], 1st ed, Moscow, 1954, p 255; G. N. Il'inskiy, "Iran v period obshchego krizisa mirovoy kapitalisticheskoy sistemy" [Iran in the Period of the General Crisis of the World Capitalist System], Moscow, 1953, p 16.
4. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 37, p 48.
5. "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya v epokhu imperializma" [International Relations in the Imperialist Era], Series 2, vol XVIII, p 111, doc 103.
6. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920," vol III, pp 356-357 (hereafter, "Papers...").
7. Ibid., vol II, pp 633-634.
8. Ibid., pp 636-637.
9. Ibid., p 638.
10. Ibid., vol III, pp 524-525.
11. A. Millspaugh, "The American Task in Persia," New York-London, 1925, p 20.
12. "Collected Resolutions of the Third and Fourth Majlis," Tehran, 1318 [sic], pp 213-217 (in Persian).
13. A. Millspaugh, Op. cit., p 18.

14. "The 6th Quarterly Report of the Administrator General of Persia," Tehran, 1924, p 2; V. Sheehan, "The New Persia," N.Y., 1927, pp 129-130.
15. A. Millsaugh, Op. cit., p 235.
16. An incident of some interest took place between Reza Shah and Clive, the British ambassador to Iran, who, interfering in the domestic political struggle in Iran, demanded the resignation of the government of Mostoufi ol-Mamalek. The British resident's flagrant interference annoyed even Reza Shah, who walked out in the middle of the conversation. Clive begged to remind Reza Shah that he owed his throne to Britain and that there were other claimants to the throne. Reza Shah's political flirtation with Hitler and the flooding of Iran with German agents placed the country's national independence in jeopardy, which led to the collapse of Reza Shah's pro-fascist policy. In September 1941 he abdicated in favor of his son and fled to South Africa. However, his crowned offspring did not learn a political lesson from this.
17. "Quarterly Reports of the Administrator General of Persia," Tehran (1923-1927); N. Karpov, "Ekonomika sovremennoy Persii" [The Economy of Persia Today], Tiflis, 1928.
18. See E. Longeman, "Report on the Finance and Commerce of Persia," London, 1928, p 12; N. Karpov, Op. cit., pp 68-69.
19. Saleh Khan Hechmet, "La Perse economique," Paris, 1920, p 87; D. Zavriyev, "Torgovo-politicheskii kurs Persii" [Persia's Commercial Policy], Tiflis, 1931, p 25.
20. "Tableau general du commerce en Perse (1913-1928)," Tehran, 1930.
21. M. Brooks, "Oil and Foreign Policy," Moscow, 1949, pp 91-92.
22. Ibid., p 91; N. Karpov, Op. cit., pp 51-52.
23. Standard Oil's concession was revoked in 1922 as a result of Soviet protests.
24. M. Brooks, Op. cit., p 93.
25. L. Fisher, "Oil Imperialism," N.Y., 1926, p 229.
26. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 27, pp 304-305.
27. "The 13th Quarterly Report of the Administrator General of Persia," Appendix II.
28. REVOLYUTSIONNYY VOSTOK, No 2, 1927, p 200. The trans-Iranian railroad cost the Iranian people 247,533,006 tumans.

29. TORGOVLYA ROSSII S VOSTOKOM, No 1-2, 1927, p 19.
30. "Collected Laws and Resolutions of the Fifth Majlis," Tehran, 1326, pp 199-200 (in Persian); REVOLYUTSIONNYY VOSTOK, No 2, 1927, p 199.
31. V. Sheehan, Op. cit., pp 133-134.
32. Ibid., p 135.
33. A. Millspaugh, Op. cit., p 46.
34. Ibid., p 236.
35. KOMMUNISTICHESKIY INTERNATSIONAL, No 43, 1929.
36. A. Millspaugh, Op. cit., p 299.
37. "Sovetsko-iranskiye otnosheniya v dogovorakh, konventsilyakh i soglasheniyakh" [Soviet-Iranian Relations in Treaties, Conventions and Agreements], Moscow, 1946, pp 104-111.
38. A. Millspaugh, Op. cit., p 185.
39. HARPER'S MAGAZINE, November 1979, p 24.

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## UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AT THE START OF THE EIGHTIES

Moscow SBNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 43-54

[Article by G. A. Arbatov]

[Text] Say what you like, the calendar has miraculous power. Although neither a new year nor even a new decade in itself begins a new page in history and relieves politicians of their old problems and concerns, it is precisely at those times that there is the temptation to sum up results and try to look into the future. When it comes down to U.S. foreign policy, this temptation is particularly hard to resist since the beginning of both the 1970's and the 1980's actually did coincide with a revised political course in that country.

The time was certainly ripe for such a revision by the 1970's--it was not only justified but vitally necessary. At a hard price in failures and mistakes--sometimes tragic--American had learned the truths of the modern era. The country reached the conclusion that the old policy, the policy of force and cold war, was expensive and dangerous, did not solve the problems actually facing the country and was leading toward an increasingly hopeless stalemate.

Above all, it was clear that the country had to get out of the quagmire of the hopeless Vietnam adventure as rapidly as possible and avoid getting into similar quagmires in the future.

It was clear that there had to be a switch from attempts to impose the country's will, a switch from a policy of force and confrontation to a policy of talks with the Soviet Union, the other socialist states and the developing countries.

It was clear that many old values and priorities needed reviewing. In particular, it was clear that much more money and effort had to be devoted to solving the aggravated domestic economic and social problems and that it was beyond the means of even this rich country to have "both guns and butter." Mistrust of militarism and of the political concepts and politicians that had foisted on the country a policy of overseas adventures, a

headlong arms race and the role of "world policeman" became widespread in the United States,

In short, it was clear that it was necessary to cut the country's coat according to its cloth and pursue a policy in line with U.S. potential, which had proved by no means limitless. As a result of these changes in Americans' feelings, many postulates of cold war and total anticommunism that only recently had seemed inviolable came under fire, while the ideas of peaceful coexistence and detente, arms limitation and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation began to attract increasing attention.

All this could not fail to have an impact on American policy. The first half of the 1970's was marked by definite positive shifts there, and this helped improve the international situation, consolidate peace and improve U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. For its part the USSR had long consistently advocated changes of that kind in international relations. With the beginning of the 1970's, when alterations became apparent in the policy of the United States and its allies, these changes became really feasible.

At the beginning of this decade, different political winds are blowing in the United States and the opposite feelings and trends are prevailing. American policy is turning back to the well-worn ruts of cold war, and this is creating many threats to peace and international security.

Just what has happened and why has the political course of the United States changed so radically? Washington itself claims that the turnabout in its policy is a response to events in Afghanistan. We have absolutely no doubt that those events were not to Washington's taste. But there is something else that is equally clear--those events simply could not have been the reason for the change in U.S. policy, if only because the foundations of that policy, its main "blocks," were installed before and not after the events in Afghanistan.

This applies above all to the most important element of that policy--the course of further building up the military might of the United States, its allies and--as the President himself said, meaning either China, or Pakistan, or Egypt (or maybe all those countries, plus some others)--its friends. All the fundamental decisions on this score had already been made by the time of the events in Afghanistan. I refer to the NATO session's decision the year before last to increase the bloc countries' military budgets annually for 15 years, and to last year's decision to produce new American medium-range missiles and deploy them on European territory. I also refer to J. Carter's decision on a "5-year plan" of new military programs and unprecedented arms appropriations and to the statements by him and other officials that the United States is determined to defend its "vital interests" in various regions--sometimes a great distance away--at all costs, including by military means.

The United States had also taken certain other steps in its policy before the events in Afghanistan:

It steered a course toward freezing arms limitation talks and, if it did not wreck ratification of the SALT II treaty, subjected it to endless delays (to say nothing of the fact that the measures taken by the United States at the same time to build up its armaments and the new bout of war hysteria that has erupted in the West in recent months seriously damaged the spirit, if not the letter, of that agreement and largely devalued its significance as a big step toward ending the arms race as a whole);

It sharply stepped up the intensity of anti-Soviet hysteria;

It expedited the rapprochement with Beijing on a platform of "common strategic" interests (anti-Soviet, of course);

Thus, by as early as mid-December 1979, any unbiased observer--in either Moscow or Washington--could not help seeing that the United States had changed some important directions of its policy (much more important than, say, grain sales or participation in the Olympics), that it was on precisely this platform that the President was entering the election campaign and that the White House might only be waiting for an opportunity to "formalize" the aforementioned changes in the shape of some new doctrine.

There is also every reason to reject the attempts to justify this political turnabout by referring to the "Soviet military threat."

There can be no question that the Soviet Union displays concern for its own defense; this concern is perfectly justified in light of what is happening in the United States and a number of other countries and regions of the world. But it is a matter precisely of defense--American propaganda may hush that up or lie about it, but American policymakers cannot avoid being aware of it.

They are also sufficiently well informed about both the military might of the powers that are the USSR's potential enemies and the realities of the USSR's geopolitical position to perceive as aggressive intentions the measures that the Soviet Union has to take to strengthen its own defense. It would be interesting to know just how American politicians and generals would define amounts of the essentials for defense, which are what they constantly accuse the USSR of exceeding, if there were Warsaw Pact troops on the northern border of the United States and if in the south, instead of Mexico, there was a country with a population of 1 billion and nuclear weapons which was pursuing a militarist course and laying claim to the territory of several American states.

On the initiative of Z. Brzezinski a propaganda ballyhoo has been kicked up in the United States regarding the notorious "arc of instability" embracing Southwest Asia and the Near East--that region has been announced as a zone of American "vital interests." Did the people over there not

pause to consider that, for a considerable part of its length, the Washington-invented "arc" runs along the Soviet Union's southern borders and across the territory of its neighbors (Afghanistan included)--that is, through a region that is extremely important to the USSR's security and vital interests?

To be honest, when it is not an ordinary citizen, scared by propaganda, or a senile retired general who is babbling about the "Soviet threat," when politicians and experts of sound mind are discussing and arguing this topic, I have always had the impression that, in fact, these people are talking and arguing not about the Soviet Union and its might or intentions, but about the United States and the kind of American policy and U.S. place and role in the world they would like to see. It is simply that it is somehow more convenient to put forward the most shameless demands and claims while alluding to the Soviet Union--just see the lengths to which the USSR is driving modest, quiet and peace-loving America.

In fact, no one provoked the United States into toughening up its foreign policy. The United States "psyched" itself, drove itself into doing this and, what is more, over a pretty long period and pretty methodically and consistently. Here I would like to move on from the pseudo-reasons to the real reasons for the abrupt turnabout in American policy. These must be sought above all in the United States itself.

In short, these are reasons of two kinds. Some of them are factors that have changed the U.S. ruling circles' stance and ensured that the wing that had long been seeking this turnabout--although for a long time without any success--prevailed in the struggle under way there. Others are factors that changed the political situation in the country so much that they permitted the ruling circles to effect the turnabout in policy.

I will begin with the first reasons.

Modern America entirely bears out Lenin's analysis of the various trends constantly struggling within the ruling bourgeoisie's ranks over the main political issues, including questions of war and peace.<sup>1</sup> It is well known that extremely influential groups of the ruling class were opposed to detente literally from its inception--the military-industrial complex and later also the oil monopolies; the military elite, part of the bureaucratic apparatus and part of the mass media connected with them; Zionist circles, and others. This was manifested with the utmost clarity back during the debate over discussion of the Soviet-American SALT I agreement in 1972 and the debate on trade legislation in 1973-1974. Although in some instances these groups succeeded in forcing acceptance of decisions that caused appreciable damage to positive political trends, they could not stop those trends.

The need for changes having deep roots in objective reality was too obvious. At the turn of the 1960's the United States was in a situation of acute



multifaceted crisis. Not just among the public, but also in America's ruling class (including a considerable section of its conservative right wing) the prevailing viewpoint was that the only way out for the United States was to embark on a review of the basic principles of foreign policy, at the very least renouncing extremes of cold war. At that time most of the ruling circles understood a truth that American political scientist R. Barnett had recently recalled--the truth that "societies die if they cannot adapt quickly enough to changes in the surrounding world."<sup>2</sup>

What was objectively placed on the agenda (to use the language of class struggle) were not, of course, revolutionary changes, but an extremely profound and fundamental reform of U.S. policy--an adaptation of it to the changes taking place in the world, to new realities, including the changed correlation of forces. A reform of an importance and scale that inevitably foreordained an acutely conflicting political process.

After all, the question essentially posed was that of breaking with the aims, notions and norms of political behavior of an entire era, the era of the absolutely unique position in which the United States found itself immediately after World War II. It found itself in this position because it was the only major power to have emerged from the war without any significant casualties and devastation, economically strengthened while its rivals had suffered unprecedented difficulties, a power which had a nuclear monopoly and supremacy in a whole series of important spheres of military technology. In short, it was a power, it seemed at the time, capable of buying almost everything and everybody and of suppressing by its superior forces or even destroying what it did not succeed in buying. The historical circumstances which enabled the United States to occupy this position were transient and irrepeatable. But they were perceived and accepted by many Americans as the natural and permanent order of things, promising the advent of "the American age."

Naturally, it was hard to part with these illusions and still harder to part with the policy based on them. How hard it is to give something up even when you have to give up something to which you never had any right. How hard it is to withdraw even from positions which can never be defended.

Understandably, under these conditions the formulation of U.S. foreign policy became an object of particularly keen struggle. While initially realistic trends gained the upper hand, in the second half of the 1970's this process of adapting policy to changes in the world began to slow down. This was largely promoted by the changes in the moods of more and more groups in the ruling class, coming under the influence of forces hostile to detente. A large part here was played by the widespread and persistent campaign mounted by these forces over the changes with which a considerable section of the U.S. ruling bourgeoisie found it particularly hard to come to terms.

One such change was the loss of U.S. military superiority, and the development of parity and approximate equality with the Soviet Union. This parity

has frequently been acknowledged verbally. But in fact attempts have been made to explain all U.S. defeats and failures in the international arena by the loss of military superiority. The reaction is absolutely wrong but very typical of imperialism in general and of U.S. imperialism in particular. It is connected with its attitude toward force, above all military force, as the main instrument of policy. This approach forced people to interpret these defeats as the result of insufficient military might and also of its insufficiently resolute utilization for the defense of U.S. "vital interests."

It was in the same spirit that U.S. ruling circles viewed the exacerbation of the problem of natural resources, particularly oil. Although for a long time it had been happy to talk about the growing "interdependence" of countries in our era, America's growing dependence on Near East oil was seen as intolerable "vulnerability" and thus as grounds for seeking special rights in this area--seeking them by every possible method, including force. The imperialist aspirations and demands were resurrected in a form so double-dyed and overt as would have been avoided in public utterances certainly since the end of the 19th century.

I will name yet another factor which is exercising an ever increasing influence on the position of a considerable number of representatives of U.S. ruling circles. This factor is China, or rather the illusions connected with it. Illusions that rapprochement with the chauvinist Chinese leadership, which is hostile toward detente and which is kindling anti-Soviet hysteria, can change the balance of power and strengthen America's position to such an extent that it will be able to totally dispense with detente and will once again be able to throw its weight around the world.

All this intensified the feelings of animosity and adventurism in the U.S. ruling elite, which gave rise to corresponding political concepts--concepts whereby U.S. military and economic might grows as a factor of world politics the more crudely and brusquely it is used, suppressing some people and putting fear into others.

True, support for this kind of concept, so far as can be judged, has been far from unconditional (and it is hard to say how longterm the support is). But it has been enough for the government to embark on an abrupt change of course. Many specific facts and details of the process leading up to this decision are still unknown. It is difficult even to say how orderly this process was. You must not simplify the situation in the United States and see order and organization where there is none, where there is a constant lurching from one side to the other and where an apparently well-conceived political mechanism does not preclude the adoption of rash decisions which are often even detrimental to U.S. interests.

It obviously took more than changes in the mood of the ruling elite to alter the course. It was necessary to undermine the public's resistance to attempts to turn away from detente toward a new version of cold war.

As is known, detente and its chief aspects, such as improving relations and developing mutually beneficial cooperation with the USSR and limiting the arms race, had the support of the overwhelming majority of Americans. That is why the opponents of detente spent a long time making a desperate effort to poison the political atmosphere. It was to this end that the hysterical "Soviet threat" campaign was mounted and everything was done to fuel nationalist and even chauvinist sentiments. Tales were invented about the "sudden" discovery of a "Soviet combat brigade" in Cuba, although Soviet military specialists had been working there for many years and Washington itself had repeatedly admitted that this was no threat to U.S. security. Highly skillful use has been made, in order to kindle chauvinist feelings, of the difficulties encountered by the United States, especially the recent crisis in Iranian-U.S. relations and the taking hostage of the American Embassy employees. Attempts were made to beat a path to the hearts and national feelings of Americans through their pocketbooks and gas tanks by calling the energy crisis and, in part, inflation the consequences of the "national humiliation," "decline" and "impotence" of the United States.

All these efforts were bound to have an impact, especially since to some extent they were made in a favorable atmosphere. Indeed it is a fact that under U.S. conditions even today it is far more beneficial and safer for politicians to err by "leaning" to the right, in the direction of implacability, hatred and toughness. For some reason this position is regarded as being more patriotic, although in a nuclear age it threatens the country with the greatest misfortune. For some reason this position is seen as being more sober and realistic, although what could be more illusory today than to pin hopes of security on the arms race and the policy of force. The fact that the quick-drawing cowboy is not only the favorite movie hero but is also a political symbol dear to the hearts of many Americans is not the sole factor here.

The surviving legacy of hegemonism, cold war and anticommunism remains an important factor in U.S. politics. Also, by all appearances, the ideas not only about national but also about personal security--ideas nurtured by the cold war and by the dark period of McCarthyism. I must mention in this connection the observation by Professor J. Galbraith that the arms race is nourished in the United States by the economic interests of influential groups, and that this interest is maintained by the "two great fears" that permeate American politics. One of them is the fear of communism, typical of conservatives. The other is the fear of appearing soft in relation to communism, typical of liberals (and, in the professor's view, even more dangerous since few people today are capable of achieving such a level of irrationality as the liberal who feels he must show that he is firmer with the Reds than anyone else is).<sup>3</sup>

A role has also been played by the peculiarities of the U.S. political mechanism, which enable a well-organized minority possessing financial resources to inhibit or even paralyze the conduct of a policy supported by the majority.



The well-known American diplomatic and foreign policy researcher G. Kennan analyzed these and other peculiarities of the U.S. State power mechanism and wrote that if the country was badly prepared even in the days of De Tocqueville for well-coordinated and purposeful participation in the complex ins and outs of world politics, it is even less adapted today. Kennan lays particular emphasis on the system's unsuitability to carry out "ambitious political and military undertakings far from its own shores" (like the Vietnam adventure) and the unsoundness of the idea of "American world leadership or imperial might."<sup>4</sup> The experience of recent years, however, has shown that great difficulties also occur for the same reasons in the pursuit of a consistent, stable course of detente and cooperation.

But maybe detente in the United States has simply had back luck. The governments in power in the 1970's (excluding, perhaps, the Nixon Administration, and that for only a very short period--until the Watergate scandal) either did not want, were unable or were afraid to consistently pursue this course. This applies particularly to the current administration--its policy has greatly contributed to the deterioration of the political situation. Last February, TIME magazine, quoting a State Department aide to the effect that Z. Brzezinski has "at last got his cold war," noted very perspicaciously that the situation, which at first glance confirms the validity of the "hard" line toward the USSR which he had been preaching for a long time, was in many respects created through his own efforts, through his anti-Soviet policy.<sup>5</sup> Of course, it is not simply that the President's advisers and some other administration representatives have managed to impose particular anti-Soviet actions on the government. The President and the administration as a whole have been guilty of vacillations and zigzags in important policy matters which have rocked the foundation of detente and objectively helped to strengthen the positions of its opponents. This has been the policy of the administration as a whole.

In America many people like to criticize detente for depriving Washington of will and determination in dealing with other countries, in particular in using military force. But if one is talking about the United States lacking will and determination in the 1970's, then it was primarily in the implementation of the detente policy, in efforts to limit the arms race and strengthen trust. This was the main reason for the fact that, despite all the benefits of the 1970's, it was in many ways a decade of missed opportunities.

It was right to note the significance of the fact that the adoption of important foreign policy decisions has coincided on this occasion with the start of the new election campaign in the United States. In fact, election eve in America is a bad time for good politics and a good time for bad politics.

But that is enough about the reasons. Let us turn to another question: What are the potential real consequences of the American policy changes? What will they mean for the world, and for the United States?



In answering this, it is necessary above all not to underestimate the dangers entailed by the shift in U.S. policy. The U.S. President was quick to call the events in Afghanistan the biggest threat to world peace since the end of World War II. Let this statement weigh on his conscience. One can clearly say, without any exaggeration, that it was the U.S. move away from detente toward the exacerbation of the international situation and the policy of force that have been the biggest threat to world peace in the last 10 years, at any rate. This is not rhetoric. The second edition of the cold war would be more dangerous than the first for a number of reasons.

First, a return to totally unbridled hostility and a relation of confrontation, to a policy whose supreme, self-contained aim is to hurt the other side at all costs, would take place at a new and more dangerous level of development of the means of destruction. And this, many specialists believe, would make military conflict more likely, and its consequences even more devastating.

It is believed--and quite rightly--that new twists in the arms race will not only increase the quantity of weapons but will also undermine strategic stability. Already on the way are weapons systems which will revive fears of the possibility of a preemptive, preventive strike (the MX and Trident-II missiles, new warheads with increased accuracy and so on), and also systems which will render more difficult monitoring and surveillance of the other side and which will thus increase mutual distrust even more, and hinder, if not make impossible, agreements on the limitation of arms (the Max and cruise missiles and so forth). Finally, an unbridled arms race will significantly increase the danger of the further spread and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world (we can already see how the change in the U.S. position vis-a-vis Pakistan makes it easier for the latter to implement its nuclear plans). This is a massive threat to international security and to U.S. security.

Second, many more participants in international relations would be dragged into the maelstrom of the cold war. And in a conflict situation an increase in their numbers is accompanied by an increased risk--especially if some of these participants are inclined to play the most senseless and irresponsible game in the world arena. This applies primarily to China. The West and especially the United States are clearly passing the point, or, perhaps, have already passed the point, beyond which, in exchange for the "China card," they have to assume burdensome and dangerous commitments and allow Beijing to use its new-found friends in its own political games.

As is known, Beijing has insatiable great-power designs and is making territorial and other claims on virtually all its neighbors. Like the United States, it regards itself as having the right to reward and punish others, and to "punish" them by means of direct military aggression. All this means that Beijing's friends have every chance of being drawn into conflicts which they would do better to avoid. The closer the United States and the other capitalist countries get to China, the more the latter's appetite and penchant for adventures will be inflamed.

In short, China with its plans will hardly "fit" the new American political schemes, schemes of heightened risk and military conflict brinkmanship which, naturally, demand increased confidence in the ability to control events. China is a power which will "go it alone" even in the new situation. Moreover, it is a nuclear power whose weapons can reach the territory of its closest neighbors at the moment, but which very soon will be able to reach U.S. territory. A power which even now is undermining the stability of a vast region and transforming the greater part of Asia into a zone of tension, arms race and potential conflicts.

The danger posed to the world situation by the new U.S. policy is also linked with other important circumstances. The coming decades will be a period of the serious exacerbation of global problems--natural resources and energy, food, the environment and others. Detente broadens the possibilities for resolving them, and under conditions of detente the very existence of global problems becomes a strong additional stimulus for international cooperation. Under cold war conditions, on the other hand, these problems whip up rivalry and enmity, and insuperable obstacles are erected in the way of their resolution.

That is what the new U.S. policy can bring the world. It cannot give America itself anything good. For the majority of the goals set by this policy are both unattainable and bear no relation to the real problems which will actually confront the United States in future years.

This applies, above all, to the goal of achieving military superiority. If the United States was unable to win the arms race before, when it had considerably more advantages, why should it succeed now that the economic, scientific and technical gap between America and the USSR has been considerably reduced?

The realistic nature of present plans for the constant buildup of military expenditure for many years ahead also gives rise to doubts. Of course, America is wealthy and has the world's most powerful economy. But this economy is also faced with very great and growing problems--in the common opinion there are not "fat" but "lean" years ahead of it. And many of these problems are related in one way or another to immoderate military spending. There is inflation and the budget deficit. There is unemployment (the funds spent on weapons, as has been established, create far fewer jobs than they would create in civilian sectors). There is the deceleration of scientific and technical progress and thus of the growth of the economy's efficiency (an enormous proportion of scientists and engineers are diverted into the development of weapons).

Finally, there is also a whole tangle of complex social problems in the United States requiring colossal funds for their solution--problems of social security, housing, health care and education, the problems of the big cities, transportation and others. For the sake of the new military programs, the appropriations for these are being cut back now. But this cannot be done endlessly without running the risk of grave upheavals.

Seeing these difficulties does not mean exaggerating them. As yet America can still pour many more billions into the bottomless barrel of the arms race. But the war in Vietnam has already shown that this potential is not unlimited and that, having reached a certain level, military spending begins to disrupt the foundations of the economy, to undermine the economy's viability and to cause domestic political conflict.

But the main things lie elsewhere. What can America purchase for these hundreds of billions of dollars? The security, they say, which allegedly is threatened by the Soviet Union. But the real threat to the national security, and even to the national existence, of the United States does not emanate from the Soviet Union. It lies in the continuing arms race, in the tension and unresolved conflicts which persist in the world and threaten to get out of control and act as the fuse for a thermonuclear catastrophe. And the shift in U.S. policy not only does not eliminate, but seriously aggravates, these true sources of the threat to U.S. security.

Evidently, U.S. relations with its allies are not taking shape very simply. One reason for the U.S. aggressive circles' reluctance to come to terms with detente was their conviction that it was intensifying centrifugal trends in the West by creating an atmosphere of "slackness" and "demobilization mentality." That is why Washington resolved to obtain from the "Soviet threat" campaign and the toughening of its political line a "dividend," such as the shortening of the leash on which the United States keeps its allies and the strengthening of the imperialist alliances.

In fact everything is proving far more complex. The U.S. allies have a deeper interest than the United States in preserving and even intensifying detente. And not only because they know better than the United States the hardships and troubles which war brings, having experienced them for themselves. For perfectly objective reasons, they and the United States have different attitudes toward many of the likely consequences of the abandonment of detente and the return to cold war. For the United States, Europe ultimately remains a remote approach to its territory, a distant trans-Atlantic bridgehead in a possible "local" conflict. But for its Western European allies, conflicts of this sort are far from a local matter, they are a matter of life and death, a question of their physical existence. In addition, for the Western European countries and for Japan, more important, truly vital interests are indeed linked with economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations with the socialist countries. Although even now the United States can "twist the arms" of individual allies, the new U.S. policy, the backsliding toward cold war, will most likely split rather than rally them and will create new pretexts for contradictions.

There is also another aspect here, an important one both for the U.S. allies and for all other countries. The sharp turn Washington has taken in its foreign policy has been accompanied by the violation of many of the commitments it has undertaken (treaty commitments included) and of its



assurances and promises. This shift has demonstrated once again an absolutely definite style of policy--fluctuation, high-handed treatment of others, total lack of restraint, the readiness to subordinate important foreign policy issues to considerations of short-term advantage, including considerations linked with domestic policy maneuvering and infighting. All of this confirms something which has been said in recent years not only by America's enemies but also by its friends--it is unreliable as a partner, as a participant in international relations.

Hopes of the "advantages" which the resurrection of interventionism, envisaged by the "Carter doctrine," will give America are unfounded, to say the least. Even from the purely military aspect of the matter, while duly acknowledging the interventionist potential of the "quick-reaction corps" now being set up in the United States, one nonetheless cannot forget that there were four to five times more U.S. troops in Vietnam than in this corps, and that did not save them from defeat. But the political aspect is even more important. From this viewpoint, the new U.S. policy is an example of a truly classic lapse of historical memory, of incomprehensibly obstinate attempts to distort the true reasons for its foreign policy defeats and failures and to depict them, despite everything the history of past decades teaches us, as the result of U.S. "weakness" and "irresoluteness" and of the development of detente.

In fact there was a completely different reason for the failures--the United States' traditional imperialist approach to other countries and the practice, entrenched during the cold war, of supporting authoritarian, corrupt regimes hostile to the people. Implanting dictators for decades and justifying this with clumsy maxims like "he may be son of a bitch but at least he is our son of a bitch," the United States was, to all appearances, placing delayed-action mines under the future of its own policy, mines which are now exploding one after another. This was one of the main lessons of Vietnam, convincingly confirmed in the 1970's in other "crisis points" in the world, particularly Iran. In actual fact it would be absurd to assert, for instance, that the shah's opponents had superior military strength at the time of the revolution. The revolutionary situation in Iran arose precisely as a result of the systematic abuse of force for over 25 years, since the Americans deliberately interfered in Iran's affairs in 1953 and overthrew the Mossadeq government to put the shah in power. Furthermore, the events in Iran cannot be viewed in isolation. The forms which they assumed are, to some extent, linked with the entire situation in the region, especially the unsettled nature of the Near East problem.

The question of the reasons for these failures retains not only theoretical, but also historical, significance for the United States. The existing approach perpetuates errors; sooner or later they will have to be paid for. There are many countries--in Latin America, the Near East and other regions--which could have scores to settle with Washington. It is perfectly clear that far from all these delayed-action mines have already exploded. But Washington seems not to be thinking of this at present.



Instead of rendering existing mines harmless, people in Washington are, to all appearances, engaged in something else, adding more and more new mines and creating additional problems for themselves in the future. It looks as though the present line toward Pakistan, where the United States is operating in accordance with classic cold war scripts, presents such a threat.

The gamble on a forcible military solution when it is justified by U.S. "vital interests," such as the need for oil, looks even more dubious. Let us leave aside even the moral aspect of the matter and look at the question practically. It is undoubtedly possible to do ~~some~~ things by military force--to bomb, destroy and burn oilfields, oil pipelines and oil refineries. But surely this will not produce oil. No. The problem of oil deliveries from the Near East, from the Persian Gulf countries, does not lend itself to a military solution. Peace in this region, the renunciation of interference in its countries' internal affairs, just and equal relations with them--these are the essential political conditions for a real solution.

The raw material problem in general equally fails to lend itself to a military solution. Peace is also needed for its resolution. And it is still essential to realize how new the developing situation is and what grave changes it will require in many spheres of life. For instance, what proportion of imported oil, for whose sake the United States is now prepared to bomb the Near Eastern and Persian Gulf countries, kill their inhabitants and essentially start a war which entails a threat to the United States itself, goes to meet the United States' truly vital interests? Given the dwindling stocks of oil (and sooner or later of many other types of natural resources as well), is it possible to continue the thoughtless expenditure of resources on the arms race and on the excesses of a way of life which developed long ago, under different conditions?

With the aid of their aggressive policy and war, the United States and the other Western countries will not be able to maintain their existing standard of living, much less improve it. For this a different policy and different methods are needed, capable of mobilizing all scientific and production potential to conservative goals, developing broad international cooperation and creating a favorable political climate for this.

Testifying before the Senate committee discussing the SALT II treaty, Stanley Hoffmann, the well-known U.S. international relations expert, recently remarked quite rightly that the reasons for the foreign policy failures which have overtaken the United States are connected "not with muscles but with brains."<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, Washington is seeking the solution of its problems in the all-round buildup and increasingly impudent use of military muscle.

This line does not convey an impression of determination or firmness. On the contrary, it looks like an example of political bigotry and intellectual cowardice. Whether its creators wanted it or not, Washington's

political course is an attempt to avoid real, complex problems at a very difficult and crucial time, to hide from the difficulties which exist behind hackneyed political cliches and formulas which have already proved to be unsound. This policy has no future. But it can, and already does, cause harm.

The extent of this harm will, of course, depend largely on how long this policy holds out and how actively they succeed in implementing it. These questions are still open. And not only because there is much which is simply unrealistic in the "Carter doctrine." No less important is the fact that, with the proclamation of this doctrine, the struggle over the main trends in the development of international relations does not end, but flares up with new vigor.

No one should have any doubts as to the stand which the USSR will take in this struggle. In his speeches, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has stressed that, in firmly rebuffing aggression, the Soviet Union will at the same time unwaveringly follow the peace program advanced by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, consistently pursue a policy of peace and detente and strive for arms limitation and the peaceful settlement of existing conflicts. "We set the doctrine of a consistent struggle for peace and security on earth against the 'doctrine' of military hysteria and a frenzied arms race," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed.

The other socialist states will be with the Soviet Union in this struggle. It will meet with broad support among the developing countries.

Many European capitalist countries and Japan do not want a return to cold war either. This can be seen already. Changes in political mood can also be expected in the United States itself. The Americans have been kept in a state of almost permanent political crisis since last September. Although this seems to have improved the President's chances in the forthcoming elections, the country can scarcely be successfully kept in this state indefinitely.

No one expects the Americans and their allies to approve of the April revolution in Afghanistan and the aid the Soviet Union rendered it. But as the dust settles from the anti-Soviet campaign, which has now been unleashed, an atmosphere conducive to sober thought will take shape. In this atmosphere it will be easier to see all events in their true proportions, to assess and resolve them sensibly; just because you do not like something, is it worth it to destroy and smash everything necessary and vitally essential--hopes for lasting peace and the cessation of the arms race, detente and mutually advantageous cooperation? Especially since, despite the panic-stricken assertions of U.S. propaganda, no one will see Soviet tanks and soldiers on the shores of the Persian Gulf or other warm-water seas?

It is to be presumed that not much time will be needed for people to realize the full monstrous absurdity of what Washington is now doing in Soviet-U.S. relations. But it must be said here that the U.S. administration

is not hesitating--it is destroying and smashing outright, with some glee, what was created at the price of prolonged and persistent labor. It is as though they have long been dreaming of this, merely waiting for the occasion to present itself." Great harm has been done to the arms limitation talks, in which the United States has no less an interest than the Soviet Union. Economic and cultural relations have been put back, the accord on direct air communications is being violated, many measures in scientific cooperation are being disrupted and an atmosphere is being fueled which is directly inciting criminal hooligan attacks by anti-Soviet groups. All this harms not only Soviet interests but U.S. interests as well. What was gathered literally crumb by crumb--some minimal stock of mutual trust and understanding, without which it is so hard to build normal relations--has suffered seriously. All this, it must be said, is being done very swiftly and efficiently. After all, destroying is not the same as building!

But there is nowhere to go along this path. And it is important to Washington to think seriously about this. Ultimately a policy should have a goal. After all, a course which has already been tested and proven bankrupt in the early 1970's is being offered for the 1980's. There will scarcely be many people, and that also goes for the Americans and their allies, willing to travel this path again under even more dangerous conditions.

An extremely crucial moment is coming in international relations. The fate of peace depends largely on whether the aggressive U.S. circles' new adventures and their obvious intention to revert to the cold war meet with a fitting rebuff.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 287; vol 45, p 70.
2. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 1 April 1979, p 68.
3. "Detente or Debacle: Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Relations," N.Y., 1979, pp 48-49.
4. G. Kennan, "The Cloud of Danger." For a Russian translation, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1979, pp 92-93.
5. TIME, 4 February 1980, p 14.
6. "The SALT-II Treaty," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Wash., 1979, pt IV, p 282.

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## NEW PHASE IN AMERICAN-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 55-63

[Article by P. G. Litavrin and P. P. Yakovlev]

[Text] Considerable changes have taken place in the last 3 years in the relations between the two largest states of the Western Hemisphere: the United States of America and the Federative Republic of Brazil. Essentially these changes have consisted in the exacerbation of conflicts in the spheres of military policy, trade and economics. The significance of these changes extends far beyond the bounds of bilateral U.S.-Brazilian ties, as they are having a perceptible effect on relations between the two Americas and between the West and the developing world as a whole.

A new kind of relationship between the United States and Brazil took shape at the beginning of the 1970's, based on Washington's policy of subimperialism. Its purpose was the energetic U.S. utilization of the strongest states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, with reactionary and conservative regimes in power, as transmitters of imperialist policy in these regions. The new U.S. line in relations with Brazil pursues the goal of involving it in the struggle against the liberation movement in Latin America and turning the Brazilian regime into a protector of U.S. interests. To this end, extensive use was made of Brazil's political weight and influence in Latin America, its growing economic strength, its intelligence and repressive systems and its willingness to use military force. At the same time, American policy reserved Brazil a certain degree of independence in world affairs, which was a direct result of its growing economic and military potential and the great-power ambitions of its ruling circles.<sup>1</sup>

The new U.S.-Brazilian relationship reached the height of its development in the first half of the 1970's, when the Republican Administration was in power in the United States.

First of all, in accordance with the principles of the "Nixon Doctrine," it was Brazil that was assigned the main role in the struggle against the liberation movement in Latin America. The participation of the Brazilian regime in preparing for and conducting reactionary coups in Bolivia, Chile



and Uruguay conclusively demonstrated its willingness to play an active counterrevolutionary role. The uninterrupted functioning of the economic "model of development" in Brazil was of equal importance to the United States as an alternative to the attempts of several Latin American countries to eradicate their dependence on imperialism and gain real economic independence. Counting on Brazil to promote imperialist policies, the United States took the desires of its leading circles for leadership in the region into account. It is therefore not surprising that R. Nixon said the following in December 1971, at the time of Brazilian President E. Garrastazu Medici's U.S. visit: "As Brazil goes, so goes the rest of Latin America."<sup>2</sup>

Striving to carry out its plans, the United States has given Brazil strong financial support. The following data are extremely indicative: Average annual investments by foreign monopolies in Brazil were 70 million dollars in 1960-1964, and 770 million in 1972-1974--that is, 11 times as great. Between 1960 and 1964 Brazil received an average of 350 million dollars a year in foreign loans, but the indicator in 1972-1974 was 5.1 billion--that is, almost 15 times as high.<sup>3</sup> Not one nation in the developing world has ever been the recipient of such huge dollar "injections." Loans and credit unprecedented in scale have been extended to Brazil by U.S.-controlled international capitalist banks and finance organizations: the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank. There is no question that the all-round support of the United States and other Western countries played the deciding role in strengthening the authority of the present military-technocratic regime.

In the 1970's, Brazil actually became the U.S. monopolies' chief base of operations, not only in Latin America but in the developing world as a whole. Between 1970 and 1977, for example, the investments of U.S. corporations in Brazil rose from 1.9 billion dollars to 6 billion, which represented over 17 percent of their total investments in the developing countries and over 21 percent of their Latin American investments.<sup>4</sup> By firmly establishing themselves in Brazil and, in particular, by penetrating deeply into Brazilian Government and private firms, U.S. corporations acquired additional opportunities for expansion in dozens of developing states and even some developed capitalist countries, thereby reinforcing the international positions of the United States and enhancing the competitive potential of the American economy.

Brazil's metamorphosis into the "privileged ally" of the United States in this region allowed Washington to reduce its direct participation in the struggle against the Latin American liberation movement while still hampering--in some areas--the advance of patriotic and anti-imperialist forces. In exchange for this, Washington continued to not only give the Brazilian regime considerable financial aid, but also to support its great-power ambitions, which became particularly apparent in February 1976, at the time of the signing of the U.S.-Brazilian "mutual understanding memorandum,"

in accordance with which the United States began to regard Brazil as a "great power" and promised to conduct summit-level political consultations with it.<sup>5</sup>

The signing of this document was assessed in diplomatic circles as recognition de jure of the special nature of U.S.-Brazilian relations and as a judicial announcement of the political alliance that had developed between the two countries. Subsequent events showed, however, that the U.S.-Brazilian "partnership" was threatened by serious internal conflicts, which became quite distinct at the end of the 1970's.

The new realities of U.S.-Brazilian relations, with which the Carter Administration had to deal, were largely the result of a relative reduction in Brazil's trade, economic, military and political dependence on the United States, which led to a change in the balance of power between them.

An important factor with an increasing effect on the nature of U.S.-Brazilian relations is indisputably the general growth of Brazilian economic potential. For example, whereas the 1950 gross domestic product (GDP) in Brazil (in constant 1970 prices and in terms of the actual purchasing power of currency) was slightly over 6 percent of the corresponding U.S. indicator, the figure had risen to over 16 percent in 1976. Moreover, in terms of GDP, which reached 200 billion dollars in 1979, Brazil is ahead of even such large developed capitalist states as Great Britain, Italy and Canada.<sup>6</sup>

At the same time, the diversification of Brazil's foreign economic ties considerably reduced the U.S. share of its foreign trade turnover: from 33-35 percent in the mid-1960's to 20 percent in the mid-1970's.<sup>7</sup> The one-sided economic dependence on the United States is also being weakened by the expanded activities of Western European (primarily West German) and Japanese monopolies in Brazil. In the 1970's the growth rate of investments in the Brazilian economy by American international corporations was already lagging behind the growth rate of the capital investments of West German and Japanese monopolies. During special hearings in the U.S. Congress, it was noted that the rate of increase in Japanese investments in the Brazilian economy in the first half of the 1970's was 5 times as high as the rate of increase in U.S. investments.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the share of the U.S. monopolies in total foreign investments in Brazil decreased from 48 percent in 1969 to 32 percent in 1977 and is still diminishing. Western European and Japanese rivals have presented branches of American international corporations with serious competition in such key branches of the Brazilian economy as the chemical industry, electrical engineering, the automotive industry and metallurgy. The priority of U.S. monopolies in some other branches has also been threatened. To compete with American international corporations, Western European and Japanese monopolies often offer their partners more advantageous terms and, as a result, are taking over more and more of the Brazilian market.<sup>9</sup>

These facts indicate that the forces most closely connected with Western European and Japanese capital are acquiring more influence in the camp of the Brazilian bourgeoisie. The development of this tendency will most certainly lead to the gradual renunciation by Brazilian ruling circles of their unconditional "emulation of Washington" and to a search for new foreign policy alternatives.

An important symptom of the decline of U.S. hegemony was Brazil's departure from its excessive emulation of Washington in foreign policy matters, which was particularly apparent in the noticeable reduction of the U.S. share of total Brazilian purchases of foreign weapons. According to the data of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, for example, Brazil purchased 690 million dollars' worth of military equipment abroad between 1967 and 1976, and the U.S. share of this amount was 300 million, or less than 45 percent, whereas its share was 70-75 percent in the 1940's and 1950's.<sup>10</sup> At the end of the 1970's, however, Brazil turned into a large exporter of weapons itself, exporting them to 33 countries for a sum exceeding 800 million dollars a year.

A severe blow was dealt to U.S. hegemony by the conclusion of the Brazilian-West German nuclear agreement in June 1975, in accordance with which West German monopolies will build two large nuclear power stations in Brazil by 1985 (and, possibly, another six by 1990), as well as a plant for the production of nuclear fuel, a regeneration installation and a plant for the concentration of uranium. This means that if this agreement is carried out, Brazil will have a full nuclear fuel cycle, as a result of which, as we know, it will be able to acquire plutonium for the development of an atomic weapon. Brazil is not party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This fact, which arouses completely justified worries about the Brazilian-West German bargain, became the pretext for pointed criticism of the agreement in the United States,<sup>11</sup> particularly since Brazilian ruling circles have declined to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty but they also have not concealed their desire to gain the status of a nuclear power.

But there is also another reason for Washington's worries. The fact is that the Brazilian-West German agreement has weakened the position of U.S. monopolies in the world market for nuclear technology and they have lost extremely sizable orders (this transaction is valued at 12 billion dollars). It is indicative that U.S. monopolies accounted for 85 percent of all exports of nuclear equipment from the capitalist countries prior to 1972, but the figure had dropped to 42 percent by 1977.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, even in this area there has been an obvious change in the balance of power, and not in the United States' favor.

The broadening of foreign economic horizons has also been accompanied by a sharp increase in Brazilian foreign political contacts. In just 3 years (1974-1976), this country opened 26 new embassies outside the Western Hemisphere and signed 240 bilateral agreements with 56 states.



The development of relations with the socialist community is of particular importance. Brazil's commodity turnover with these states, for example, rose from 171 million dollars in 1970 to 1.03 billion in 1976--that is, 6-fold--which considerably surpassed the growth rate of Brazilian foreign trade as a whole.<sup>13</sup>

The broader contact with the socialist community testifies to the gradual departure of Brazilian ruling circles from the reactionary foreign policy theories with which they armed themselves in the mid-1960's and are necessitating certain adjustments in diplomatic practices. It is indicative that the idea of "responsible pragmatism" declared by the Brazilian Government in 1974 in foreign policy was interpreted in the United States not only as a desire to "gain markets in the socialist states," but also as a departure from "militant anticommunism."<sup>14</sup>

It should be stressed that the desire of Brazilian ruling circles to diversify their foreign economic and political contacts was partly due to the crisis of the Brazilian "model of development," which offered the possibility of considerably accelerating rates of economic growth but simultaneously led the nation into a blind alley of unprecedented economic and financial dependence on international monopolistic capital and on transnational corporations. By the end of 1979 the Brazilian foreign debt amounted to 48 billion dollars. In this context, the broadening of commercial contacts with the socialist community not only introduces new features into U.S.-Brazilian relations, but also strengthens Brazil's international position as a whole by familiarizing it with a system of world economic relations free of inequality and exploitation.

In the second half of the 1970's, Brazil also instituted much more active relations and contacts with other developing countries. It began to play a more important role in the "Group of 77" and its desire to become the leader of the developing world was seen more distinctly. This is attested to by certain steps taken by this nation, such as its vote in favor of the reorganization of international economic relations, its condemnation of Israeli aggression and racism from the UN rostrum and its establishment and development of relations with the People's Republic of Angola. There is no question that these actions of the "privileged ally" are contrary to the interests of U.S. imperialism. Dramatizing the situation somewhat, the NEW YORK TIMES reported in this connection that, in the middle of the 1970's, "the United States and Brazil disagreed on key economic international issues."<sup>15</sup> In reality, naturally, things are quite different. Nonetheless, new tendencies in Brazilian foreign policy are arousing increasing anxiety in Washington.

In view of all these facts, several prominent American politicians and researchers, particularly Z. Brzezinski and R. Fontaine, believe that Brazil is turning into a local "power center"--that is, into a country with considerable economic and military potential, as well as growing political influence and--due to the relatively high level of diversification in foreign contacts--a certain degree of independence and freedom of



movement in the world arena.<sup>16</sup> According to Z. Brzezinski, Brazil, by virtue of its tremendous quantities of natural and human resources, has more chance of becoming a "superpower" than, for example, Japan.<sup>17</sup>

A new approach to Brazil was also necessitated by the exacerbation of U.S. relations with the developing countries in the 1970's. American political thinkers began to regard Brazil not only as the most important and most successful developing country, but also as a budding "great power," occupying a unique intermediate position with part of its interests connected with the developing world and part with the West. Under these conditions, according to A. Fishlow, prominent American expert on Latin American affairs, U.S. policy is aimed at "cutting off" Brazil from the mainstream of the developing countries and completely "uniting" it with the West.<sup>18</sup>

But the United States' attempts to keep Brazil as the West's ally in its sphere of influence met with serious obstacles stemming from the peculiarities of the internal development of this nation and the policies of the ruling regime, which has its own interpretation of Brazil's objectives and place in the world.

In addition, J. B. Figueiredo, new president of Brazil, stressed in an interview with the Mexican journal VISION that his government adhered to the principles of diplomatic pluralism presently lying at the basis of the further establishment and expansion of Brazilian foreign political contacts, and spoke in favor of broader contacts with the socialist and developing countries.<sup>19</sup>

Nonetheless, Washington made an attempt to counteract Brazilian foreign policy trends undesirable to the United States.

First of all, Washington tried to prevent the total implementation of the Brazilian-West German nuclear agreement. Immediately after the Democrats took power, U.S. Vice President W. Mondale met with FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt and suggested changes in the parts of the agreement which pertain to the provision of Brazil with the technology and equipment for the concentration of uranium and the regeneration of spent fuel. In response to this demarche, Bonn announced that any change in the agreement would have to be initiated by Brazil and that the FRG had no intention of amending the document and would not even try to discern the Brazilian Government's views on this matter.

For the same purpose, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State W. Christopher went to Brazil at the end of February 1977. His trip did not produce the desired results either.

At that same time, the Carter Administration launched a campaign in "defense of human rights" against Brazil, stressing that its approach to the Brazilian regime was different from the policy of the Republicans. Whereas in 1976 the United States was trying to keep Brazil within its

orbit of influence by signing the "memorandum on mutual understanding," Carter announced that he did not regard this nation as the leader in Latin America because the regime in power did not respect human rights.<sup>20</sup> (This, incidentally, is the truth and has been discussed by the world public.) The United States simultaneously cut off military aid to its southern partner.

In continuing to regard Brazil as an "object of its policy," the United States obviously did not believe that it would "accept the challenge." In response to Washington's pressure, the Brazilian regime canceled the military agreements it had concluded with the United States back in 1952. Although these agreements were outdated and were not of any great importance to Brazil, their cancellation pushed U.S.-Brazilian relations into the zone of obvious crisis, which became even more acute when the United States held up shipments of nuclear fuel for the first Brazilian nuclear power station, built by the American Westinghouse Electric company.<sup>21</sup>

It is possible that Brazil's cancellation of the military agreements was a surprise to the White House, which most probably did not want to exacerbate bilateral relations to this degree, but it is also apparent that the United States was deliberately complicating these relations by attempting to exert pressure on Brazil.

The exacerbation of U.S.-Brazilian relations aroused pointed dissatisfaction in the U.S. circles which still regard Brazil as Washington's "privileged ally" in Latin America. In particular, reports in the American press expressed the misgiving at that time that White House policy would so alienate Brazil from the United States that it would restore its relations with Cuba and even work toward a "military pact with the Russians."<sup>22</sup>

Encountering a more resolute Brazilian position than it had expected and opposition within the country, the White House changed its tactics. In April 1977, J. Carter proposed a compromise in the form of an international agreement on the provision of such countries as Brazil with nuclear fuel. But this idea did not arouse any enthusiasm in Brazil or in the FRG. Moreover, Bonn sent the Brazilian leaders a special message to reaffirm its intention to completely fulfill all points of the agreement. This dealt a severe blow to the Washington Administration's maneuvers.

Considerable changes in White House views became apparent after the American President's meeting with other Western leaders in London (May 1977). It was after this meeting that Washington, according to the American press, recognized the Brazilian-West German agreement as an established fact.<sup>23</sup> The White House simultaneously took steps to normalize relations with Brazil: In the middle of May 1977, Assistant Secretary of State T. Todman for inter-American affairs visited Brazil, and in July of the same year Carter sent a personal message to President E. Geisel, which was interpreted in diplomatic circles as an attempt to smooth out American-Brazilian conflicts. Finally, in November 1977, Washington lifted the ban on shipments of nuclear fuel to Brazil.

But the deterioration of U.S.-Brazilian relations, the absence of tangible results from the pressure exerted on Brazil and the mounting criticism within the United States itself of the administration's behavior in this matter called for more effective measures. In March 1978, President J. Carter went to Brazil.<sup>24</sup> During this visit, debatable issues--the nuclear agreement with the FRG and the "human rights" issue--were actually removed from the agenda of the talks with the Brazilian leadership. The American President even tried to remove these issues from the framework of bilateral relations and to focus attention on the two countries' areas of convergence by describing the complications in their relations as temporary. "The important factors connecting us with Brazil outweigh our differences," Carter said. He was forced, however, to admit that conflicts did exist in U.S.-Brazilian relations.<sup>25</sup>

American theoretical thought in recent years has focused on a search for ways of smoothing out the conflicts in relations with Brazil and finding new methods of exerting influence on this "obstinate" partner. Ideas about the need for internal political change in Brazil are becoming quite popular in U.S. ruling circles and the scientific community, and this should be a change followed by Brazilian foreign policy modifications acceptable to the United States. On the whole, this change has been associated with the gradual return of the nation to civilian rule or some liberalization of the regime.

The American ideas and theories regarding the liberalization of Brazil and the establishment of a bourgeois democratic order there in the future prove that neither official Washington nor the overwhelming majority of American political scientists have ever supported the true democratization of the government in this Latin American country, but simply want to "coordinate" domestic changes in this country with U.S. global objectives.

Many researchers and politicians in the United States have noted that the authoritarian nature of the Brazilian Government is already hampering its closer partnership with the Western democracies and its further economic and political development. The strategists of American imperialism, such as Z. Brzezinski and the experts on the Trilateral Commission, and the leaders of the European social democrats might, in principle, want to see a more "trustworthy" political system in this country, strengthen the position of the Brazilian national bourgeoisie and direct Brazilian development into the channel of bourgeois parliamentarism to prevent any possibility of a "violent change" within the nation in an "unpredictable direction." This, as American researcher E. Gaspar admits, is the reason for the criticism of the violation of human rights in Brazil, for statements that "success in economic development does not justify the violation of democratic freedoms" and the appeals for liberalization.<sup>26</sup> It is clear that Washington will indisputably have to consider objective trends in Brazil's internal political development--the increasing thirst for democratization in all population strata, the increasing strength of opposition forces and the growth of the workers movement.



The pressure exerted by Washington on Brazil for the purpose of liberalizing the regime was actually weak and intermittent. By the end of 1977 the administration had already demonstrated that it was prepared to be satisfied with the Brazilian military leadership's most insignificant steps to liberalize the regime. In fact, the presidents of the two countries exchanged messages expressing their agreement on the human rights issue. When the new government took power in Brazil (March 1979), Washington took an even softer stand. The new president of Brazil, J. B. de Oliveira Figueiredo, promised to establish "relative democracy" in the nation and restore the civilian government in the future; he announced several liberalization measures (the relaxation of censorship, the authorization of some strikes, and amnesty); Washington did not delay in expressing its satisfaction. Moreover, when U.S. Vice President W. Mondale visited Brazil in March 1979, he announced "total support for the domestic policy of the new government and its ideological position." The American press and official documents began to make frequent reference to the "improvement of the human rights situation" in Brazil, and the slight liberalization was extolled as a result of U.S. policy.<sup>27</sup>

The groundlessness of these statements is self-evident. It should be stressed that the recent changes in Brazil have resulted primarily from the nation's internal development, the persistent struggle of the masses for the restoration of democracy, the consolidation of forces opposing the dictatorship and the support of these forces by world progressive public opinion. The fact that Washington hastened to express "total" support for the domestic policy of the new Brazilian Government only underscores the hypocrisy of its campaign "in defense of human rights."

The two faced position of the Democratic Administration, reflected when it, on the one hand, expressed its displeasure with extremes and "excesses" in the policy of the Latin American dictatorship and, on the other, worries that their fall will be followed by "excessively rapid democratization," provides grounds for discussing Washington's latest "new" strategy in this region. According to increasingly frequent references in American political literature, the present purpose of U.S. policy toward Brazil or the other Latin American rightist authoritarian regimes is their gradual and painless (for Washington's interests) replacement with "moderate regimes."<sup>28</sup>

Another telltale fact is that, despite the complications that spring up in U.S.-Brazilian relations, the question of establishing a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) under the aegis of the United States has not been removed from the agenda. According to Washington strategists, Brazil will be expected to play far from the least significant role in this organization. The question of creating SATO was also discussed at the Atlantic conference in Brazil in November 1978, which was attended by prominent representatives of the U.S. military-industrial complex, presidential National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski, Assistant Secretary of State V. Vaky and politicians from Argentina and Brazil. Facts of this



kind testify to Washington's intention to find new ways of resuming and expanding military cooperation with Brazil. There is evidence, however, that these plans have not been supported by the Brazilian regime as yet. For example, when a governmental delegation from Angola visited Brazil in March 1979, the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs assured its members that his nation would not be a member of SATO. Moreover, at the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1979, the Brazilian delegation actively supported the need for disarmament.

In the second half of 1979, new signs of U.S.-Brazilian rapprochement were seen. The efforts and initiatives of the present American Administration have recently been aimed in this direction. The first steps of the new Brazilian Government, headed by General J. B. Figueiredo, proved that he was more likely than his predecessor to favor a continued close alliance with the United States.

On the whole, Washington policy has recently displayed a tendency toward "equilibrium" in relations with Brazil and a shift of emphasis from disputed issues to issues reflecting the common class views of the American and Brazilian bourgeoisie.

At the same time, it is obvious that, in spite of Washington's maneuvers, the tension in the sphere of trade and economic ties has not abated and is even escalating. Pointed dissatisfaction was aroused in Brazil in October 1979 by U.S. measures to raise loan interest rates, which would automatically increase the Brazilian foreign debt by another 500 million dollars. Washington also failed in its attempt to exert pressure on Brazil to curtail previously contracted shipments of grain to the USSR in connection with its absurd campaign against "Soviet intervention in Afghanistan." Representatives of the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture announced that Brazil would preserve its independent policy in foreign trade and would not support the measures proposed by the U.S. Government.

This state of affairs, in our opinion, indicates that an extremely solid and broad sphere of conflict has come into being and is still growing in U.S.-Brazilian relations, although the entire group of conflicts does not transcend the bounds of the class alliance between the U.S. monopolistic oligarchy and the Brazilian bourgeoisie. It is also apparent that U.S.-Brazilian relations are experiencing crisis and that ruling circles in both countries are making an effort to find a new kind of partnership corresponding to the realities of the present day.

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CSO: 1803

**PRESERVATION AND REVITALIZATION OF HISTORICAL BUILDINGS**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 64-77**

**[Article by A. V. Ikonnikov]**

**[Not translated by JPRS]**

**CSO: 1803**



## THE 'CHINA FACTOR' IN WASHINGTON'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVENTURES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 78-84

[Article by B. N. Zanegin]

[Text] The beginning of the current year in American-Chinese relations was marked by the U.S. secretary of defense's trip to the PRC (5-13 January 1980). The mass media in the United States and Beijing's propaganda machine did everything within their power to exaggerate the significance of these first U.S.-Chinese military contacts. Propaganda in both countries depicted them as the beginning of a far-reaching rapprochement and as an emergency measure supposedly taken in response to the "Soviet threat" to U.S. and PRC interests in Asia.

Behind the facade of this propaganda campaign, we can find the multifaceted and far from always identical interests of aggressive imperialist circles in the United States and the Beijing pretenders to hegemony in Asia. In this connection, it would be expedient to examine H. Brown's visit to the PRC and the present phase of U.S.-Chinese relations against the background of the situation that had taken shape in the United States by the beginning of the 1980 campaign, in the context of the changes the Democratic Administration is making in foreign policy and with consideration for some specific features of the domestic situation in the PRC and its international position.

The considerations that must now be taken into account by the United States include the well-known fact that the struggle of the increasingly unpopular President J. Carter for re-election is being waged in an atmosphere of mounting internal crisis, with which, as more and more American voters are now aware, the Democratic Administration cannot cope. The high rate of inflation, the constant rise in consumer prices, the unemployment and the arbitrary escalation of gasoline and heating fuel prices by the oil monopolies are directly affecting the vital needs of the American general public.

The internal crisis has been accompanied by considerable setbacks or, in essence, failures in American diplomacy. The weakening of U.S. foreign policy positions in the Arab world as a result of the Camp David

agreement, the lack of success in establishing American control over Mexican oil resources, the failure of steps to prevent national liberation revolutions and progressive social reforms in the liberated countries, particularly Afghanistan, the crisis instigated by the administration in relations with revolutionary Iran, which evoked an outburst of anti-American feelings throughout the Moslem East--this is far from a complete list of the foreign policy errors of the Democratic Administration, connected with attempts to conduct an active interventionist course without adequate consideration of changes taking place in the international arena and the actual capabilities of the United States.

These foreign policy errors were part of the reason for the energization and expansion of the conservative opposition to President Carter and his administration. Reflecting the growth of chauvinist feelings in the nation, which came into being soon after the failure of the American military adventure in Indochina, the conservatives have criticized the foreign policy line of the administration and accused the President of "weakness" in dealing with the "Soviet threat" and of conducting a "conciliatory" policy. The conservative opposition has tried to overcome the "Vietnam syndrom" in U.S. foreign policy--that is, the refusal to learn a lesson from the defeat in Vietnam and the institution of a tough policy toward the Soviet Union. The conservative platform has included demands to make detente, particularly the ratification of the SALT II treaty, conditional upon the "willingness" of the USSR and other socialist countries to deny assistance to progressive regimes in liberated countries such as Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, and to use the anti-Sovietism of the Chinese leadership as a means of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union.

After encountering insurmountable difficulties in domestic affairs, President J. Carter resorted to a tried and tested method--the escalation of international tension to divert the attention of the Americans away from internal problems and the government's inability to cope with them. The leadership of the Democratic Party centered their campaign strategy around a sharp shift to the right in foreign policy and actual capitulation to the conservative opposition in the question of detente in U.S.-Soviet relations and East-West relations. In connection with this, the American Administration borrowed the chief components of the conservative foreign policy platform, including alliance with all international forces hostile to detente.

In several speeches in December 1979 and January 1980, J. Carter set forth a new foreign policy program for America. In accordance with this program, national foreign policy would be directed into a new channel--a channel the American press hastened to call the "second cold war." Statements by top-level representatives of the administration and subsequent actions in the international arena left no room for doubt that Washington was renouncing its previously declared foreign policy objectives (detente in relations with the East) and priorities (an agreement on strategic offensive arms control); the promise to be guided by the

principle of "negotiation instead of confrontation" was consigned to oblivion; the administration returned to the characteristic cold war tactics of ultimatums, flagrant pressure, threats and blackmail.

The new policy line revolves around a five-year plan of unprecedented augmentation of military strength in the area of strategic and conventional weapons. The purpose of this well-known militaristic program is not being concealed. It consists in establishing a material basis for dictatorial policy in the world arena, in achieving absolute supremacy over probable opponents and in creating special means of direct U.S. military intervention in any part of the world where the positions of U.S. monopolistic capital might be threatened by progressive, anti-imperialist forces. It envisages the intensification and expansion of the global system of American imperialism's support points and the extension of its primary function of "containing communism" to the developing countries, where the struggle for independence and a just international economic order is interpreted by U.S. ruling circles as something undermining the bases of contemporary capitalism.

This plan includes a return to the active base strategy, the considerable expansion of the network of American military bases outside the United States as the foundation of permanent American military presence close to possible crisis zones, the revitalization of existing alliances and the creation of new military-political blocs, including unnatural alliances between aggressors and their victims (Israel-Egypt) and between liberated people and imperialist countries (PRC-United States and Japan). Finally, Washington has been searching for new "proxies" to perform police services with American weapons in various parts of the world, such as the services performed until recently by the shah's Iran in the Persian Gulf zone.

Brown's visit to the PRC is an important component of the new U.S. foreign policy line. There is every reason to believe that the secretary of defense's instructions from the White House included the mission of sounding out Beijing as to the possibility and limits of PRC involvement in Washington's projected system for the "containment of the Soviet Union." At the same time, the U.S. secretary of defense's visit to the PRC represented a definite stage in the development of U.S.-Chinese relations, characterized by several extraordinary circumstances.

The modified Maoist leadership, which took shape in 1976 after Mao Zedong's death, set forth a plan for "four modernizations" once drawn up by Zhou Enlai--this is a program aimed at familiarizing the billions of people in China, one of the poorest countries in the world, with the riches of contemporary civilization. For one reason or another, however, primarily in connection with the Chinese leaders' ambitions for hegemony in Asia, the primary objective turned out to be the modernization of the Chinese armed forces, which is absorbing the lion's share of the PRC's efforts and meager financial resources.

The failure of the punitive expedition to Vietnam in the beginning of 1979, which revealed China's military weakness, provided the militant faction in the Beijing leadership with a new motive to accelerate the militarization of the country and, above all, to equip the armed forces of the PRC with modern offensive means, thereby establishing the necessary conditions for the broader use of military power beyond China's borders.

In this sphere, the Chinese leaders, who do not have their own scientific, technical and industrial base, are counting on Western assistance, offering support for the anti-Soviet aspects of Western policy as payment. Immediate measures to rearm Chinese ground forces, the navy and air force include the well-known attempts to place weapon orders in the Western European countries and Japan--orders for weapons ranging from fighter-interceptors, tanks and missile equipment to automatic infantry armaments.

The Chinese leaders would also like to acquire weapons from the United States (they have expressed this wish to representatives of the Washington Administration on numerous occasions). As yet, the American Government has refrained from selling China means of destruction. By relaxing the requirements for the issuance of licenses for strategic items and urging its Western allies and Japan to do the same, however, the Carter Administration has given Beijing an opportunity to purchase electronic and electrical engineering equipment, equipment for guidance systems, nuclear technology, precision instruments and special materials, lasers and even the key components of nuclear warheads in the West. According to the forecasts of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL (February 1979), by the end of the 1980's the Chinese leadership will possess a new generation of effective offensive strategic weapons numbering in the thousands. This new arsenal, built up with considerable assistance from the United States and other Western countries, will replace, according to the journal, the present ineffective, vulnerable and negligible nuclear forces. The validity of this forecast is corroborated by press reports regarding the successful testing of the CSS X-4 intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 9,500-10,500 kilometers in the PRC (in 1979 at least six such tests were conducted).

In connection with this, note should be taken of the fact well known in Washington--that this program for the rapid buildup of military strength is being carried out in a country which just recently experienced an acute political crisis, the consequences of which have not been overcome as yet. The CCP leadership is being torn apart by conflicting views in regard to China's future development, its foreign policy is at a crossroads, and it is unlikely that anyone would be bold enough to predict its next zigzag. The vigorous anti-Soviet course conducted by the so-called "pragmatic leadership" is at least partially due to tactical considerations--the desire to make use of the adventurist plans of J. Carter and his advisers to play the notorious "China card" for the purpose of implementing its own anti-Soviet military and political ideas and gaining



preferential payment terms for armament deliveries from the developed capitalist countries.

The Chinese supporters of the one-sided reliance on the West, however, are faced by a sizable opposition. It includes, on one side, the particular substratum of the population and leadership which has retained its unwavering leftist radical views despite the "pragmatic leadership's" efforts to overcome them. Moreover, it would be logical to assume that leftist radical anti-Americanism in China is being stimulated by large anti-imperialist movements such as the Iranian revolution with its primarily anti-American goals. On the other side, there are individuals among the "pragmatists," dominant in the leadership, who contrast Deng Xiaoping's one-sided pro-Western political line with a more carefully considered line, aimed at the development of multilateral international cooperation for the purpose of the accelerated modernization of China. Apparently, the Soviet Union has not been excluded: The experience of the 1950's made many Chinese who are now working in governmental and economic administrative positions aware that Sino-Soviet cooperation would be expedient for the PRC.

American diplomacy is trying to take the peculiarities of this situation and the balance of political power in the PRC into account. American political thinkers long ago drafted plans for the creation of a pro-American substratum in the PRC leadership and intelligentsia, similar to the one which existed in Kuomintang China and made it easier for American monopolistic capital to infiltrate the country and manipulate its foreign policy. Beijing's extreme interest in American assistance in these "modernizations" and, in particular, the military reinforcement of China, makes the present time the most convenient for putting these ideas to work. By helping the "pragmatists" in a crucial matter (the creation of substantial modern armed forces, including strategic offensive armaments) and indulging them in their Sinocentric (hegemonistic) plans, American diplomacy hopes to establish the pro-American faction in power in Beijing, impede Sino-Soviet normalization and establish the prerequisites for the use of the PRC as an American policeman in adjacent regions.

The results of H. Brown's visit illustrate the desire of American diplomacy to develop this field of relations. Judging by announcements by the two sides and reports in the press, specific agreements have been reached on military cooperation.

The United States has agreed to supply China with all the necessary equipment for tracking artificial satellites like the Landsat-D for the purpose of processing photodata transmitted from orbit. The equipment includes components intended for decoding military information. Moreover, the American Administration's statements in regard to this transaction stressed that the possibility of military usage would no longer stand in the way of shipments of weapons to the PRC.

The two sides agreed to expand military contacts on various levels and, in particular, a visit to the United States by a Chinese delegation headed by Geng Biao, the member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo who is responsible for the military preparedness of the nation, was planned.

American and Chinese representatives also agreed on joint or parallel military measures against third countries, such as Vietnam, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The discussion concerned, firstly, the offer of direct military assistance to Thailand and Pakistan to keep these states from becoming beachheads for hostilities against Vietnam and Kampuchea in Southeast Asia and against Afghanistan in Southwest Asia. Washington's offer of military aid to Pakistan in the amount of 400 million dollars and presidential Adviser Z. Brzezinski's visit to Islamabad in February of this year to discuss specific aspects of this aid--that is, the use of the Pakistani military regime's territory and armed forces against neighboring countries (for example, Afghanistan)--clearly illustrate the contribution of the American side to the so-called "parallel" actions. Secondly, Washington and Beijing agreed to recruit, arm and train counter-revolutionary rebel detachments in Thailand and Pakistan to fight against the legal governments of Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Behind the agreement of the two sides to take joint (or "parallel") action, it is easy to see the willingness of the Carter Administration to expand the assortment and scales of military shipments to China by including fire weapons, means of communication, motor vehicle transport and other equipment of an expressly military nature. According to the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE of 26-27 January 1980, H. Brown said that the U.S. Administration was prepared to consider Beijing's orders for weapons "in each specific case."

American and Chinese press organs are directing attention to the military-political aspects of the Beijing talks and their results. The matter is being depicted in such a way as to imply that the U.S. Government's haste in developing military cooperation with the PRC was motivated by events in Afghanistan and represents one facet of the United States' "defensive reaction" to the mythical "expansion" of the Soviet Union in Southwest Asia.

Actually, Washington tried to use China for its own foreign policy purposes much earlier, soon after the democratic government was formed. In fact, changes in U.S.-Chinese relations were directly linked with the evolution in relations with the USSR from the promotion of detente to the development of confrontation.

The author of the present "China policy" is the President's adviser on national security affairs, Z. Brzezinski. Some of his former students, who have now become eminent scholars, maintain that as early as the 1960's, when he was the director of an institute for the study of communism at New York's Columbia University, he developed one of his favorite themes in his lectures--the idea that the United States had to form alliances

with any and all anti-Soviet forces, including Beijing. His appointment to a key post in the administration gave him a chance to implement this idea, particularly in view of the fact that Jimmy Carter worked with Z. Brzezinski on the so-called "Trilateral Commission" long before his election to the presidency and was well aware of Brzezinski's political views.

The decision to take steps toward rapprochement with Beijing was made in the White House soon after the President's unsuccessful attempt to revise the Vladivostok agreement of 1974 on strategic arms limitation and to force the Soviet Union to accept the one-sided American approach to this central issue in Soviet-American relations. The loss of illusions about the possibility of flagrant U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union on the pretext of "defending human rights" had a similar effect.

The process of playing the "China card" against third countries began with the Beijing visit of the same Z. Brzezinski in May 1978. The President's adviser was instructed to correct the unfavorable impression made on the Beijing elite by liberal C. Vance, who had visited the PRC not long before (August 1977), and convince the Chinese leadership of the sincerity of President Carter's intention to put an end to the stagnation in relations between Washington and Beijing. Brzezinski's main argument was the administration's willingness to base the "new" U.S.-Chinese relationship on "common strategic (anti-Soviet) interests," and the result of this was a subsequent agreement to establish diplomatic relations.

After this, U.S. Vice President W. Mondale visited the PRC in August 1979.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of this visit included the reinforcement and development of the anti-Soviet foundation of U.S.-Chinese relations. It should be borne in mind that this visit was timed to coincide with the Soviet and Chinese Governments' agreement to begin talks in Moscow to discuss the normalization of relations. Mondale's sweeping political declarations were reinforced by the information that the PRC would be offered several material benefits, including large sums of credits and favorable terms for Chinese imports (most-favored-nation terms were extended to the PRC by an act of the U.S. Congress on 25 January 1980).

As for the visit of Secretary of Defense H. Brown, as demonstrated above, it represented a new step toward the utilization of Beijing's desire for hegemony and the direction of this desire into channels benefiting the United States. This is one of the distinctive features of the present phase of U.S.-Chinese relations.

During all previous U.S.-Chinese contacts, it was Beijing that encouraged the United States to confront the Soviet Union more boldly. The main purpose of this was to obtain American support for the Chinese militarists' adventures in Indochina, where, as we know, the interests of the great-power Chinese policy and the chauvinistic motives of U.S. reactionary circles, striving to gain revenge for the defeats suffered in Vietnam, paradoxically coincided for some time.

1. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, Nos 3 and 12, 1979--  
Editor's note.

But this time the situation was different. Brown encouraged Beijing to display anti-Soviet feeling, hoping to gain China's energetic participation in American military actions against the Asian people. Besides this, the United States is trying to gain assistance from the Beijing regime to strengthen the strategic positions of American imperialism in the southwestern part of the Asian continent, which is contrary to the security interests of not only Afghanistan, Iran, India and other countries, but, in the final analysis, China as well.

For today, however, these conflicts have receded in the face of the common desire of the Carter Administration and the Maoist leadership to put an end to detente and return world politics to the days of tension and confrontation.

Under these conditions, how far will U.S.-Chinese relations progress along the dangerous course charted in the White House? It would probably be impossible to answer this question now. It is a fact, however, that the development of hegemonism in U.S. foreign policy is causing international relations as a whole to enter a complex and difficult stage.

But it is good to remember that detente has always been the result of objective factors and is in the vital interests of all people. This is the basis of the optimistic view of future world politics. "We know," L. I. Brezhnev said, "that the will of the people has cleared a path, bypassing all obstacles, to the positive trend in world affairs that is known by the meaningful term 'detente.' This policy has deep roots. It is being supported by powerful forces and it has every chance of remaining the leading tendency in relations between states."

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## WEST EUROPEAN CHALLENGE?

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 84-89

[Article by V. S. Shein]

[Text] The NATO states in Western Europe, at least the largest ones, have tried to throw down a new challenge to the U.S. defense industry, and this time they are backing up this challenge with tangible success in the development of military and economic cooperation within Western Europe.

This cooperation is gradually taking on relatively broad dimensions. The experience of the past few years has shown that the United States' NATO partners can, through concerted efforts, develop modern weapon systems based on the most advanced technology. This applies primarily to the interaction of the Western European countries in the development of aircraft and missiles, although it extends to other fields as well. This is illustrated by the development of the Jaguar aircraft by England and France, the Anglo-Italo-West German program for the production of the GN-70 and SP-70 howitzers and the multipurpose Tornado aircraft, the Franco-West German missile building project--Hot, Milan, Roland--and other examples.

Just a few months ago, a new military-industrial complex, the Euro-Missile Dynamics Group, came into being in Western Europe as a result of an agreement reached by the governments of Great Britain, France and the FRG. This complex, which unites the efforts of such well-known firms as British Aerospace, Aerospatial and Messerschmidt-Belkov-Bloehm, will work on the development and production of tactical missiles, antitank guns and other combat equipment.

The "continental" in the production of weapons in Western Europe is most often explained not as a desire to step up military preparations, but as a response to purely economic considerations. For example, references are made to the rising cost of modern weapons systems, the need to consider balances of trade, employment and technical progress, and so forth. The list of main factors includes the desire of the Western European NATO

members to withstand the pressure of the U.S. defense industry, which sells its NATO allies ten times as many weapons as it buys from them.

The growth of Western European military cooperation was stimulated by the creation of the European programming group in 1976, which is not formally affiliated with NATO. Within the framework of this group, the United States' allies coordinate their military programs and draw up plans for broader military-industrial interaction. The group, including France, is fairly active, which is irritating and disturbing representatives of American military concerns because it indicates that a unified Western European armament production system will be formed.

The Common Market is also making an increasing practical contribution in the progression toward this goal. In the report of the European Parliament's committee on political affairs (the "Kleps report" of 8 May 1978), the creation of a European defense industry is regarded as a basic element in the development of the overall industrial policy of the EEC and as an essential step toward achieving a better balance in military sales between Western Europe and the United States. The report, approved by the European Parliament, appealed for the coordination of the activities of the European programming group and the EEC Commission to provide the defense industry in Western Europe with a "uniting" foundation. The question of drafting a coordinated EEC policy in the sphere of military production was discussed again at a session of the European Parliament last fall. At the same time, attempts are actually being made to propel the Common Market in the direction of metamorphosis into a military-political group.

The Western European Union (WEU) has become much more active. It also advocates ensuring the "survival" of the defense industry of its members and more balanced trade in weapons with the United States through the broader joint production of military equipment and the necessary structural reorganization of the Western European defense industry. Statements to this effect were made, in particular, in the report on Western European policy in the field of arms production (the "Critchley report" of 31 October 1978), approved by the WEU assembly. The president of the assembly, former FRG Defense Minister von Hassel, addressed a symposium held last fall in Brussels to discuss this matter, stating that the nations of Western Europe should forget past differences and begin to work out a common policy in the sphere of arms production.

Representatives of other NATO countries also spoke at the symposium. For example, according to P. Mayer, French inspector general of finance, the only way to protect the European defense industry and resist the expansion of U.S. military concerns consists in giving preference to weapons manufactured in Western Europe. Broader cooperation by the Western European NATO members was advocated by Director General de Geus of the Dutch Defense Ministry's Department of Economic and Financial Affairs, and other symposium speakers.

Although Western Europe is making progress in military-industrial integration, it can only boast of isolated achievements as yet. Nonetheless, certain circles in the United States, expressing the interests of the military monopolies, are already sounding the alarm. The steps taken to develop Western European cooperation in arms production have been described in the United States as a direct threat to the North Atlantic alliance. For example, when General A. Haig resigned from the position of supreme commander of NATO Armed Forces in Europe, he felt the need, at a farewell press conference on 29 June 1979, to frighten his listeners with the danger of the "separation" of the United States and Western Europe, particularly as a result of divided efforts in arms production.

Western European Atlanticists have expressed the same views. The former ambassador of Great Britain in Washington, P. Jay, for example, popularized the belief that the West was in danger of splitting up into hostile economic groups as a result of mounting "regional nationalism." Jay and those who agree with him regard the desire for Western European cooperation in the sphere of arms production as one of the characteristic signs of this "nationalism." At a seminar on problems in the relations between the United States and Western Europe, held in Paris in May 1979 and sponsored by the Atlantic Institute, "European defense" was discussed as a reason for the possible "transformation" of the North Atlantic alliance.

It must be said that Washington officially has not objected to Western European military integration, but has actually supported it and has linked it with its own plans to increase the "total strength" of the West. At the same time, it has not concealed the fact that it would only be pleased by integration to coordinate the military efforts of Western Europe within the Atlantic system, and not undermining this system.

The United States has proposed a so-called "triad" of action as a basis for broader inter-Atlantic cooperation by the NATO countries, along with the creation of the appropriate administrative structure. This "triad," which has been widely publicized by the Carter Administration, consists of the following elements: "Memorandums of understanding," "double production" and "families of weapons."

The declared goal of the "memorandums of understanding" is to open the military market to "free and fair" competition by the corresponding industries in the NATO countries. These "memorandums" have already been drafted by the United States, England, Canada, the FRG, Norway, Holland and Italy for specific types of military equipment. Theoretically, they should aid in the mutual cancellation of various restrictions established according to the "buy national" principle.

"Double production" envisages the possibility of the production by any NATO country or group of countries of systems of weapons developed by anyone of the allies. The expected benefits of this consist essentially

in the avoidance of duplicate research and development projects. But it is being depicted in a broader context, as something that will allegedly prevent the kind of disparities in trade and employment that would arise if the particular country that developed this military equipment began to exercise exclusive sales rights. An example of the implementation of this "double production" principle is the Roland missile device developed by France and Germany and now licensed for production in the United States. In turn, the Americans have offered Western European consortiums the AIM-91 "air-to-air" missile, the Copperhead artillery charge with a laser tracking system and the Stinger antiair missile. The Pentagon has declared its intention to expand this type of interaction by the NATO countries.

As for the other element of the "triad," the "families of weapons," according to W. Perry, U.S. assistant secretary of defense, the main objective consists in "gaining greater effectiveness by reducing the unnecessary duplication" of research and development. The U.S. leadership feels it is necessary to determine which nation plans to develop certain types of weapons in the next few years, identify duplicate plans and divide the responsibilities for developing variations of the particular system among different countries (short-range, long-range and so forth); the results of this development, the so-called "packets of information for production," are then to be used in common.

In an attempt to make the "family weapons" principle more appealing to its allies, the United States has expressed its willingness to give Western European industry part of the responsibility for research and development in those cases when the Americans are leading in the engineering of a particular system. Western European industry, in turn, will be expected to make similar reciprocal moves. This approach, as has been stressed in the United States, would aid in the development of more modern designs and would simplify the exchange of the necessary information for subsequent "double production." The objects of negotiation within NATO in connection with this issue are antitank guided missiles and "air-to-ground," "ship-to-ship" and "air-to-air" missiles. The machinery for implementing this principle, however, has not been put in operation as yet.

According to representatives of the American Government, the "cooperation triad" can only be successful over the long range if this cooperation is begun extremely early, during the priority-setting stage. In view of this, the United States supports the development of a periodical weapons planning system within the NATO framework for the particular purpose of determining the need for weapons and military equipment prior to the compilation of national programs and encouraging the multilateral satisfaction of these needs.

Great significance is also attached in Washington to the line of so-called "rationalization"--that is, primarily the broader standardization and guaranteed interchangeability of the weapons and military equipment



of the NATO countries. The vigorous advocacy of standardization, which is not a new idea in general, reflects the specific stand taken in NATO by the Carter Administration.

Standardization, which would impose more closely concerted action on the countries involved, would, in the hope of Washington leaders, considerably augment the military potential of the North Atlantic alliance, enhance its effectiveness and guarantee the "growth" of the military strength of the West, under U.S. control. This would not only mean an increase in the military strength of the NATO countries, but also its guaranteed manageability. American ruling circles have actually embarked on a course of creating an integrated NATO army within the near future on the basis of interchangeable, and later identical, military equipment.

Despite the fairly vigorous efforts of U.S. leaders, there has been no considerable progress as yet in the area of standardization or in the general expansion of military-industrial interaction by the NATO countries on the inter-Atlantic level. Western European military integration is now obviously being given higher priority than Atlantic integration. One of the main reasons for this is the Western European leaders' realization of the danger of cooperation in weapons production on American terms. Many of the United States' partners, fearing the further restriction of their independence, intend to find ways of counteracting this and of ensuring that programs involving U.S. participation are more egalitarian in character. Another extremely important factor is the desire of Western European political leaders to protect the interests of their own military-industrial concerns, which are trying to grab a larger share of the colossal profits derived from the arms race.

Differences of opinion between the United States and the Western European countries over questions of military cooperation are already, even in this initial stage, quite obvious, primarily in connection with the weapons trade, both within the framework of the Atlantic system and outside this system. America's allies, which have set up their own powerful weapons industry, are demanding at least "minimal reciprocity" in the area of military sales. But events are not moving in a direction favoring Western Europe. Backed up by their modern technology, American corporations are exporting, and offering at advantageous prices, military equipment that can be mass-produced due to the huge size of the U.S. military market. The traditional markets of the Western European firms are being threatened. In Western Europe there is the fear that cooperation with America could be used by Washington to strengthen U.S. positions even more within the sphere of inter-Atlantic weapons exchange.

The Western European countries are also disturbed by the prospect of adapting outdated national military industry to the proposal that NATO be equipped with the latest weapons systems. It has been suggested that Western Europe will be unable to compete with the United States in the Atlantic market for these new types of equipment. In response to

criticism, the U.S. Administration reasserted that the "two-way street" principle was the basis of cooperation between America and Western Europe, a "united and collective" basis, in the area of military shipments. Despite these assurances, however, there is widespread skepticism among America's allies regarding Washington's willingness to make sizable concessions to Western Europe in matters pertaining to the arms trade. This skepticism has been reinforced by the actual behavior of the United States.

Washington has verbally stressed its desire for egalitarianism in NATO and its intention to adhere to a "common line." In fact, however, U.S. ruling circles have impeded the attempts of their "junior partners" to put inter-Atlantic cooperation on a basis more beneficial to them. Washington's cancellation, motivated by its concern for the interests of U.S. military monopolies, of projects connected with the creation of a standard combat tank for NATO, adapted from the latest model of the West German Leopard tank (agreement was only reached on a standard 120-millimeter gun for the tank, produced in the FRG, and the American XM-1 tank), aroused pointedly negative views in many Western European leaders in regard to the U.S. proposals.

The current American administration's stubbornness in matters connected with the advance warning system aroused the same reaction in the allies, particularly the FRG and England. Great Britain immediately responded by flatly refusing to sacrifice its own system of this type, based on Nimrod aircraft, for the United States' sake. But even after plans were drawn up for a standard NATO air force unit, consisting of 11 English Nimrod planes and 18 L-1A planes (modified Boeing-707's), conflicts still remained. The West German Government is not particularly delighted with the prospect of huge financial expenditures on the AWACS project and is still experiencing its irritation with the United States in connection with the Leopard incident.

There is the widespread opinion in Western Union that the U.S. Congress can impede military cooperation projects that will not be profitable for the U.S. defense industry. Formally, Congress supports the idea of standardization and has even passed a law to this effect. In a related statement on the need for more balanced arms trade with Western Europe, however, Congress stipulated several conditions which would be extremely difficult for America's allies to satisfy all at once.

The other side is having the same problem. It will be difficult to gain the support of Western European parliaments for costly programs and projects that will obviously be of the greatest benefit to the United States. Realizing that it would not be so easy to confuse the legislative organs of many NATO states with dubious speculations on economic and other "advantages" of the American-style cooperation, Washington quite officially proposed at a NATO Council session in May 1978 that the allied governments resort to the exertion of pressure on their parliaments.

Naturally, Carter did not and could not provide any guarantees regarding the position of the U.S. Congress, which is obviously in no hurry to make decisions of the slightest benefit to Western Europe.

On Capitol Hill, where the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex are widely represented, Western Europe's request for progressive military technology are being openly denied, and all of the restrictions and prohibitions preventing Western European concerns from reinforcing their competitive positions are still being defended. This is being done in spite of the attempts of the State Department and some other agencies to change the situation enough to draw Western Europe into the orbit of the American policy of inter-Atlantic partnership in arms production.

The present state of events is stimulating the desire of Western European military-industrial concerns to reinforce cooperation within Western Europe, which, under present conditions, represents an increasing challenge to the United States. Washington, on the other hand, intends, judging by all indications, to use all means within its power to neutralize Eurocentric feelings in the allied nations.

It would be difficult to predict the final outcome of this battle. But one thing is quite clear: Western Europe's challenge of the United States in the buildup of weapons and the augmentation of the strength of Western military-industrial complexes are stimulating military preparations and the arms race, undermining detente and preventing the resolution of the urgent problem of European security.

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CHRYSLER VICISSITUDES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
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[Article by N. A. Zakharov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA

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pp 96-103

[Article by B. I. Alekhin]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## 'NEW ROLE' OF JAPAN DEBATED

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pp 104-107

[Article by V. I. Churin]

[Text] The processes occurring in Japan and affecting the foreign policy of this nation as well as the status of U.S.-Japanese relations have long attracted the attention of the U.S. academic community. This attention has been particularly pronounced in the last decade, when the nature of the U.S.-Japanese alliance changed: From the obedient "junior partner" of the United States, Japan turned into a persistent and successful competitor in the economic sphere and into a nation which has declared its own economic and political interests, sometimes differing from American interests. The discussions of these matters among American scholars are aimed at discerning new problems and tendencies in order to prevent the development of "unfavorable" trends or to redirect, into the proper channels, those which the United States considers to be consistent with the U.S. interests.

The conclusions and recommendations at which U.S. scholars have recently arrived on the basis of an analysis of numerous examples attesting to Japan's present move in the direction of militarization are of interest to Soviet researchers primarily because they are either supposed to influence Washington's policy-making in relations with Japan or reflect already distinct trends.

"Japan has begun to establish new policy guidelines in the area of security and foreign affairs, which is of great significance for East Asia and adjacent areas."<sup>1</sup> Professor B. Gordon, for example, said in an article printed in ORBIS (in a book published in 1969, "Toward Disagreement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy," he was fairly accurate in predicting the general trends in U.S. policy in East Asia during the first half of the 1970's). The article contains evidence of his worry that Tokyo policy could escape U.S. control. In Tokyo it is now "common practice," B. Gordon writes, "to make references to 'foreign pressure'...for the purpose of justifying actions the Japanese leadership regards as necessary."<sup>2</sup> Gordon feels that Tokyo policy "is leaning toward less reliance on the United States in the economic sphere and in the area of defense."<sup>3</sup>

This tendency could lead, in the author's opinion, to the creation of "a certain distance between Japan and the United States," which would result in their effective separation.<sup>4</sup> Here we should recall the description of current attitudes in Japan made by prominent Japanese expert on international affairs K. Wakaizumi: "It appears that Japan's long psychological dependence on the United States has been broken almost as definitely as when the 'black ships' of Commodore Perry put an end to the era of Japan's diplomatic isolation in 1853."<sup>5</sup> "In Japan they are arguing the need for a foreign policy which will differ significantly from the one that has existed since the defeat in 1945," B. Gordon writes. "As a result, it is already almost a certainty that Japan will considerably augment its military potential in the next 3-5 years. It is slightly less of a certainty that, deliberately or not, this augmentation will be accompanied by the weakening of many of the bonds connecting Japan to the United States."<sup>6</sup>

Gordon warns that this would cause the "international structure of Asia" to turn more and more distinctly into a "quadripolar model"--that is, Japan might acquire "too much" political and, mainly, military independence. At the same time, works by American political scientists on Washington's policy toward Tokyo and the entire sphere of U.S.-Japanese relations clearly indicate a line of stirring up militaristic tendencies in Japan to attach the nation more closely to Washington's foreign policy plans and make more extensive use of it to defend the interests of U.S. imperialism.

What is more, M. Pillsbury, a prominent political scientist who is on the staff of the U.S. Senate's Budget Committee, has even coined the term "Japan card" by analogy with Washington's "China card." "Japan," the author writes in an article published recently in FOREIGN POLICY magazine, "is regaining the status of not only a commercial power, but also a military power."<sup>7</sup> In 1975 M. Pillsbury, who was then a RAND Corporation researcher, published an article which aroused widespread interest in the United States, in which he argued in favor of the establishment of military ties between the United States and the PRC. "In various circles this article was interpreted as unrealistic and even dangerous. But many of his proposals have now come to pass,"<sup>8</sup> the publishers of FOREIGN POLICY write in the preface to Pillsbury's new work. In this way, the reader's attention is also directed to Pillsbury's recommendations regarding U.S.-Japanese relations.

The author advises the United States to encourage present political tendencies in Japan. Moreover, he says that the present commotion in Japan over the so-called "Soviet military threat" is "just as significant" as Tokyo's evident desire for militarization. His proposed target of Japan's increasing military potential is indisputable.

Pillsbury makes a variety of specific recommendations: The United States should assist Japan in equipping its "self-defense forces" with the latest types of military equipment, and U.S.-Japanese cooperation "in the sphere of security" should be further developed; joint U.S.-Japanese military exercises should be practiced more widely, Japan should be included in

NATO consultations, and an exchange of visits should be organized between official representatives of the Japanese "self-defense forces" and officials from NATO headquarters in Brussels; moreover, as an example of a possible topic of discussion, the author cites the study of the circumstances under which Japan could "contain" the Soviet Far Eastern fleet in the Sea of Japan by blocking the Tsugaru, Laperous and other straits. He also proposes joint military space programs. Pillsbury speaks of the need to give Japan access to "the most modern long-range detection equipment if the Japanese decide to build reconnaissance satellites." He asks Japan for financial and technical cooperation in completing the "extremely costly American program for the satellite-aided surveillance of the Soviet fleet's movements in the Pacific" (it "could lead to the establishment of a Pacific Intelligence center, to which the NATO allies would also have access").<sup>9</sup>

Again and again, Pillsbury advocates the addition of intense anti-Soviet colors to Japanese-Chinese relations. He declares that, "to one degree or another," all of his recommended measures for the improvement of "Japanese-American relations in the area of security" could also include "officials representing the defense establishment in Beijing." In particular, "Chinese servicemen could participate, in an observer capacity, in joint Japanese-American antisubmarine exercises in the Sea of Japan, and Chinese ships could eventually even take some part in these maneuvers."<sup>10</sup> The author admits that "such actions are potentially provocative" toward the Soviet Union, but this does not cause him to question the wisdom of his proposals. On the contrary, he regards this as a way of exerting pressure on the USSR: "The Russians should be told that their strategic behavior in the Pacific will have a direct influence on the frequency and intensity of military cooperation between Beijing, Washington and Tokyo." The Russians "must realize that their actions could push Tokyo, Beijing and Washington closer to one another, and possibly into an alliance,"<sup>11</sup> he says in a futile attempt to give this planned "cooperation" the appearance of defensive and all but compulsory action.

The agenda for future U.S.-Japanese consultations is to include several topics that are "too delicate" to discuss at the present time. These are nuclear issues, such as the possibility of creating Japanese nuclear forces, and the question of whether American ships entering Japanese ports will be allowed to carry nuclear weapons; the question of participation by Japanese "volunteers" in the UN Armed Forces; the possibility of linking the problem of the U.S. trade deficit to "cooperation in the area of security" (the author's line of reasoning is obvious: When the success of proposed measures begins to whet the appetites of the Japanese militarists and Japan is even more closely attached to the American military machine, it will be increasingly vulnerable to pressure exerted by the United States in the area of military "cooperation," which could force it to make concessions in the economic sphere as well). As an example of this kind of "link," Pillsbury mentions the possibility of pressuring Japan to spend more on the purchase of American weapons than the 4.5 billion dollars



it has already promised to pay during the 1980's for the purchase of American K-15 and P-3C military planes. The author politely postpones any discussion of the revision of Japan's constitutional ban on armed forces, as well as the revision of the American-Japanese treaty "on mutual security" for the purpose of "encouraging the Japanese to play a regional role in the area of security."<sup>12</sup>

Plans to build up Japan's military strength and to enhance its military role in East Asia were brought up in the West even in the past. They were particularly apparent at the beginning of the 1970's, when it was suggested that Japan "compensate" for the reduction of the American presence in Asia due to the weakening of U.S. positions in the world arena and the failures of U.S. foreign policy, which were distinctly reflected in the defeats suffered by the United States in the war against the people of Indochina. President Ford's "Pacific Doctrine" demonstrated the U.S. desire to stop this "retreat," and the actions of the Carter Administration have clearly demonstrated a desire to reinforce the aggressive and offensive nature of U.S. foreign policy. In this context, the present plans for the further buildup of Japanese military potential are qualitatively different from the plans of American strategists of the early 1970's: Japan has been invited to take part in imperialism's desperate attempt to reverse the historically determined process of the consolidation of forces for progress and socialism in the world arena. This kind of "joint offensive" is precisely the objective set by M. Pillsbury.<sup>13</sup>

The buildup of Japanese military potential is also encouraged by K. Adelman, a political scientist from the Stanford Research Institute, on the pages of ASIA PACIFIC COMMUNITY, a magazine published in Tokyo. Analyzing the regional factors contributing to the "arousal of Japan's security interests," he deliberately exaggerates the "Soviet threat." Even when he discusses Taiwan's significance for Japanese security, he stresses that the primary consideration is not the threat of possible attempts by Beijing to settle the "Taiwan question" by force, but the hypothetical possibility of "Soviet-Taiwan convergence." Adelman is not as inventive as M. Pillsbury in his recommendations, but his proposals are no less eloquent: For example, he "suggests" that the Japanese Government might prohibit the sale of a floating dock to the Soviet Union by a Japanese firm.<sup>14</sup>

The desire to solve the serious problems the United States is facing in its trade with Japan by focusing the efforts of the Japanese economy on military goals is even more evident in Adelman's line of reasoning than in Pillsbury's. According to some Americans, he says, the average rate of Japanese economic growth would be fully 8-10 percent lower if Japan were to allocate 6-7 percent of its GNP for defense. If this had been the case in the last two decades, the scales of the Japanese economy would have been 30 percent smaller by 1974. "But this was not done," Adelman says with regret, "and now the Japanese are encountering a multitude of problems in the security sphere." Some people feel, Adelman remarks with affection, that the "safest" and most reasonable way of satisfying the "mass passion

for armament" is to quietly and continuously augment Japan's military potential. Obstacles such as the restriction of military expenditures to 1 percent of the GNP can be overcome by including items in the "national security budget" which would envisage the allocation of funds for the creation of food and oil reserves. Besides this, according to K. Adelman, Tokyo could take on a larger share of the expense of national "defense," as was the case in November 1978, when the Japanese agreed to pay an additional 100 million dollars over the next 2 years to cover the expense of construction projects on U.S. bases in Japan. Adelman concludes his article by urging adherence to a motto voiced at the end of the 18th century by Adam Smith: "Defense is much more important than wealth."<sup>15</sup> But it is unlikely that the Japanese will agree with this postulate, considering the fact that it uses the term "defense" in the American sense, and the fact that Japan still has a long way to go before it reaches wealth or even the resolution of all its social, economic and other problems.

Washington's exertion of pressure on Tokyo for the purpose of forcing it to spend more on military pursuits is discussed by Harvard political scientist M. Nacht in an article in ASIA PACIFIC COMMUNITY. "Although this is not the official opinion of the Carter Administration," he writes, "there are influential members of Congress, prominent analysts of foreign policy and defense and expert on Asia who...advise the Japanese Government to spend more on defense."<sup>16</sup>

These statements clearly indicate the direction in which American political scientists, and now even official Washington, are quite eagerly playing the "Japanese card" as a supplement to the "China card," obviously giving no serious thought to the fact that the time will come when both Beijing and Tokyo, now encouraged by Washington, will have the opportunity to make their own large-scale moves in this dangerous game and will begin to actively play the "American card" in their own hegemonistic interests.

Will this not cause the specter of Pearl Harbor to loom up before the United States?

#### FOOTNOTES

1. B. Gordon, "Loose Cannon on a Rolling Deck? Japan's Changing Security Policies," ORBIS, Winter 1979, p 968.
2. Ibid., p 981.
3. Ibid., p 1002.
4. Ibid., p 1003.
5. K. Wakaizumi, "Japan's Passive Diplomacy Reconsidered," ASIA PACIFIC COMMUNITY, Winter 1978/79, p 41.

6. B. Gordon, *Op. cit.*, p 970.
7. M. Pillabury, "A Japanese Card?" *FOREIGN POLICY*, Winter 1978/79, p 4.
8. *Ibid.*, p 3.
9. *Ibid.*, pp 21-25.
10. *Ibid.*, p 25.
11. *Ibid.*, p 26.
12. *Ibid.*, pp 26-27.
13. *Ibid.*, p 27.
14. K. Adelman, "Japan's Security Awakening. Regional Factors," *ASIA PACIFIC COMMUNITY*, Summer 1979, p 108.
15. *Ibid.*, pp 107-108.
16. M. Nacht, "Fallacies in Japan-U.S. Security Relations," *ASIA PACIFIC COMMUNITY*, Winter 1978/79, p 26.

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THE POWERS THAT BE

MOSCOW SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 108-115

[Conclusion of abridgement of chapters from the book "The Powers That Be"  
by David Halberstam, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1979]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### Non-Proliferation Safeguards

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russ' n No 4, Apr 80  
pp 116-117

[Review by V. F. Davydov of the book "Postures for Non-Proliferation. Arms Limitation and Security Policies To Minimize Nuclear Proliferation," London, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1979, VIII + 168 pages]

[Text] In the special literature on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is published in large quantities in the West, attention is focused on ways of neutralizing the possible use of nuclear power stations and enterprises for the concentration of uranium and the reproduction of spent fuel for the development of a nuclear weapon.

It is from another vantage point that the problem of non-proliferation is investigated by the author of this book, American scientist E. Shettle, who works for the United States' influential Ford Foundation. The author believes that the elimination of all danger of proliferation in the distant future will only be made possible by international security regulations to protect the interests of non-nuclear countries. In her opinion, the interrelationship between the policies of the nuclear powers and the attitudes of other countries toward nuclear arms plays the deciding role in the strategy of non-proliferation (p 13).

American political scientists, however, take two diametrically opposed approaches to the interpretation of this interrelationship. The supporters of the first approach, including W. Hahn, researcher at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, Professor M. Hogue, former Secretary of Defense and Energy J. Schlesinger and others, feel that the greater the arsenal of nuclear weapons possessed by the chief nuclear powers, the less likelihood there is that a large number of non-nuclear countries will acquire their own nuclear weapons. Conversely, a significant reduction in the U.S. nuclear arsenal will increase, in their opinion, the desire of other countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

Repudiating all steps to limit the use of nuclear weapons, they advocate the continuation of the arms race in the quantitative and qualitative sense, the assumption of stronger military commitments by the United States to its allies and the extension of these to new countries, and the possible waging of "limited" nuclear wars.

Behind these recommendations is the expectation that widening the technological gap between the military potentials of the nuclear and non-nuclear countries will intimidate the latter and make them reluctant to enter the race for nuclear arms. Therefore, nuclear weapons can supposedly perform the functions of "intimidating" and "detering" non-nuclear as well as nuclear countries.

Analyzing the views of the representatives of this current, the author concludes that the implementation of these recommendations can only aid in the further proliferation of nuclear arms. The example set by England and France in the creation of independent nuclear potential testifies that the American "nuclear umbrella" could not satisfy the security interests of these NATO allies. Besides this, several non-nuclear countries simply do not want to lose their political independence by allowing the United States to "guarantee" their security. These countries generally see U.S. nuclear policy as a threat to their own interests, which could motivate them to neutralize it with the aid of their own nuclear weapons.

From the political standpoint, the author says, these recommendations are inappropriate for a non-proliferation strategy because they assert that only nuclear weapons can endow states with a "unique political status" and a dominant position in the system of international relations. Moreover, they propose the further enhancement of the political and military significance of nuclear weapons and, consequently, the perpetuation of the nuclear arms race.

The supporters of the second approach--Princeton University Professor R. Falk, political scientists H. Ball and M. Singer, former Director J. Smart of the London Institute of Strategic Studies and others--take the opposite view of the nature of the relationship between the nuclear arms race and proliferation. They feel that smaller stockpiles of these weapons in the nuclear states will present more obstacles to their utilization and diminish the likelihood that other countries will try to acquire them. As a result, they are in favor of considerably reducing nuclear stockpiles and substantially revising the military policy of the nuclear states. In their opinion, the construction of international security on the foundation of disarmament and detente will guarantee the success of any non-proliferation strategy.

Analyzing the view of this group of scientists, the author lists the following possible ways of neutralizing the motives for the attainment of nuclear potential: the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in regions where they are not presently deployed, and the withdrawal of tactical nuclear forces from

crisis zones; the creation of nuclear-free zones; the non-utilization of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries; no first use of these weapons by nuclear states against one another. In her opinion, the legal prohibition of the use of these weapons is acquiring particular significance in the consolidation of international security: "Even if nuclear proliferation should take place in the future, the existence of permanent restrictions on their use will minimize the negative effect of the initiation of new members into the 'nuclear club'" (p 46).

From the political standpoint, nuclear disarmament will testify to the diminished significance of nuclear arsenals and will signify that the world's leading powers do not associate their international positions with the possession of these weapons. The author believes that the process of disarmament should be headed by the United States and the USSR, but other nuclear countries should also take part in the process.

In her opinion, the encouragement of non-nuclear countries to take part in future negotiations could enhance their international prestige and strengthen their belief that they have absolutely no need to develop their own nuclear weapons for this purpose.

The author agrees, although with some reservations, with the supporters of disarmament and feels that if nuclear weapons are gradually pushed into a position of little importance in world politics, the danger of their further proliferation will be minimal (p 52).

The fact that the majority of non-nuclear countries repeatedly insisted, when the text of the corresponding treaty was being drafted, that the nuclear states undertake to reduce their arsenals to compensate the others for declining to develop their own nuclear weapons, also speaks in favor of the choice of disarmament as a basis for the long-range non-proliferation policy. This is why disarmament is an essential condition for the successful functioning of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The author is absolutely justified in saying that far-reaching steps in the area of nuclear disarmament will require a "considerable degree of cooperation between the United States and the USSR." But she does not mention in her book that the majority of these proposals, such as the ones regarding the non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons, were initiated by the USSR, but have not been implemented as yet through the fault of the United States.

On the whole, the book is directed against militaristic forces. They are still comforting themselves with the illusion that nuclear weapons could aid in strengthening the security of individual countries and the entire world, ignoring the fact that it is precisely this policy that increases the danger of nuclear war.

## Study of Soviet and U.S. Diplomacy

Moscow ISDA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 117-119

[Review by V. M. Berezikov of the book "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy" by Joseph G. Whelan, Congressional Research Service, Washington, Library of Congress, 373 pages]

[Text] The International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives requested a group of specialists (headed by Doctor Joseph Whelan) from the Congressional Research Service to conduct a study of Soviet foreign policy. The result is this recent publication, covering the period from the October Revolution to the present day. The work contains a great deal of factual material. It relates a multitude of diplomatic episodes, from the Brest Peace to SALT. On the whole, the authors of the work commend Soviet diplomacy and the diplomatic service of the Soviet State.

Nonetheless, the obvious biases of the researchers are striking. They believe that Washington has always wanted peace and has favored the just settlement of disputes, while the Soviet Union has supposedly refused to come to terms, which has allegedly led to conflicts and confrontations. It is no secret, however, that international events testify to the exact opposite.

Soviet documents on the foreign policy and diplomacy of the USSR are totally absent from the work. Only a list of U.S. Government publications is presented at the end of the book. The reader will not find a list of Soviet Government documents pertaining to foreign policy. The authors only mention the foreign policy decisions of the 23th CPSU Congress in passing, and only in the section on the developing countries. The Program of Peace adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress is not mentioned at all. These exceedingly important documents, which lie at the basis of the activity of all foreign policy organs in our nation and are mandatory for every Soviet diplomat, remain unknown to the readers of a work dealing with Soviet diplomacy. It is in these decrees, however, that the foreign policy goals and objectives of the Soviet State are defined and the principles of Soviet diplomacy are set forth in their entirety. For some reason, the authors felt justified in omitting them from the work. At the same time, they cite an American political scientists' complaint that he finds it "difficult to define" the foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union. But after all, these goals have already been defined and made public, and from the highest rostrum in our nation.

There are many such omissions, that are more than just odd, in the work. For example, the negotiations preceding the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk are described in detail, and this is followed by a lengthy discussion of the "conclusions" drawn by Soviet diplomacy from this experience. The 5 years following the October Revolution, a period of brutal civil war and



intervention by 14 powers supporting the counterrevolution, however, are completely ignored. One of these powers was the United States. The authors do not even wonder about the kind of experience Soviet diplomacy acquired in this period. They also do not say a word about Washington's reasons for waiting 16 years to recognize the Soviet Union.

The authors present a detailed discussion of several wartime conferences--Moscow, Tehran and Yalta--which demonstrated the combat unity of the powers making up the anti-Hitler coalition, but they completely ignore the Potsdam Conference, at which time President Truman committed the first act of attempted atomic blackmail against the USSR. A serious analysis of the Potsdam Conference documents, however, provides abundant material for a correct understanding of the history of Soviet diplomatic behavior and international relations. Relieving themselves of the responsibility of making this kind of analysis, the specialists from the Congressional Research Service allege, without producing any proof, that it was the Soviet Union, and not the United States, that deviated from the ideal of postwar cooperation, although many excellently documented volumes attesting to the opposite have already been written.

In general, the authors of this work tend to invariably ascribe the worst motives to the Soviet Union and the finest to the United States. In a discussion of the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission to Moscow in the difficult fall of 1941, the experts from the Congressional Research Service are touched by the magnanimous way in which Washington and London did not make any particular stipulations when they offered military equipment to the Soviet Union, and they are distressed by the "insufficient gratitude" of the Soviet side (p 125). This is an odd way of putting it. After all, the Soviet people, who bore most of the burden of the struggle against fascism, had more than paid for these shipments with their own blood. Besides this, the shipments, as is well known, constituted only 4 percent of all the military equipment used by the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. We must also remember that when the Western allies finally landed in Normandy at the end of 1944, they were opposed by only 12 German divisions, while more than 200 enemy divisions were posted on the Soviet front. It is only in light of these facts that this "magnanimity" and "insufficient gratitude" can be assessed from the correct vantage point, although it is true that the military shipments of the allies played an important role in the difficult months of 1941 and this was appreciated by the Soviet side.

The final section of the work discusses the conclusions Washington should draw from this analysis of Soviet foreign policy and from the experience of the diplomatic negotiations conducted by both powers in recent years. Here the authors also display a unique approach. They recommend that Soviet diplomacy be subjected to a certain degree of "de-ideologization" for the purpose of bringing it into "conformity" with Western standards. According to the authors, this would simplify the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations and the conclusion of agreements on important issues of the present day.

This approach bears a strong resemblance to repeated futile attempts in the past to alter others according to the American model and image.

#### Unemployment in America

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80 pp 119-121

[Review by L. A. Nemova of the book "Out of Work. Why There's So Much Unemployment and Why It's Getting Worse" by Cy Conick, Toronto, James Lorimer and Co., Publishers, 1978, 176 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

#### Social Security Plans and Problems

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80 p 122

[Review by S. I. Cherbinskiy of the book "Policymaking for Social Security" by Martha Derthick, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1979, XIV + 446 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

#### Current U.S. Foreign Policy Theories

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80 p 123

[Review by Yu. K. Krasnov of the book "Sovremennyye vneshnepoliticheskiye kontseptsii SSHA" edited by G. A. Trofimenko, Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 380 pages]

[Text] The latest American foreign policy theories, engendered at a time of international detente, are discussed in this work.

Extensive factual material is used to demonstrate how American theorists are trying to work out foreign policy principles and methods which would enhance the "competitive ability" of the American Government under these new conditions, or at least prevent the deterioration of its international positions.

The authors of the work single out four features common to the majority of American bourgeois foreign policy theories. The first is the idea of organizing some kind of "club" of the industrially developed capitalist powers. This club would be expected to solve its own problems and then work out coordinated solutions to problems in interrelations with the developing and socialist countries.

Another characteristic of many American theorists is the idea that nuclear war is undesirable under present conditions. The authors show how bourgeois theorists arrive at this belief in different ways: some through a realization of the barbarous and inhuman nature of this kind of war, and others through pragmatic calculations which demonstrate that the present strategic parity between the United States and the USSR would make nuclear war futile and suicidal for the United States.

In their description of American theories, the authors also mention another feature common to many American theorists: the belief that so-called non-military factors of strength, primarily results of the technological revolution, can serve as a panacea for preserving and strengthening U.S. foreign policy positions. These factors include the export of technology, "know-how," modern managerial practices and so forth.

Another feature of the American theories, pointed out by the Soviet researchers, is the fact that the threat of force is still, despite its definite depreciation under the conditions of the present "geopolitical situation," regarded as one of the instruments of pressure in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. The authors show that people in the United States are persisting, despite the lessons taught by history and despite detente, in planning sly intrigues, which are supposed to provide opportunities for the use of "partial advantages" as diplomatic bargaining points.

American predictions of international relations in the 1980's and 1990's, the search for new foreign policy tactics, the evolution of American military and political thought and the American concept of detente are analyzed in depth in the work. In addition, the authors examine new trends in the American policy of "critical response," the evolution of the approach of American bourgeois ideologists to the ideological struggle, current tendencies in peace research and in the use of non-military "factors of strength" and several other topics.

The general conclusion of the authors is that, despite the "novelty" and "realism" of some theories, many American foreign policy theorists are still carrying around obsolete baggage and are indulging in dreams about "imperial America," although there is also no question that definite progress has been made in American political science in comparison to the stand taken by the majority of its representatives in the 1950's and 1960's.

#### Capitalism and Environmental Protection

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 123-124

[Review by V. D. Pisarev of the book "Amerikanskiy kapitalizm i problema okhrany okruzhayushchey sredy" by V. I. Sokolov, Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 200 pages]

[Text] The subject of this review, a work based on original factual data, provides an understanding of the contradictory nature of the measures taken

by state-monopoly forces to combat the ecological crisis, which are having a serious effect on various facets of material, social and spiritual life in the United States.

The author conclusively proves the absence of scientific grounds for the arguments of bourgeois ideologists who blame the ecological crisis on technical progress, economic growth and demographic trends. By focusing attention on the natural, scientific and technical aspects of the ecological crisis, bourgeois ideologists are intentionally confusing socioeconomic problems with natural ones to conceal the increasingly pronounced contradictions of capitalism.

The author notes that technological, organizational and economic experience in the resolution of ecological problems is being accumulated in the United States (national expenditures on pollution control rose from around 10 billion dollars in 1970 to more than 40 billion in 1977). There has been more activity in the international arena to organize global environmental control, set international standards in this field and strengthen the position of U.S. monopolies in world markets for purification equipment and technology. The data cited by the author testify that all of these measures are largely aimed at the attainment of American imperialism's foreign policy and foreign economic goals.

The author pays particular attention to the salient features of socioeconomic processes connected with environmental pollution and reflecting the reaction of state-monopoly capital to the ecological crisis. He presents a detailed analysis of questions of legislation and the establishment of administrative and legal guidelines for the capitalist exploitation of nature.

The author correctly stresses that when the U.S. Congress and Administration pass laws to protect the environment and plan specific conservation measures, they leave their implementation up to the monopolies, which will ultimately determine actual policy regarding these decisions.

### Labor Unions and Foreign Policy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 124-125

[Review by Ya. N. Keremetzkiy of the book "Profsoyuzy SShA i vnesnyaya politika" by G. D. Gevorgyan, Moscow, Profizdat, 1979, 252 pages]

[Text] With the aid of abundant historical material, the author of this work analyzes some important aspects of the foreign policy activity of American labor unions. He traces the causes of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism in the foreign policy of U.S. labor organizations, examines the part played by this policy in the moral and political isolation of the workers movement within the nation and in the international labor movement



and analyzes the struggle between rightist and leftist-centrist forces in the unions over the issues of peaceful coexistence and detente at a time when the workers movement is losing strength.

The author is completely correct in calling the bourgeois ideological mentality of the American labor aristocracy and union bureaucracy the principal cause of hostility toward real socialism. These groups, the most influential in the workers movement, have always been chiefly interested in, as V. I. Lenin put it, making a comfortable and convenient spot for themselves in the capitalist society. According to these groups, as G. D. Gevorgyan conclusively proves, "commercial" trade-unionism is incompatible with socialism. The reactionary foreign policy ideas of the leaders of the AFOFL, and later of the AFL-CIO, have primarily been due to their interest in establishing a system of "privileges and bribes" for part of the working class in a capitalist system endowed with military and economic strength and capable of imposing its wishes on the world.

The author concludes that in 1966 and 1967--that is, when most of the working class entered the peace movement--an independent foreign policy line began to be established in labor unions and the reactionary AFL-CIO bosses began to lose their exclusive right to represent the workers movement in international politics. The author cites a statement by D. Fraser, the head of the Automobile Workers Union who helped to destroy the foreign policy dictatorial system of George Meany in the 1960's and 1970's, as typical of the new trend in the workers movement: "The labor movement in the United States is a conservative force when it comes to foreign policy matters, and this calls for a change." Those who favor the modification of union foreign policy are quite aware that anticommunism and anti-Sovietism will make it extremely difficult for the unions to become an independent and more influential progressive force in society.

An analysis of new developments in the labor unions gives the book special educative value. The most perceptible of these developments is the increasingly tense struggle within the labor movement between leftist and centrist forces (representing the interests of the dissatisfied majority of organized workers) and the rightist forces of the labor bureaucracy, striving to hold on to their privileged social status. As the author points out, the issues of peace and detente are influencing union policy more and more. This is one of the most important factors strengthening the position of leftist-centrist forces. The workers have become increasingly confident that the cessation of the arms race and the reduction of the Pentagon budget will be a condition for their attainment of major socioeconomic concessions from the ruling class. In a study of changes in the alignment and balance of union forces at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, the author focuses attention on the effect of the Soviet Union's active policy of peace on this process. At the same time, in a discussion of the complex and contradictory process by which cold war dogmas are being repudiated in the labor movement, G. D. Gevorgyan proves that the rightist labor bureaucracy still has a good

chance of keeping the unions in a conservative position regarding foreign policy issues.

American Blacks. 17th-20th Centuries

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80 p 125

[Review by S. A. Chervonnaya of the book "Negry SShA. XVII-nachalo XX v." by E. L. Nitoburg, Nauka, 1979, 293 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 80  
pp 126-127

[Text] December

3 -- A delegation of U.S. state governors headed by Iowa State Governor R. Ray left the USSR. The trip was part of a reciprocal exchange of visits.

5 -- In accordance with a decision of the Soviet Government, made with the advice and consent of other members of the Warsaw Pact, the first Soviet military formations, consisting of 1,500 personnel, along with weapons and combat equipment, began to be recalled from the GDR to Soviet territory.

10 -- At a press conference in Washington, Senate Majority Leader R. Byrd announced that the Senate would make a decision on the SALT II Treaty in the beginning of 1980.

12 -- The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow regarding the bomb set off in front of the building of the Soviet UN delegation in New York on 11 December.

13 -- A session of the Soviet-American permanent consultative commission to aid in implementing the goals and tenets of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement and measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war came to an end in Geneva.

21 -- Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received U.S. Ambassador T. Watson.

A group of "hawks" from the Senate Armed Services Committee, headed by H. Jackson, disregarded Senate procedure and tradition by submitting formal recommendations to the Senate that the SALT II Treaty be rejected or radically revised with a view to unilateral advantages for the United States.

24 -- Minister A. A. Gromyko and Ambassador T. Watson had a talk at the ambassador's request.

#### January

4 -- President Carter suggested that Senate Majority Leader R. Byrd postpone the discussion of the SALT II Treaty in the Senate. The pretext chosen by the President for this postponement was the assistance, including military, rendered by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan, in response to the Afghan Government's repeated requests, in line with Article 4 of the treaty on friendship, good neighbor relations and cooperation between the USSR and the DRA and in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

6 -- In a televised speech, the American President announced his intention to take several unilateral steps to curtail trade, economic, scientific and cultural relations with the Soviet Union. The American Administration used lies about "Soviet aggression" in Afghanistan to justify these actions.

7 -- A TASS statement regarding J. Carter's televised speech of 4 January was published in PRAVDA. The statement stressed, in particular, that the "specific content of this speech and the steps announced by the U.S. Administration in the area of Soviet-American relations can only be described as hostile to the interests of peace."

9-11 -- The Committee of Soviet Women organized a Soviet-American meeting to discuss "the role of the public in the struggle for a world without war." In a joint statement, the women who attended the meeting commended the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet State and all other initiatives aimed at the prevention of nuclear war.

13 -- Soviet central press organs published "L. I. Brezhnev's Responses to the Questions of a PRAVDA Correspondent" (see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 2, 1980).

A bomb was set off at the entrance of the Aeroflot agency in New York by persons unknown. The Aeroflot building suffered considerable material damage.

18 -- An act of sabotage was attempted at a New York airport against an Aeroflot plane making its regular Moscow-New York run. One of the American employees of the flight control center of this airport deliberately disrupted the operations of the computer monitoring the approach and landing of the Soviet plane, resulting in the actual possibility of an accident. Only the last-minute intervention of the airport's senior dispatcher saved the situation, and the plane made a normal landing. The Soviet Embassy in Washington asked the U.S. State Department for an explanation.

19 -- Speaking in Des Moines (Iowa), Senator E. Kennedy, prominent American politician, criticized the Washington Administration's unilateral actions against the Soviet Union.



29 -- An editorial "On the Message of the U.S. President" was printed in PRAVDA, in which the unilateral U.S. actions were described as "an attempt at the flagrant violation of universally recognized standards of inter-governmental relations and a challenge to the very essence of international law." The article stated that "the document clearly shows that Washington wants to disrupt the existing approximate balance of power between the USSR and the United States and achieve American military superiority."

30 -- Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received U.S. Ambassador T. Watson at his request. They discussed aspects of Soviet-American relations and some international issues.

February

3 -- A provocative action involving an Aeroflot plane making its Moscow-New York-Moscow run took place at Kennedy Airport.

11 -- Bilateral talks between Soviet and U.S. delegations on the banning of chemical weapons resumed in Geneva.

Another illegal act was committed by the American authorities in connection with a Soviet passenger plane carrying 122 members of the Soviet sports delegation bound for the Winter Olympics in Lake Placid. The plane, after futilely waiting around 2 hours for permission to unload the passengers, had to fly to Washington.

21 -- A regular meeting of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the Soviet-American talks on the banning of chemical weapons was held in Geneva.

The permanent Soviet mission to the United Nations sent the UN secretary-general a statement regarding the United States' annexationist actions involving the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), with the request that this statement be distributed as an official document of the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

22 -- Speaking before the voters of the Baumanskiy Electoral District in Moscow, L. I. Brezhnev reasserted the intention of the USSR to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan 'as soon as all forms of outside intervention, directed against the government and people of Afghanistan, cease completely."

The Soviet UN delegation sent the American side a note to protest the terrorist act committed against it.

25 -- The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the American Embassy in Moscow, stressing that, in spite of the universally accepted norms of international law and all previous assurances, the American authorities are still guilty of negligence and are not taking effective

measures to guarantee the safety of Soviet establishments and citizens in the United States.

The U.S. Department of State refused to issue visas to Soviet specialists who were supposed to attend an international conference on computer equipment and laser optical devices.

27 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev received A. Hammer, president of Occidental Petroleum and prominent representative of the U.S. business community, in the Kremlin.

In an interview with the editors of several small-town papers, J. Carter reasserted his administration's intention to promote the escalation of international tension. He also attacked the Soviet Union and tried to misrepresent events in Afghanistan.

28 -- According to a PRAVDA report, the Anglo-American Pergamon Press issued a massive edition of L. I. Brezhnev's book "Tselina" [Virgin Land].

A Soviet-American symposium on "Ultrasonic Diagnosis and Surgery in Ophthalmology" was held in Moscow.

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